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Abstract 
This thesis conducts a controversy study focusing on the intermingling of political 
considerations and emerging science in a controversy over whether or not the 
Zipingpu dam in China’s Sichuan Province caused the magnitude 7.9 Wenchuan 
earthquake on May 12th 2008. The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake was one of the 
deadliest, costliest and biggest earthquakes in China in three decades. Over 90,000 
people died, went missing or were presumed dead, and economic damage was 
estimated at over 100 billion US dollars in 2013. For scientists to suggest that such 
an unfathomable disaster could have been man-made was controversial to say the 
least. Not only because the root cause of the earthquake pointed to was a dam, and 
dam projects are inherently rife with conflict, but also because the Zipingpu dam 
was itself a high priority project for the Chinese central government and the 
Sichuan Province.  
Taking the controversy over the Zipingpu dam as the empirical point of departure 
for the thesis means that the thesis spans two disciplines: That of contemporary 
China area studies and that of the constructivist tradition of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), more specifically controversy studies as developed 
within STS (Jasanoff 1986 and 2004; Nelkin 1979/1992, Venturini 2010 and 2012) 
and the notion of Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) as developed in 
contemporary China studies (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal and 
Lampton 1992; Mertha 2008 and 2009). Theoretically, the thesis seeks to 
contribute to a budding conversation between contemporary China studies and 
STS by bringing the reflexive analytical vocabulary from controversy studies in 
STS into contemporary China studies in the analysis of a controversy originating 
in China. The aim of such attempted bridge-building between different 
disciplinary traditions is to seek out the interesting questions such a meeting may 
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pose to both. Only a limited number of controversy studies have been conducted 
in China, the reason for which can be related to Chinese language capability being 
a significant barrier to following discussions, reading papers, doing participant 
observation or interviewing Chinese speaking actors taking part in controversies. 
Controversy studies have been a stable element within the broader field of STS 
since the field’s inception in the late 1970s and the concept of expertise is at the 
heart of controversy studies. Thus, questions such as the following are explored: 
How is expertise constituted in China? Which types of expertise can legitimately 
be drawn on in the Chinese political system? Which ones not? How are such 
matters determined? And how is expertise connected to notions of legitimacy in 
China? 
The research agenda for the thesis is thus structured around the central problem 
statement: What historical conditions led up to the controversy over the Zipingpu 
dam and the Wenchuan earthquake and what role did expert knowledge play in 
assessing the risk of Chinese major dam projects? 
The thesis is structured in three basic parts. Part I, comprising Chapters 1 and 2, 
discusses how the two disciplinary traditions may come together in the thesis and 
outlines the methods employed, the conditions of conducting a controversy study 
in a Chinese context and how these have shaped the study. Methodologically, the 
thesis builds on qualitative methods drawing upon methods from anthropology, 
contemporary China studies and STS such as multi-sited ethnography (Falzon 
2016; Marcus 1995), following the actors (Latour and Woolgar 1979), controversy 
studies (Nelkin 1979/1992; Jasanoff 2004, Yaneva 2005, Venturini 2010 and 2012) 
and doing ethnographic fieldwork in China (Heimer and Thøgersen 2006). 
Part II, comprising Chapters 3 and 4 focuses on the historical conditions of the 
political use of expert knowledge in political decision making in China and how 
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these conditions have influenced the hydropower industry and hydropower policy 
making in China. This part particularly draws on contemporary China studies.  
Part III, comprising Chapters 5 through 8, analyses the controversy. Over four 
chapters a detailed analysis of the controversy over whether the Zipingpu dam did 
or did not cause the Wenchuan earthquake is analyzed. The study of the 
controversy first analyses the historical antecedents of the political decision to 
build Zipingpu in Chapter 5. Second, the scientific controversy as it unfolded in 
academic journals after the Wenchuan earthquake occurred is analyzed in Chapter 
6. Third, Chapter 7 analyzes the negotiations around the potential risk of a large 
earthquake happening at, or near to, the Zipingpu dam prior to its construction. 
Lastly, the public controversy over Zipingpu is analyzed in Chapter 8 detailing the 
strategies experts employed to gain credibility and legitimacy, and ultimately how 
this may have impacted on hydropower policy making in China. 
The thesis concludes that contemporary China studies, in the form of FA, and 
controversy studies in STS supplement each other well. Firstly, in that the 
combination effectively breaks up the traditional categorizations in FA based on 
the bureaucratic logic of “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison 
1971 as quoted in Brødsgaard 2013). The analysis of the scientific arguments 
employed in the controversy over Zipingpu for instance shows that scientists at the 
China Earthquake Administration (CEA) argued both for and against the Zipingpu 
dam causing the Wenchuan earthquake. FA tells us that the CEA, as a government 
agency belonging to the ‘establishment’, should not logically have argued both 
sides of the debate. Thus, the thesis shows, that FA alone cannot account for the 
way CEA scientists argued in the scientific debate. Drawing on the reflexive 
vocabulary from STS effectively broke up such categorizations and in turn the 
analysis of the controversy could conclude that the way scientific actors argued 
was more related to the scientific field they belonged to (e.g. engineering or 
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seismology) than which agency they worked for or which country they belonged 
to.  
Bureaucratic ranking as understood in FA is also highlighted in the thesis as a 
factor shown to be of importance in the analysis of a controversy taking place in a 
Chinese context. The analysis of pre-construction negotiations about earthquake 
risk at Zipingpu shows that in the negotiations bureaucratic ranking could have 
tipped a ‘scientific debate’ to fall out in favor of the Zipingpu Company against 
the provincial branch of the CEA, so that a high priority project could be built 
within budget - regardless of the scientific evidence presented by seismologists on 
each side. 
Lastly, the thesis concludes that the risk of large dams causing earthquakes once 
built is, on the part of engineers, considered a risk that can be contained within 
engineering science. The thesis shows that engineers play a key role as experts in 
assessing the risk of Chinese major dam projects. Furthermore, engineers make 
what is tentatively called a ‘compartmentalization move’ where the risk of 
earthquakes is divided into what is the task of engineers and – perhaps more 
importantly – what is not the task of engineers. Thus, the science of building 
earthquake proof dams can be taken care of within engineering science. This 
‘compartmentalization move’ means that it does not matter if an earthquake is 
man-made or not, as long as the dams built are able to withstand them. In this way, 
the risk of man-made earthquakes is ‘compartmentalized’ outside of a debate 
coming out of the controversy over Zipingpu – namely the debate whether large 
dams should be built at all if they can cause earthquakes. For hydropower policy 
making in China, the ‘compartmentalization move’, on the part of engineers, 
means that as an anti-dam argument, the fact that dams can cause earthquakes 
does not work very well in China. The thesis thus concludes that this is perhaps 
not because the government is unwilling to listen to different scientific actors, but 
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because the government, in listening to engineers, foregoes the policy option of 
not building dams in earthquake prone zones in China.   
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Dansk referat 
Afhandlingen er et kontroversstudie med fokus på interaktionen mellem politiske 
overvejelser og ny viden i kontroversen om hvorvidt Zipingpu dæmningen i Kinas 
Sichuan provins forårsagede Wenchuan jordskælvet d. 12. maj 2008. Wenchuan 
jordskælvet målte 7.9 på Richter skalaen og var et af de største, mest 
dødbringende og omkostningstunge jordskælv i Kina i tre årtier. Over 90.000 
mennesker blev dræbt, forsvandt eller blev formodet døde. De økonomiske 
konsekvenser af ødelæggelserne blev anslået til over 100 milliarder US dollars i 
2013. Det faktum at forskere kunne fremsætte formodninger om, at en så 
ubegribelig stor katastrofe kunne være menneskeskabt var yderst kontroversielt. 
Ikke kun fordi man pegede på Zipingpu dæmningen som årsagen til jordskælvet, 
og dæmningsprojekter traditionelt er yderst konfliktfyldte, men også fordi 
Zipingpu-dæmningen i sig selv var et højt prioriteret projekt for den Kinesiske 
centralregering og den Kinesiske Sichuan provins. 
At tage kontroversen omkring Zipingpu-dæmningen som det empiriske afsæt for 
afhandlingen betyder, at afhandlingen spænder over to discipliner: moderne Kina 
studier og den konstruktivistiske tradition STS - Science and Technology Studies 
(videnskabs- og teknologistudier). Mere specifikt, kontroversstudier udviklet i 
STS-traditionen (Jasanoff 1986 og 2004; Nelkin 1979/1992; Venturini 2010 og 
2012) og begrebet Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) som udviklet indenfor 
moderne Kina-studier (Lieberthal og Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal og Lampton 
1992; Mertha 2008 og 2009).  
Teoretisk søger afhandlingen at bidrage til en spirende dialog mellem moderne 
Kina-studier og STS ved at bringe tankegangen bag kontroversstudier i STS ind i 
moderne Kina studier. Formålet med et sådant forsøg på at bygge bro mellem 
forskellige traditioner er at finde frem til de interessante spørgsmål, som en sådan 
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brobygning kan give anledning til for begge discipliner. Der er kun gennemført et 
meget begrænset antal kontroversstudier i Kina. Årsagen til dette kan være, at det 
kinesiske sprog kan være en betydelig barriere i forhold til at følge diskussioner, 
læse artikler, lave deltagerobservation eller interviewe kinesisk talende aktører i 
kontroverser.  
Kontroversstudier har været et stabilt element inden for det bredere STS felt siden 
feltet blev introduceret i slutningen af 1970erne. Kontroversstudier kredser 
omkring ekspertisebegrebet og undersøger bl.a. hvordan ekspertviden interagerer 
med samfundet gennem teknovidenskabelige kontroverser. Således søger 
afhandlingen at undersøge spørgsmål som: Hvordan konstitueres ekspertise i Kina? 
Hvilke typer ekspertise er det legitimt at trække på i det kinesiske politiske system? 
Hvilke er ikke? Hvordan bliver sådanne spørgsmål afgjort? Og hvordan 
legitimeres ekspertise i Kina? 
Forskningsdagsordenen for afhandlingen er således struktureret omkring en 
central problemstilling som går på hvilke historiske forhold der har ført til 
kontroversen omkring sammenhængen mellem Zipingpu-dæmningen og 
Wenchuan jordskælvet, samt hvilken rolle ekspertviden har spillet i vurderingen af 
risici forbundet med større kinesiske dæmningsprojekter. 
Afhandlingen er organiseret i tre dele. Del I, der omfatter Kapitel 1 og 2, 
diskuterer hvordan de to forskningsdiscipliner afhandlingen bygger på kan 
kombineres, skitserer de anvendte metoder og betingelserne for at gennemføre et 
kontroversstudium i Kina, samt hvordan disse betingelser har formet studiet. De 
metoder, der er anvendt i studiet, bygger på kvalitativ metode med inspiration fra 
antropologien, moderne Kina-studier og STS så som ’multi-sited ethnography’ 
(Falzon 2016; Marcus 1995), ’følg aktørerne’ (Latour og Woolgar 
1979), ’kontroversstudier’ (Nelkin 1979/1992; Jasanoff 2004; Yaneva 2005; 
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Venturini 2010 og 2012), samt metoder til at gennemføre etnografisk feltarbejde i 
Kina (Heimer og Thøgersen 2006). 
Del II, der omfatter kapitel 3 og 4, fokuserer på de historiske forhold, der ligger til 
grund for politisk brug af ekspertviden i Kina, samt hvordan disse forhold påvirker 
dæmningsindustrien og politiske beslutninger omkring dæmninger i Kina. Del II 
af studiet trækker især på moderne Kina-studier. 
Del III, der omfatter kapitel 5 til og med 8, udgør selve kontroversstudiet. Over 
fire kapitler udføres en detaljeret analyse af kontroversen om, hvorvidt Zipingpu-
dæmningen forårsagede Wenchuan jordskælvet eller ej. I undersøgelsen af 
kontroversen analyseres først de historiske faktorer der ligger til grund for den 
politiske beslutning om at bygge Zipingpu dæmningen. Dette undersøges i Kapitel 
5 hvor også aktørerne i kontroversen kort introduceres. Dernæst analyseres den 
videnskabelige kontrovers, som den udfoldede sig i akademiske tidsskrifter og 
forskningspublikationer efter Wenchuan jordskælvet. Analysen af den 
videnskabelige kontrovers fremlægges i Kapitel 6. I Kapitel 7 analyseres 
forhandlingerne omkring den potentielle risiko for at et stort jordskælv ville opstå 
ved, eller i nærheden af, Zipingpu-dæmningen før den blev bygget. Endelig 
analyseres den offentlige kontrovers over Zipingpu dæmningen i Kapitel 8. I dette 
kapitel analyseres ligeledes hvordan eksperter positionerer sig for at opnå 
troværdighed og legitimitet, og i sidste ende hvordan dette kan have påvirket 
politiske beslutninger omkring dæmningsbyggeri i Kina. 
Afhandlingen konkluderer, at moderne Kina-studier i form af FA og 
kontroversstudier i STS supplerer hinanden godt. For det første, fordi 
kombinationen bryder de traditionelle kategoriseringer som FA opstiller op. 
Kategoriseringer baseret på den bureaukratiske logik af "hvor du står, afhænger af 
hvor du sidder" (Allison 1971 som citeret i Brødsgaard 2013). Analysen af de 
videnskabelige argumenter, der blev anvendt i kontroversen om Zipingpu 
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dæmningen, viser for eksempel, at forskere ved den kinesiske 
jordskælvsadministration (China Earthquake Administration - CEA) 
argumenterede både for og imod at Zipingpu-dæmningen skulle have forårsaget 
Wenchuan jordskælvet. FA fortæller os, at jordskælvsadministrationen, som en del 
af det Kinesiske administrative apparat, tilhører ’etablissementet’ og derfor kun 
burde have argumenteret imod. Således viser afhandlingen, at FA ikke alene kan 
redegøre for, hvordan forskere i jordskælvsadministrationen agerede i den 
videnskabelige debat. Ved at trække på det analytiske vokabularium fra STS 
brydes FA kategoriseringen således op. Derved kan det på baggrund af analysen af 
kontroversen konkluderes, at den måde hvorpå de videnskabelige aktører 
argumenterede, var mere relateret til deres videnskabelige disciplin (f.eks. 
ingeniør eller seismolog) end til hvilken institution de arbejdede for eller hvilket 
land de kom fra. 
Bureaukratisk rang som forstået inden for rammerne af FA fremhæves i 
afhandlingen som en faktor der viser sig at være af betydning i analysen af en 
kontrovers der udspiller sig i Kina. Analysen af forhandlinger omkring risiko for 
store jordskælv ved Zipingpu dæmningen før den blev bygget, viser at 
bureaukratisk rang kunne have givet det selskab som var ansvarlig for bygningen 
af Zipingpu dæmningen en fordel i en ellers "videnskabelig debat" med jordskælvs 
administrationen. Bureaukratisk rang viser sig således at kunne benyttes til at få et 
højt prioriteret projekt bygget inden for budgetmæssige rammer, næsten uanset de 
videnskabelige argumenter fremført af seismologer på hver side af forhandlingen. 
Endelig konkluderer afhandlingen, at risikoen for at store dæmninger forårsager 
jordskælv når de er blevet bygget, af ingeniører anses for at være en risiko, der kan 
inddæmmes af ingeniørvidenskaben. Kontroversstudiet viser, at ingeniører spiller 
en nøglerolle som eksperter i vurderingen af risici forbundet med store Kinesiske 
dæmningsprojekter. Desuden benytter ingeniører det, der i afhandlingen 
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kaldes ”kompartmentalisering” i deres argumentation, hvor risikoen for jordskælv 
bliver opdelt i separate domæner. Dette betyder at risikoen for jordskælv opdeles i 
hvad der er en ingeniøropgave og - måske vigtigere - hvad der ikke er. 
Denne ’kompartmentalisering’ betyder, at det ikke er vigtigt, om et jordskælv er 
menneskeskabt eller ej, så længe de dæmninger der bygges er i stand til at modstå 
dem. På denne måde bliver risikoen for menneskeskabte 
jordskælv ’kompartmentaliseret’ som værende uden for den debat, der fulgte lige i 
hælene på kontroversen over Zipingpu - nemlig debatten om hvorvidt man 
overhovedet skal bygge dæmninger i potentielle jordskælvszoner hvis de kan 
forårsage jordskælv. For så vidt angår politiske beslutninger omkring 
dæmningsbyggeri i Kina betyder ’kompartmentaliseringen’ fra ingeniørernes side, 
at argument at dæmninger forårsager jordskælv ikke kommer til at fungere særlig 
godt som et argument mod at bygge flere store dæmninger i Kina. Afhandlingen 
konkluderer at det ikke er fordi den Kinesiske regering ikke er villig til at lytte til 
forskellige videnskabelige aktørers argumenter, men fordi regeringen ved primært 
at lytte til ingeniører simpelthen ikke giver sig selv den politiske valgmulighed at 
undlade at bygge dæmninger i potentielle jordskælvszoner i Kina. 
 20 
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Introduction 
At 2:30 local time on May 12th 2008, a magnitude 7.9 earthquake struck 
Wenchuan County in China’s Sichuan Province. The epicenter was close to the 
city of Dujiangyan some 50 kilometers north west of Chengdu, the capital of 
Sichuan Province (See map Figure 1). The earthquake has been called the Great 
Sichuan Earthquake or the Wenhuan Earthquake1 and was one of the deadliest, 
costliest and most destructive earthquakes in China in three decades (Daniell 
2013). Approximately 69,185 people were killed, 18,467 went missing and were 
presumed dead. 374,171 people were injured and more than 5 million left 
homeless. Total economic loss was estimated at 86 billion US dollars in 2008 and 
that number rose steadily to over 100 billion US dollars in the ensuing years. 
Entire villages were completely destroyed (USGS 2008; Encyclopedia Britannica 
2013; Daniell 2013; Sorace 2017). The gravity of the event and extent of the 
disaster is hard to comprehend. 
 
Figure 1: Map of the location of the Sichuan or Wenchuan Earthquake in China, May 12th 
2008. Source: Encyclopedia Britannica (2013). 
                                           
1 In China the earthquake is referred to as the Wenchuan earthquake. Therefore this term will be used throughout 
the thesis. 
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In January 2009 the respected journal Science published a small article, 
provocatively entitled: “A Human Trigger for the Great Quake of Sichuan?” The 
article opened with a controversial idea. The idea that the Wenchuan earthquake 
might have been man-made: 
“Natural disasters are often described as “acts of God”, but within days 
of last May’s devastating earthquake in China’s Sichuan Province, 
seismologists in and out of China were quietly wondering whether 
humans might have had a hand in it. Now, the first researchers have 
gone public with evidence that stresses from the water piled behind the 
Zipingpu Dam may have triggered the failure of the nearby fault, a 
failure that went on to rupture almost 300 kilometers of fault and kill 
some 80,000 people” (Kerr and Stone 2009). 
In the article, evidence from scientists was reported which suggested that the 
weight of the water behind the 156m high Zipingpu dam, located close to the 
epicenter, might have triggered the Wenchuan earthquake. For scientists to 
suggest that humans are able to make or trigger an earthquake of such destructive 
magnitude as Wenchuan, an earthquake with so grave consequences, was a serious 
issue. Not only to other scientists, who did not think there was enough evidence to 
suggest that Wenchuan was man-made, but also to the public.  
When I first encountered the concept of a man-made earthquake, I was baffled. I 
had no idea that today an earthquake is not just an earthquake. I had no idea that 
an earthquake is no longer ‘just’ a natural disaster that we can claim came out of 
nowhere. But how are we to know – let alone be certain – whether an earthquake 
is man-made? To that end, we need experts. In other words, we need an 
intermediary to interpret the events in the ‘natural world’ in order to help us 
understand the phenomenon at play before our very eyes. That intermediary is 
usually called science and is performed by scientists, or experts, if you will.  
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American STS scholar, Sheila Jasanoff, has pointed to an interesting paradox in 
today’s complex societies. On the one hand “… there is hardly a move we can 
make without relying on experts” (Jasanoff 2003: 161). On the other,  
“…the view of the disinterested expert, standing apart from values and 
preferences, has all but eroded over the past few decades. Experts, we 
have begun to realize, do not know ‘best’ according to some principled, 
linear scale of assessment” (Jasanoff 2003:160).  
In many ways, this thesis revolves around this paradox and how it unfolds in the 
context of discussing man-made earthquakes. But man-made earthquakes are not 
only the concern of science and experts. As soon as the Zipingpu dam was drawn 
into the analysis of the causes of the Wenchuan earthquake the issue of man-made 
earthquakes became political. Not only is hydropower part of the energy sector - a 
strategic state sector in China - the Zipingpu dam itself is the property of the 
Sichuan Province and was a high-level national prestige project.  
The suggested link between the Zipingpu dam and the Wenchuan earthquake 
surfacing after the Wenchuan earthquake prompted a number of actors to take 
action. Scientists, journalists, NGO organizations, government agencies and many 
others researched and reflected upon the issue of whether the Zipingpu dam had 
caused the Wenchuan earthquake or not. Their writings were published in 
academic articles, in the news, in opinion pieces, books and specialized magazine 
articles, in reports, on blogs and the issue was discussed at conferences. Actors 
from China, the US, Japan, New Zealand and other countries participated. As all 
these different actors expressed opinions on the issue of Zipingpu’s possible role 
in causing Wenchuan, the issue of Wenchuan perhaps being man-made grew. New 
questions were posed. Questions such as: Are dams safe? Should dams be built in 
earthquake prone zones? If dams can trigger earthquakes should they be built at all?  
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As the issues and the questions multiplied, the debate about Zipingpu was linked 
to an almost archetypical development issue: the issue of dam building. Disputes 
over dam building have that David and Goliath type quality to them where 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank are backing dam 
projects and environmental movements intent on e.g. protecting indigenous 
people’s rights fight the same projects. Dam building is more than rife with 
conflict meaning that, more often than not, dams are at the center of controversies 
(World Commission on Dams 2000).2 A dam at the center of speculation about 
being the cause of a major earthquake thus provided fuel to an already smoldering 
fire. 
The heightened attention around the possible role the Zipingpu dam might, or 
might not, have played in causing the Wenchuan earthquake and the linking of the 
Zipingpu dam to other, bigger societal issues such as dam development carry all 
the markers of a classic controversy. A phenomenon which, very openly defined 
simply refers to: “…situations where actors disagree (or better, agree on their 
disagreement)” (Venturini 2010:261) particularly where a technical or scientific 
component is central to the controversy (Venturini 2010). In Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) such situations have since the late 1970s been a central 
point of entry to study and understand the close connection between scientific 
knowledge production, technological change and socio-political order (Bruun 
Jensen et al. 2007). The study of controversies has thus been a stable element 
within the STS field since its inception in the late 1970s. Controversies were seen 
as a way to explore science-society relations, opening up what might otherwise be 
taken for granted assumptions among different professional and expert groups 
contributing to the discussion of science and democracy (Jasanoff 1986; Nelkin 
                                           
2 Dams are defined as: “…built structures that impede the flow of a river in order to derive social benefits such as 
irrigation or power generation” (Magee 2015:216) 
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1979/1992). For example, cases on controversies over animal rights, fetal research, 
nuclear energy, and DNA research highlighted the blending of facts and values in 
technical disputes over politically sensitive science (Nelkin 1979/1992). Politics 
were thus central to studies of techno-scientific controversies playing out in the 
public and policy making domains (Nelkin 1971 and 1979/1992). 
In many ways the controversy over the Zipingpu dam fits this classic idea of a 
controversy. However, what is not classic about this controversy is the simple fact 
that it takes place in China. Controversy studies in STS have traditionally grown 
out of studying cases in (‘Western’) democratic countries. What happens then, if 
we take the controversy study to China? Will it be business as usual? Do we meet 
the same kind of issues in China as when studying a controversy in the US or the 
EU? Is conducting a controversy study different in China? And if so how? This 
thesis traces the process of doing a controversy study focused on the Zipingpu 
dam in China and discusses the implications. 
Only a limited number of controversy studies have been conducted in China, the 
reason of which can be related to Chinese language capability being a significant 
barrier to follow discussions, read papers or interview Chinese speaking actors 
taking part in controversies.3 Furthermore, it can also relate to the fact that doing 
fieldwork in China into highly politically sensitive issues, persons or industries - 
such as large-scale hydropower development - can literally get you arrested. For 
example one of my informants spent six months in house arrest for publishing 
about the possible link between earthquakes and dams in China. The stakes are 
high in politically charged circumstances. 
Choosing the controversy over Zipingpu as the empirical point of entry for this 
study has meant that the thesis spans two disciplines: That of contemporary China 
                                           
3 A notable exception is Kirkegaard (2015) although it should be mentioned that she draws on a different branch of 
STS than is drawn on in this thesis in her comprehensive study of the Chinese wind power sector. 
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area studies (hereafter contemporary China studies) and that of STS. As most 
controversies, Zipingpu calls for an interdisciplinary approach. The thesis is 
therefore guided by controversy studies in the constructivist tradition of STS4 but 
the choice to focus on a controversy originating in China opens up for 
interpretation of the controversy’s Chinese context by drawing on contemporary 
China studies literature - thus grounding the controversy study in a particular 
cultural and political context. In sum, this thesis draws together a range of diverse 
subjects such as the role of expertise in controversies, the science of earthquakes, 
hydropower development and Chinese politics and policy making.     
In this thesis, I aim to make clear how the combination of contemporary China 
Studies and STS can open up a discussion about how to study controversies in a 
non-democratic context such as the Chinese. Furthermore, I also aim to discuss 
how expertise mobilized in a controversy, and in turn used in policy making, 
might – or might not – have particular characteristics in a Chinese context. Thus, 
through the facilitation of controversy studies in STS, the thesis seeks to open up a 
conversation between ‘contemporary China studies’ and ‘STS’ and ask questions 
such as: How is expertise constituted in China? Which types of expertise are 
legitimate to draw on in the Chinese political system? Which ones are not? How 
are such matters determined? How is expertise connected to notions of legitimacy 
in China?  
In sum, the research agenda for the thesis is encompassed in the problem 
statement centering on the questions: 
                                           
4 The constructivist foundations broadly refer to the notion that STS “…starts from the assumption that science and 
technology are thoroughly social activities” and that “there is no abstract and logical scientific method apart from 
the actions of scientists and engineers” (Sismondo 2004:10). There is of course significant variation within STS 
which discusses these matters in much more detail, but here it should suffice to explain one basic assumption that 
the field draws on. 
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What historical conditions led up to the controversy over the Zipingpu dam and 
the Wenchuan earthquake and what role did expert knowledge play in assessing 
the risk of Chinese major dam projects? 
The problem statement is addressed through the following research questions: 
• What are the historical conditions for the use of scientific and expert 
knowledge in political decision making in China? 
• How have these historical conditions influenced hydropower policy making 
in China? 
• How did the scientific and public debate around Zipingpu and man-made 
earthquakes affect hydropower policy making in China? 
• What strategies did experts use to gain credibility and legitimacy in the 
debate around man-made earthquakes in China? 
I will explore these questions through conducting a controversy study focused on 
how science and politics are co-produced in matters of expertise in the events 
surrounding the Zipingpu dam and its possible relation to the Wenchuan 
earthquake. 
Reading guide 
Apart from the present Introduction and the Conclusion, the thesis is structured in 
three basic parts. 
Part I, comprises Chapter 1 and 2. The purpose of Part I is to make clear how the 
study has come about, in terms of methods employed, and to discuss the 
interdisciplinary approach the thesis is grounded in. The aim of Chapter 1 is to 
discuss the limitations and challenges of conducting a controversy study involving 
hydropower and earthquakes in China. The choice to start the thesis with a 
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meditation on methods enables an understanding of how the research has come 
about and what the choice to conduct a controversy study in China has entailed. 
Chapter 2 positions the study in the literature and outlines the foundational 
discussion of the thesis. It comprises of a literature review focused on highlighting 
relevant studies in STS which have focused on the intermingling of science, 
politics and expertise and discusses how STS and contemporary China studies 
meet in a controversy study setting. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to open the 
discussion of how the two different research traditions may meet in a controversy 
study so as to lay the conceptual foundation for conducting the controversy study 
in Part III.  
The purpose of Part II is to take us into the Chinese context. Part II marks a step 
towards the empirical level of the controversy study (as presented in Part III) as 
chapters 3 and 4 are zooming more closely in on specific policy dilemmas and the 
history of hydropower development in China. First, Chapter 3 presents the 
historical conditions of the interrelationship between science and politics in China 
since 1949. The chapter draws on the parts of contemporary China studies focused 
on Chinese politics and the relation between the political sphere, intellectuals, 
knowledge and science, thus grounding the controversy study in the Chinese 
context. Second, Chapter 4 focuses on how the historical conditions outlined in 
Chapter 3 have influenced the Chinese hydropower sector. The chapter outlines 
the basics of hydropower development and the history of hydropower in China, 
including an overview of the complicated character of the hydropower industry 
and the bureaucratic set-up around hydropower policy and decision making in 
China and beyond. 
Part III presents the controversy study and consists of Chapter 5 through 8 in 
which the controversy is laid out in detail. The chapters cover the history of 
Zipingpu, the scientific controversy over Zipingpu, risk negotiations, and the use 
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of expertise in hydropower policy making. Chapter 5 presents the history of the 
Zipingpu dam and the actors in the controversy over Zipingpu. Chapter 6 presents 
the scientific controversy over whether Zipingpu caused Wenchuan or not. 
Chapter 7 focuses on evaluating the risk of earthquakes at Zipingpu prior to the 
Wenchuan earthquake. Lastly, Chapter 8 analyzes the strategies used by experts to 
gain credibility and legitimacy and in turn how this may affect the use of expert 
knowledge in Chinese hydropower policy making. In sum, the four chapters 
analyze and discuss different aspects of the controversy in an effort to show how 
conducting a controversy study in a Chinese context plays out and what the 
implications for the political use of expertise may be.  
Following Part III is the conclusion. The conclusion completes the study by 
summing up the main findings of the thesis in order to conclude on how bringing 
together STS and contemporary China studies in a controversy study has panned 
out. Lastly, further implications of the study are discussed.  
Now, let us turn to how the thesis came about, the methods employed and the data 
collected. 
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Chapter 1: Method meditations - putting 
together a controversy study 
The present chapter shows how and why such different elements as earthquakes, 
Chinese politics, controversies, expertise and hydropower are coming together in 
this thesis. The chapter presents the theoretical and empirical motivations behind 
the thesis, shows which methods were employed to conduct the study and the 
details of how it has come about. Lastly, the chapter presents why all of these 
different elements are necessary for the analysis of the Zipingpu-Wenchuan 
controversy. 
An open-ended approach 
My thesis draws on methods used in contemporary China studies and in STS, both 
of which draw on e.g. history, anthropology and sociological methods. I am 
inspired by a long standing tradition in STS where following the development of 
new technology, an unfolding scientific discovery, a controversy or a dispute over 
science and technology is often a starting point. Consequently, my point of 
departure was the very simple idea of taking STS to China. Why? First, because 
only a limited number of controversy studies have been conducted in China 
(Kirkegaard 2015). New ground could perhaps be covered here by thinking 
through questions of controversies in a Chinese context. Second, China is 
becoming a significant player when it comes to scientific knowledge and 
technological development (Benner et al. 2012; Cyranoski 2016; Seger and 
Breidne 2007). Taking STS to China seems relevant not just in the context of 
China’s huge investment in this area, but also because China offers a completely 
different setting for studying the intersections between scientific controversies, 
politics and the role of experts in this. Most studies in STS have taken the 
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(‘Western’) democratic state as a given in their investigations of how scientific 
knowledge and political systems interact (Cao 2014; Fu 2007; Jasanoff 2004; Lin 
and Law 2014; MacPhail 2009). China is not a democratic state and the STS of 
tomorrow must be able to investigate the complex interweaving of science, 
technology and society into a non-democratic setting such as the Chinese as this is 
becoming prominent in modern scientific and technological development.  
Drawing on what can broadly be described as the constructivist foundations of 
STS5, I have taken an open-ended approach to study controversies unfolding over 
science and technology and then study such controversies in a Chinese context. 
This means that at the outset of my studies I did not know that I would end up 
focusing on the controversy over the Zipingpu dam and its possible relation to the 
2008 Wenchuan earthquake. Such open-endedness, then, was fully intended. 
Studying global phenomena such as controversies over hydropower development 
or the seismological science related to earthquakes thus warrants a multi-sited 
approach to data collection. Seismic events do not take place in one location and 
the knowledge and debates they generate tend to spread like wildfire. Here I have 
found inspiration in the method of ‘following the actors’ developed by - now 
renowned - STS scholars, Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law as a 
consequence of their work in the 1970s (Bruun Jensen et al. 2007). This approach 
coupled with historical and ethnographic accounts has also been employed to form 
the backbone of many STS case studies into techno-scientific issues (Bruun Jensen 
et al. 2007; Sismondo 2004). The approach of following the actors draws heavily 
on the multi-sited ethnography approach (Falzon 2016; Marcus 1995). An 
approach which has been employed in STS and social anthropology in order to 
study for example globalized corporations (e.g. Garsten 1994). Gathering data at 
multiple locations or sites and following actors – as far as possible - across 
                                           
5 See note 4. 
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national boundaries has become increasingly practiced in anthropology since the 
1980s (Hannerz 2003) and is today almost an obligatory move in STS due to the 
nature of the empirical phenomena studied in this field.  
An enduring feature of a number of STS studies is the focus on controversies in 
different types of controversy studies. Controversies over technical, scientific and 
risk issues have been points of entry into analyzing the constitution and 
deployment of expertise in contested processes of political decision making, 
negotiation and struggle. Thus, controversies over new science and technology 
and how it should be regulated are often areas ripe for studying the co-production 
of science and politics in matters of expert decision making. Controversy studies 
will be described in more detail in Chapter 2.  
According to Sismondo, “Case studies are the bread and butter of ST&S” 
(Sismondo 2004: vii). 6  In other words, STS scholars often prefer to address 
seemingly ‘larger’ and theoretical discussions - such as e.g. links between science 
and democracy or the socio-political consequences of classifications – by way of 
detailed empirical explorations of particular cases. By and large, STS has tended 
to favor ‘thick description’ of particular cases. Paraphrasing Geertz (1973), 
ethnography is ‘thick description’ in the sense that the ethnographer needs to show 
the meaning behind words and deeds and not just present events from the view of 
a disinterested spectator. Producing thick description requires simultaneously a 
practice of ethnographic field work and the practice of thinking and reflecting 
about the meaning of events in different contexts.  
Taking departure in the focus on specific cases in branches of the STS tradition, it 
did not take a leap of faith to combine the open-ended approach with approaches 
in contemporary China studies as rich empirical case studies are also the norm 
here. In the study of the Chinese political system and policy making in China for 
                                           
6 ST&S refers to Science, Technology & Society – a precursor of what is today called STS (Sismondo 2004). 
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example, detailed descriptions of bureaucratic structures, the importance of 
ranking and personnel decisions, biographies of the life of top-ranking officials etc. 
are all part of the empirical context. Drawing on these detailed and ‘thick’ 
descriptions opens up paths into understanding e.g. how and why a particular 
policy came about at a particular point in time or the impact of leadership rotations 
on the current national policy climate in China. One important difference, to me, is 
that what contemporary China studies do not seem to do by nature – but what STS 
seems to have in its DNA - is to be extremely reflective about the concepts 
deployed in the research and the consequences and impacts they have both for 
researcher and the researched. Reflexively in discussing categorizations of others’ 
as well as one’s own work at the same time is thus important in the present study 
in order to study an empirical phenomenon such as a controversy, where precisely 
categorizations and positions of actors change continuously. 
In sum, the approaches employed both in STS and contemporary China studies are 
combined so as to conduct a controversy study in a Chinese context. Taking 
departure in fieldwork and particularly doing fieldwork in China, the rest of the 
chapter outlines my journey through the research process, the methods used to 
circumvent problems of access and the different kinds of data the thesis builds on.  
Finding the issue(s)  
The aim of the following section is to describe how I have built the present study 
and to show how I have come to explore controversies over emerging science in a 
Chinese context. The following describes how the contested nature of hydropower 
development coupled with the Chinese state’s push for reduction of greenhouse 
gas (and thus more hydropower) combined with state-owned dominance of the 
hydropower sector serves as fertile ground to explore controversies in a Chinese 
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context. Thus, the background upon which the thesis is built has its roots in 
contemporary China studies.  
When I started out my dissertation research in late 2011, I did not know that I 
would end up writing a thesis focused on the case of the Zipingpu dam’s possible 
connection to the Wenchuan earthquake. My project was founded in a larger 
research project on public sector reform in China, particularly related to large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), so I knew early on that my project was to relate to 
Chinese SOEs. SOEs are at the heart of many studies on party-business relations 
in China. Through continuous reforms of the state sector over the last decades, 
SOES have increasingly become independent enterprises, while at the same time 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has managed to retain control through 
appointment of business executives through the nomenklatura system (Brødsgaard 
2017). The position of the SOEs being on the one hand independent enterprises 
but on the other being controlled by the Chinese state presents a paradox to many 
China researchers and has provided an interesting foundation for building a more 
thorough understanding of the consequences of the close party-business relations 
for the state. 
As a strategic sector of the economy, the energy sector has been the subject of a 
number of studies on Chinese SOEs, their party and state relations. After reading 
political scientist and China scholar Andrew Mertha’s book China’s Water 
Warriors (Mertha 2008) detailing cases on hydropower decision making in China, 
I became fascinated with hydropower in general and the Chinese hydropower 
sector in particular. Particularly so, as during the last decade, China has 
increasingly moved toward a low carbon energy pathway, changing policies and 
making new ones in order to, amongst other initiatives, reduce the country’s 
substantial greenhouse gas emissions (International Energy Agency 2014). In 
more general terms, China has increasingly focused on sustainable development 
and protecting the environment and has poured enormous resources into the so-
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called ‘green’ industries since the mid-2000s (10 FYP; Christensen 2013). In 
terms of renewable energy, hydropower is at the center of a strategy to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions due to China’s large hydropower potential, particularly 
concentrated in the south western parts of the country (Brown, Magee and Xu 
2008). To understand Chinese hydropower, however, it is also important to 
understand the wider context of the global hydropower industry. Hydropower 
projects across the globe routinely face opposition from e.g. indigenous peoples 
and/or environmental groups opposing large-scale infrastructure development. 
Controversies have erupted over hydropower development for decades and China 
is no exception. Thus, when choosing to focus on a controversy involving 
hydropower in China it is necessary to take the wider (contested) context of 
hydropower development into account. 
The intermingling of local (Chinese) concerns over hydropower with wider 
concerns over hydropower as e.g. represented by international NGOs was 
highlighted in Mertha’s (2008) study of a controversial case over hydropower 
development on the Nujiang (Salween) river in south western China. I found 
Mertha’s (2008) case a good starting point in terms of exploring controversies 
over hydropower development in China. The case deals with the Chinese SOE, 
Huadian Corporation which in 2003, together with the Nu prefecture government 
in south western China, submitted and got pre-approval for building a cascade of 
up to 13 dams on the Nu River (Dore and Yu 2004). In 2004 the plans to dam the 
river were abruptly halted. The then-premier Wen Jiabao discontinued the projects 
and called for more cautious and scientific studies of the environmental and social 
impacts of the projects (McDonald 2007; Mertha 2008). This decision was very 
controversial. It had not been seen before that such a high-ranked central 
government representative put a stop to a large hydropower project as hydropower 
projects have conventionally held the favor of Beijing officials (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 2008). Therefore the decision came as a surprise to many 
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China researchers (Mertha 2008; Magee 2006a; McDonald 2007). The dam plans 
for the Nujiang have since been revived, revised and halted again as debates over 
the dam projects continuously erupts (INT20121210; INT20121214; 
INT20121120; China.org.cn 2013; CSHE 2011; Daily Economic News 2011; Zhu 
2011; Sinohydro 2011).7 To this day the Nujiang river projects continue to be 
subject of debate (International Rivers Press Release 2016) however 
environmentalists seem optimistic about the state abandoning the full scale project 
(Phillips 2016). The Nujiang case highlights tensions between different levels of 
government in China and e.g. environmental NGOs’ efforts to halt large scale dam 
projects. The controversy over the proposed dams on the Nujiang River and the 
different strategies employed by NGOs, scientists and other dam-opponents – both 
international and domestic – in effectively linking the Nu River dams to more 
general themes of viability of dam building in China thus became a starting point 
for seeking out a suitable techno-scientific controversy to study in China.  
The consequences of choosing controversies involving hydropower as an 
empirical field of study turned out to present a number of challenges with regard 
to data collection, which will be addressed below. 
My initial phase of research in late 2011 and early 2012 was a period of desk 
research. Reading up on the hydropower sector in China and globally and getting 
to understand the basic workings of the hydropower industry more broadly. 
During this initial phase I found a number of critical issues, such as the debates 
about damming the Nujiang River, which raised questions about the viability of 
hydropower as a renewable and sustainable source of energy. These issues are at 
odds with the current push for hydropower development in China and elsewhere. 
Another such issue is the question of earthquake risk in relation to large scale 
                                           
7 All interviews are referred to by INT followed by the date of the interview (e.g. INT20121210). Field notes are 
referred to as FN followed by year and month (e.g. FN201305). Further description of the data is found below 
under the heading “The data material”. 
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dams and the possibility of large dams being able to trigger earthquakes. This was 
an issue that was discussed in e.g. news articles and later in 2012 by informants 
during fieldwork. In conversations (as well as in news articles) this issue was often 
linked to e.g. the Nujiang River Dams project. I found the issue of earthquake risk 
ripe with emerging scientific knowledge and conflicting perspectives - in a sense, 
closing the ring and drawing together my interest in taking STS to China and 
studying controversies unfolding over science and technology in a Chinese context. 
Thus, the different components of the study started to come together at this point. I 
realized that I would have to draw on not only contemporary China studies and 
STS but also research on the hydropower industry as well as emerging scientific 
knowledge about earthquakes. Doing research on the hydropower industry seemed 
to be a good way to prepare for further fieldwork, in terms of finding out how to 
study SOEs in the hydropower industry. A few words about studying different 
perspectives on hydropower will follow. 
Studying different perspectives on hydropower 
As is probably true with most things in life, as well as in research, everyone has an 
agenda - including oneself. In this thesis a dam is at the center of a controversy 
and is used as a research object around which to conduct a controversy study. In 
other contexts a dam can be a construction project, a source of water or energy 
supply or even a national symbol of development and modernization. In other 
words, dams serve as the backdrop for a wide variety of studies in many different 
fields. In the following I will show how diving into this diverse field entails 
awareness of the ways in which dams are utilized to shape different agendas. 
Hydropower decision making, planning, design and construction are characterized 
by being complicated and encompass a range of different fields and issues within 
one project – e.g. from geology to indigenous people’s rights. Thus, a great deal of 
literature is available on different engineering aspects of hydropower construction 
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in specialized journals (Magee 2006a), and in specialized science journals 
studying the geological conditions for hydropower construction e.g. International 
Journal on Hydropower and Dams or Journal of Hydrologic Engineering. Also, in 
energy related research numerous studies of different aspects of hydropower have 
been done (e.g. Energy Policy 2002). A large part of writing about hydropower 
entails navigating between different actors’ articulations about what hydropower 
development is, what purposes it serves, whom it serves, how to do it ‘right’, and 
the impacts and benefits it may or may not deliver for societies.  
A common scenario is that comprehensive research reports on hydropower are 
commissioned with support from intergovernmental organizations such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), development banks, or under 
the auspices of the UN. One example is a highly cited report titled The World 
Commission on Dams Report (WCD). Organizations such as the World Bank, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
publish guidelines and reports focused on environmental and social sustainability 
in relation to the dam projects they finance as well as research specifically 
focusing on hydropower development and the energy sector. These documents are 
also intended for use by policy makers and hydropower companies in relation to 
hydropower planning and decision making processes (FN201305. See also 
International Finance Corporation 2012 and Asian Development Bank 2013). 
Other sources which solicit reports and research are NGOs and grassroots 
movements that are looking for independent studies of hydropower development 
projects’ benefits and drawbacks for society at large or local communities in 
particular. This type of research is often directed towards a specific topic such as 
earthquake risk (Jackson 2012) threats to fisheries or indigenous people’s rights in 
relation to specific dam projects (International Rivers Website). Before I 
embarked on fieldwork, I tried to sort out these different notions of hydropower.  
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Studying a scientific controversy means studying documents. My informants are 
all text producers and it would be impossible to understand them without studying 
their texts. Consequently, my research builds on comprehensive document studies 
of research into the types of documents written by international organizations (e.g. 
IPCC) development banks (e.g. World Bank), hydropower industry associations 
(e.g. International Hydropower Association - IHA) nongovernmental 
organizations (e.g. International Rivers, Probe International) as well as books and 
reports written about water, hydropower and dam development for the general 
public, policy makers and the specialized (also academic) reader interested in 
hydropower. Thus, such documents form a big part of the empirical material for 
the thesis.  
In the social sciences, hydropower projects and the controversies which often 
erupt over such projects have provided numerous case studies and empirical 
backgrounds for a wide variety of different studies in many different fields such as 
anthropology, human geography, STS, contemporary China studies and political 
science (Hirsh 1998; Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Magee 2006a and 2006b; 
McDonald 2007; Mertha and Lowry 2006 and 2008; Rogers and Marres 2008; 
Wade 2011). My research thus draws on case studies into these different types of 
conflicts over hydropower development. Points of controversy around hydropower 
in some ways become natural focal points of case studies. Depending on the 
theoretical perspective, they highlight different theoretical points.  
When hydropower conflicts are the only common denominator, the theoretical 
backgrounds of the studies I have drawn inspiration from are different. However, 
collectively they are part of the different perspectives and narratives I have 
encountered in my study of hydropower broadly. For example, Mertha (2008 and 
2009) argues a case of pluralization of the Chinese policy making process in 
general and around hydropower development in particular, through employing the 
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concept of Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA). He puts into perspective the role 
of NGOs, journalists and other ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in the Chinese policy 
making process and suggests that these groups continuously engage in 
manipulating issue frames: 
 
“…in order to mobilize support, constrain government pushback, and 
link with other interested actors” (Mertha 2008: XVI).8  
 
Looking to STS, Rogers and Marres (2008) also focus on aspects of issue 
formation by NGOs but take a different theoretical approach. They analyze the 
controversy over the Narmada dam in India through using a digital methods 
approach developed in an STS context. Their controversy study highlights that 
issue networks (as represented by NGOs on the web):  
 
“…publicly testify to the fact that processes of issue formation tend to 
take place at a distance from the sites in which these issues make 
themselves most forcefully felt” (Rogers and Marres 2008: 274).  
 
Further, they conclude that: 
 
“As the Narmada Dams were adopted as a cause of concern by 
international NGOs, local issue definitions were exchanged for 
institutionally-oriented, more structural issue framings, both off and on 
the Web.” (Rogers and Marres 2008: 274).  
 
                                           
8 The concept of FA and its potential usefulness in analyzing aspects of the Zipingpu controversy will be addressed 
primarily in Chapter 2.  
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Thus, controversies over hydropower development may serve many different 
scientific and political ends. Drawing on such a wide range of actors’ articulations 
in different documents means that I have paid attention to how I could navigate 
this host of different narratives about hydropower development that I was sure to 
meet in the field. In my fieldwork and research I was thus aware of how some 
stories build more momentum than others, get circulated and perhaps become 
reinforced while others are neglected, downplayed or fail to build sufficient 
momentum to become accepted as viable articulations about the benefits or 
negative consequences of hydropower development. In practical terms this for 
example meant that I could draw on the narrative most relevant for the informant I 
was approaching for an interview so as to make my project relevant and 
interesting to the informant. 
 
That different narratives and perspectives on hydropower and related issues are 
also presented in the academic literature that I build my thesis on, means that 
throughout the thesis what is considered ‘empirical’ and what is considered 
‘theoretical’ and ‘conceptual’ varies with the context in which a perspective is 
discussed. This is a much larger discussion e.g. in STS but it should suffice to say 
that the perspective that “conceptual–empirical mixtures are unavoidable in actual 
research practice” (Bruun Jensen 2014) applies in this context. This should 
become clear throughout the next chapters. 
Whether dams are able to trigger earthquakes is just one site of contention in 
science where different arguments about how earthquakes relate to dams are 
discussed. This discussion is in different ways narrated into larger social issues for 
instance risks associated with large scale infrastructure development such as dams. 
The point being that in this thesis the different perspectives – and their associated 
actors and institutions – are part of taking a new perspective: A controversy study 
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grounded in the STS interest in inquiring into the relationship between science, 
expertise and politics. 
Bridging disciplines and becoming expert  
How to go about studying a controversy where so many perspectives and a variety 
of different scientific disciplines are involved? I was a newcomer to earth science, 
seismology, hydropower engineering and the finer details of research on dams 
only a few years ago. Being interested in ‘following the actors’ (Latour 1988; 
Latour and Woolgar 1979) involved in a controversy focusing on the Zipingpu 
dam, however, forced me to do my best to learn the terminology and the science 
behind the language of hydrological engineers, seismologists, earth scientists more 
broadly as well as other specialized researchers and practitioners involved in – or 
with the ability to explain parts of - the issue I was following. In other words, to 
study the controversy surrounding Zipingpu and its possible relation to Wenchuan 
I had to understand my interviewees’ science language so I could interpret 
documents and conduct interviews with the experts involved in the controversy. In 
Collins and Evans’ (2007) words, I had to gain “interactional expertise” in for 
example in seismology. This, put crudely, means that as a researcher I had to 
become knowledgeable about e.g. specialized terminology and arguments made in 
earth science but not to the extent that I would be able to contribute to a 
specialized journal article in seismology - or what Collins and Evans (2007) term 
“contributory expertise”. My choice of participant observation as a method for this 
thesis springs out of a need for local experts to educate me in understanding issues 
that require highly specialized language and knowledge. For this, I also had to do 
language studies to read up on terms used in Mandarin Chinese when talking 
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about hydropower engineering, earthquake science, water conservation or other 
topics where more specialized language required it in Mandarin.9  
Learning the specialized technical languages of the different informants in English, 
Danish and Mandarin Chinese where required has been building over time. Thus, 
during my fieldwork I have had countless small encounters and informal talks 
with different kinds of informants that have shaped my fieldwork and knowledge 
in different ways. For example on a tour of two large dam sites in the Boneo 
jungle in Malaysia - where Chinese SOEs were responsible for the majority of the 
construction activity - I was amongst a group of approximately 21 people of 
different nationality and specialization.10 On this trip which comprised – among 
other specialists - electrical engineers, financial institution managers, hydropower 
executives and NGO representatives, I had direct access to a wide variety of 
viewpoints. All of the participants had long-standing experience in the 
hydropower or dam industry. The possibility to do participant observation of e.g. 
meetings and technical presentations during this trip (and at other events where 
many different constituents were gathered such as a large hydropower conference) 
gave me the opportunity to engage in conversations about almost any aspect of 
dam building with different types of experts. Participant observation of technical 
presentations, meetings and workshops in connection with specialized hydropower 
conferences and participation in field trips both in China and outside China has 
therefore been a vital part of my fieldwork as it allowed me to more fully 
understand the context of the case I was studying. 
In some ways it may seem counterintuitive that I had to go to Borneo to study 
Chinese hydropower. However, as access to do interviews with hydropower 
                                           
9 The author reads, writes and speaks Mandarin Chinese. 
10 This trip was arranged by the International Hydropower Association (IHA) and Malaysian Energy Company 
Sarawak Energy in connection with the IHA’s 2013 Hydropower Congress in Kuching, Malaysia. Congress 
participants could (on a first-come first-serve basis and by paying a large fee) join a post-congress study tour of two 
large dam sites on Borneo. I was lucky to get an opportunity to join the tour.  
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company representatives (of which the most important are state-owned in China) 
and access to go visit specific dam sites proved almost impossible in mainland 
China, it was easier to get myself introduced at a specialized conference or 
meeting - most often outside of China – where I got small informal interviews. 
Thereafter I could contact the people I had met for further interviews, references to 
other contacts etc. Not all were willing to talk to me again once back in mainland 
China, but some proved helpful and were instrumental in getting me interviews, 
information or new contacts. In addition, a visit to a dam site can only tell you so 
much, if you are going on your own. Tours of the sites in China that I was 
interested in were not available to the public. Moreover, sites are often blocked off 
for visitors, declared military sites, fenced off as most construction sites are, or 
generally difficult to access even on foot, for example due to construction taking 
place in mountainous regions. In Borneo it took a seven hour drive in four-wheel 
drives through the jungle, a three hour boat trip and some more driving on rough 
and muddy logging roads just to get to one of the dam sites. Thus visiting a 
potential dam site, a site under construction or a finished dam I found that it was 
more beneficial to go with someone who could either tell me what I was looking at, 
help me gain access to the site itself and/or to information about the building 
process, the earthquake engineering or other aspects of the dam or the site. 
Doing fieldwork in China  
Eliciting information, e.g. in the form of interviews about anything deemed 
‘political’ in China is notoriously tricky (Heimer and Thøgersen 2006: 12-13). 
Hydropower is exactly such an area. Some examples from my fieldwork may help 
to explain the context of doing fieldwork related to hydropower development in 
China. During my fieldwork it was not uncommon for potential informants to turn 
down interviews - if it was possible to get a response from them at all. This is a 
common feature of field work not only in China and reasons can of course be 
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many. However, when getting e-mails from informants saying “Very 
unfortunately, I am not allowed to give them [the information you asked about] 
because of National Security” (E-mail from informant November 26 2012 on file 
with author), then suspicion sets in. I was ‘shadowed’ on parts of my field trip to 
the Nujiang River’s potential dam sites. I was most likely followed by someone 
from the local public security bureau (PSB) or from a local branch of the 
‘Guobao’, Chinas national security ministry. I also got photographed (more likely 
by the Guobao) from a car while interviewing an outspoken individual 
contributing to the debate on Zipingpu causing Wenchuan (FN201211). Getting 
photographed as a foreigner in China is not unusual. The circumstances of that 
particular interview and location, however, led me to conclude that there was 
nothing usual about these photographs being taken. 11  Being followed or 
photographed was of course not about me, but about the person (or persons) I was 
interviewing or the location I was visiting. The people I was interviewing were 
most likely being monitored by the Guobao already as a consequence of 
controversial writings, opinions and actions in terms of bringing the issue of 
earthquake risk in relation to large dams in south west China forward. As such, 
persons engaged in issues that can, or have already, caused public disturbances 
(e.g. anti-dam demonstrations) are likely being monitored by the Guobao or the 
PSB so they are able to curb future potential disturbances.  
It was challenging for me to do fieldwork in an atmosphere where one informant, 
a scientist who has intimate knowledge about hydropower development in China 
said: “I really respect your choice” (INT20130506). By “respecting my choice” he 
meant that choosing to study “such a complex and sensitive issue” (ibid.) in China 
                                           
11 That particular interview took place in a small, half empty, hotel lobby, on a rainy Sunday night in November 
around 10 pm, directly after I got in from the airport (where I had been picked up by my informant). My informant 
sat with his back to the window. I noticed a grey car driving up close to the window as if to park. The car kept 
running, a man rolled down the passenger side window and proceeded to photograph us through the window (at 
first using flash). The car then drove off again. I didn’t think this was the most natural of scenarios to get 
photographed as a tourist in China (FN201211).  
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can be very difficult. The difficulties first presented themselves in very practical 
terms. It took a lot of persuasion to get to do interviews because many of my 
informants assumed I wanted data, in the sense of (sensitive) numbers on for 
example water flow volumes in different rivers. Such numbers are not to be shared 
with foreigners due to national security. The Law of the People’s Republic on 
Guarding State Secrets (1988/2010) stipulates that state secrets cover e.g. “secrets 
concerning major policy decisions on state affairs” and “secret matters in national 
economic and social development”. Reading the law, it is clear that what actually 
constitutes state secrets is inherently elusive and hence subject to a wide-ranging 
and looming state prerogative. Hydropower is part of national economic and social 
development on a large scale and often involves conflicts locally, provincially and 
nationally. Some researchers and other potential informants did not want to be 
associated with political issues in any way or form. However, after some 
explaining I could often convince people to talk to me as I was more interested in 
the process of e.g. policy making or how research was conducted rather than the 
data some of the researchers worked with. Some, however, just outright refused 
interviews regardless.  
Doing fieldwork in China was also challenging in more personal terms as I 
became increasingly sensitive to how much I myself as a researcher engaged in 
self-censorship to avoid outright ‘political’ or ‘sensitive issues’. Questioning 
myself if I was avoiding presenting directly to my potential informants what I was 
interested in asking them about (such as the link between earthquakes and dams) 
because I thought this would deter them from talking to me. Was I afraid of 
repercussions if I was poking too much around sensitive issues? Doing research on 
hydropower in China can literally get you arrested.12 It may seem brave and well-
                                           
12 One example is a foreign researcher being arrested during his fieldwork on hydropower development in Yunnan 
province in China. He seems to have turned the incident of his arrest into some kind of event to display the 
sometimes difficult nature of his work. Thus his university profile picture displays him sitting smiling in the back of 
a Chinese police car driving off. When visiting the Nujiang River in Yunnan Province during my fieldwork in 2012, 
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intended to try to do research on a subject which often bumps up against ‘issues of 
national security’, but might also just be ill-advised and bad judgement on my part 
to imagine that it is possible to find out anything about what actually happens with 
regard to Chinese decision making on hydropower development in China. If you 
add earthquakes into this ‘minefield’ you get a combination where one of my 
informants was put under house arrest for six months for raising issues around 
dams causing earthquakes (INT20131001).13    
In short, the research atmosphere I encountered was one that can be described as 
full of paranoia and self-censorship on the part of my informants. Living in and 
experiencing this atmosphere during my fieldwork gave me a perspective on the 
situations and general atmosphere my informants were navigating daily through 
e.g. engaging in self-censorship to avoid overtly ‘sensitive issues’. In sum, through 
my own experience of doing fieldwork I felt I got closer to understanding my 
informants’ different perspectives. Most researchers and students who have done 
fieldwork in China on topics that may be considered ‘sensitive’ or ‘political’ (and 
today it seems that this can really be almost anything depending on how you frame 
it) have had to grapple with these kinds of issues (Heimer and Thøgersen 2006). 
No one, not even personnel inside the Chinese bureaucracy, Chinese leaders or 
Chinese scientists can really say for sure how e.g. policies are ultimately decided 
(INT20130627). This of course may be said of a lot of different countries but 
perhaps for different reasons. What is important in this context is to understand 
that difficulties regarding access to informants, to interviews, documents etc. may 
be hampered by how you frame your questions, the people you are referred 
through, by your university affiliation or otherwise. For example, some informants 
                                                                                                                                       
I was followed around quite openly and I was repeatedly asked by officials (e.g. when showing my passport to enter 
the Nujiang region) if I was a journalist or researcher – a category notoriously suspicious in China. See also 
description of being followed on a field trip to the Nu River in 2015 by International Rivers in International Rivers 
Newsletter (2016). 
13 On my informant’s run-ins with the government see also Larson (2008). 
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I was referred to through NGO-organization contacts, who introduced me first and 
then put me in contact with the person I wanted to talk to. Others I wrote directly 
to e.g. asking about their research and presenting myself as being interested in 
their particular field of research – e.g. environmental assessment of hydropower 
development. I also made sure to display my Chinese university affiliation with 
the University of Chinese Academy of Science e.g. when approaching researchers 
at universities. This because I found that affiliation helped place my research at a 
domestic university. Not only having a foreign affiliation but also a Chinese one 
thus implicitly acknowledged that my research topic was formally also part of the 
Chinese system. In this way perhaps not perceived as too controversial by my 
potential informants. Nevertheless, the method I employed to get any kind of 
information can perhaps best be described as snowballing or engaging in a game 
of Chinese whispers.  
Chinese whispers, field notes, interviews and documents 
‘Chinese whispers’ is a party game where one person at the end of a chain of 
people whispers a sentence only they know into the ear of the person next to them. 
The sentence is then whispered on and on, down through the chain and usually 
ends up more or less wildly distorted when the person at the end of the chain of 
people says the words they have heard out loud. Thus, we learn that the truth can 
be distorted significantly when undergoing repeated slight distortions or 
interpretations by a number of people. The party game illustrates two points. One, 
that no matter how accurate one tries to be in order to discover ‘the origins’ behind 
words, facts or people’s actions, distortion is there for better or for worse. Or 
rather may not really be discovered as it is ultimately a constructed entity. The 
second point is that there seems to be an idea that there is something particular 
about things ‘Chinese’. We will return to the second point in Chapter 3 as this is 
also a general theme in contemporary China studies. 
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Chinese whispers in a slightly different meaning can also serve as a metaphor for 
data collection in China. Not in the sense that all you learn is gibberish but more in 
the sense of the well-known snow-balling method of data collection. 14  
The practicalities of doing research on a sensitive subject in China that touches on 
political issues surrounding hydropower, water resources and earthquakes have 
been difficult but not impossible. I found that the best approach to collect data on 
such a topic was simply going to China and start contacting people. Although 
having done my research regarding who to preferably talk to, setting up interviews 
with what I might think was all the right people before I left for China was not 
feasible. Not only because they did not necessarily answer e-mails, phone calls or 
requests for interviews while I was still in Denmark, but also because all the 
preparation and research in the world could not make me available to do an 
interview in China at very short notice.15 Furthermore, I did not necessarily know 
who all my informants were before leaving for China. This meant that I needed 
my informants to point to the next potential informant (snowballing). My project 
description may have become more or less distorted by the time I reached the next 
persons’ office, but the point is that I managed to get there. Through 
connections/guanxi16 or Chinese whispers as it were. This seems to be a common 
feature of fieldwork almost anywhere in the world and this was no different in 
China. Nevertheless, the person I was referred through spoke volumes about what 
my interest was and thus from being referred from someone else the informant 
                                           
14 For another use of the Chinese whispers metaphor see Kirkegaard (2015). 
15 When I was doing fieldwork in China I had several of these ‘last minute’ interviews, where I, shortly after having 
sent an e-mail or left a message for a potential interviewee received a call asking if I could come by immediately, 
the same day or the next day. Seldom were interviews scheduled more than one week ahead. 
16 Guanxi is the well-known Mandarin Chinese word for relationship connoting personal connections or network 
ties. 
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formed ideas about the issue I was interested in.17  Sometimes that had to be 
corrected at the actual interview. At other times not.  
In her research on the one-child policy Susan Greenhalgh described coping with 
the situation of quickly realizing that none of her informants were neutral about 
the policy she was researching: “there were ardent proponents and fierce 
opponents” (Greenhalgh 2008: 42). I had the same experience in my fieldwork as I 
found that none of my informants were neutral about dam-building. I didn’t expect 
them to be, but given the politically charged atmosphere of hydropower 
development policy in China it was important to avoid talking about overtly 
political issues in hydropower when I described my research interests.18 Otherwise 
I would not get referred onwards. One of my informants for example advised me 
not to not take sides as his experience was that informants would often ask you if 
you were pro-dam or an anti-dam and this could derail conversation. His usual 
response would be to say: “No I’m not anti-dam, I’m anti bad-dam” 
(INT20121120) which is vague enough to let the informant decide which dams are 
bad (and which ones are good) and thus perhaps leave the issue open. I was 
fortunate enough not to be asked that question by the majority of my informants 
and instead encourage my informants to talk to me about their research and voice 
their opinions.  
As is perhaps clear, it may not be possible to ascertain if the information you 
obtain is ‘correct’ or neutral on some linear scale of assessment. And the point 
                                           
17 I felt there was a difference in how my interests were perceived depending on whether I was introduced by 
someone from an environmental NGO or by a researcher in environmental science. For example, if I was 
introduced to a researcher that I was interested in interviewing by someone at an environmental NGO I was more 
than once assumed to be more interested in getting actual data and information not available to NGOs rather than 
being interested in talking to the researcher about his or her research as such.  
18  An example of describing my research interest was that I sometimes expressed interest in the process of 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) of hydropower. Although somewhat controversial – due to some 
documented corruption in EIA processes - EIAs are not as controversial as earthquakes and hydropower. I found 
that questions relating to earthquake risk could nevertheless be posed during such interviews as EIAs relate to risk 
more generally. EIAs are also instruments used by anti-dam activists to draw more attention to the policy making 
process around hydropower thus signaling interest in EIAs was one way of approaching informants and get them to 
talk about broader hydropower issues. 
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here is that it did not matter. What mattered to me during the research process was 
getting different perspectives from different informants - whether an interview 
was related to earth science, hydropower development, or whether I was 
participating in a workshop conducted by an NGO or a conference organized by 
the hydropower industry. My choice of semi-structured interviews as a method for 
this thesis thus sprung out of a need to gain knowledge about how different 
experts think, speak and strategically position themselves in different contexts in 
order to gain legitimacy for their viewpoints. Cross-checking with documents, 
official policies, newspaper reporting, interviewing journalists, scientists, NGO 
representatives, academics and other researchers who have knowledge or have 
been engaging with the issue, controversy or subject of my study helped me group 
the different perspectives. In this way enabling me to write the story of the 
Zipingpu-Wenchuan controversy as presented in this thesis and in turn discuss the 
inter-connected issues of expertise, knowledge and politics.  
If someone was to go to China today and do research on the topic of the Zipingpu 
dam and its possible connection to the Wenchuan earthquake they might find a 
similar controversy, but more likely, they will find that a different event or a 
different controversy is more important to focus on today in order to study the co-
production of science and politics in matters of expert decision making. Because 
circumstances may be different today and this particular issue may not be as hot as 
it was during my fieldwork. However, the analytical point of conducting a 
controversy study in China should be more robust and my hope is that this 
controversy study can contribute to finding new ways to open up discussions 
about science and politics in matters of expert decision-making in China and 
beyond.  
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The data material 
For the present thesis I have done 48 semi-structured interviews with engineers, 
earth scientists and other academics, with journalists, NGO representatives and 
hydropower industry representatives in countries as different as China, the US, 
Denmark, France and Malaysia. The reason for going to e.g. France or Malaysia 
was attempting to contact Chinese hydropower companies outside of China - as 
mentioned above. Also, going to large conferences where a number of 
international hydropower interests were gathered gave me access to a variety of 
companies, interest organizations and specialists. In addition to interviews in 
person, interviews have also taken place over Skype with informants from China 
and the US. One interview has been by written correspondence. Interviews have 
mainly been conducted in English and Mandarin Chinese. A few interviews were 
conducted in Danish. Interview quotes in Danish or Mandarin Chinese have been 
translated into English by the author. Where possible all interviews have been 
recorded. All recorded interviews have subsequently been transcribed. Where 
recording was not possible I have taken notes during and after interviews. In 
addition, I have done participant observation in meetings, technical presentations 
and workshops at specialized conferences on water and hydropower, at NGO 
meetings and workshops. These have taken place in France, Malaysia and 
mainland China. 19  All fieldwork in China took place during 2012-2013. Two 
months in 2012: a short trip in April 2012 and a longer stay in late October until 
December 2012. In 2013 I spent almost five months during the spring and summer 
of 2013 in China, based in Beijing with trips to various destinations in and outside 
of mainland China. Interviews have also been conducted in relation to academic 
conference participation in the US in 2014. Lastly, further additional interviews 
have been conducted in 2014 via Skype to interviewees in the US and in 2016 in 
                                           
19 I participated in the World Water Forum in Marseilles, France, in March 2012 and The International Hydropower 
Association’s Hydropower Congress in Kuching, Malaysia in May 2013. I also participated in events, workshops 
and talks in China organized by the NGOs International Rivers China and Green Earth Volunteers. 
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Denmark. The majority of my interviews have been anonymized in order to 
protect my informants. All interviews are referred to by INT followed by the date 
of the interview (e.g. INT20121210). Field notes are referred to as FN followed by 
year and month (e.g. FN201305). Only a few informants are, with their permission, 
described with their real names as these informants are already highly visible and 
publicly known for their opinions in and outside China. During my fieldtrips to 
China as well as during participant observation outside China I have taken more 
than 170 pages of field notes which I also draw on as part of my data material for 
the thesis. Secondary literature obtained through my informants such as minutes of 
meetings, news articles, reports, books and other information is also drawn on in 
the thesis. Lastly, documents such as news reports, various policy documents, and 
academic articles obtained through online as well as research in specialized 
journals that have published on hydropower, earthquake engineering and the 
possible Zipingpu-Wenchuan issue also form part of the data material informing 
the thesis.  
Data analysis 
The data have been manually coded according to themes and sub-themes relating 
to the controversy over Zipingpu and related controversies over hydropower 
development in China. Themes have been drawn out from the data so that quotes 
and field note excerpts have been organized in separate documents relating to the 
themes and sub-themes. Themes related to specific issues toward more general 
issues were drawn out from interviews, fieldnotes and documents. Central themes 
were for example 1) Controversy over the Zipingpu dam itself – construction, 
history 2) Scientific controversy over whether Zipingpu caused Wenchuan 2) 
Man-made earthquakes/ reservoir induced seismicity 3) Issues of dam building in 
earthquake prone zones 4) Chinese state policy towards hydropower development 
5) general hydropower policy dilemmas. The themes formed the different focal 
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points in the overall controversy study as exemplified by the controversy over 
whether Zipingpu caused Wenchuan or not. 
The next chapter focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis and 
discusses the relationship between STS and contemporary China studies so as to 
discuss how to ground a controversy study in a Chinese context. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical approach 
The present chapter outlines the theoretical approach of the thesis and aims to 
draw together on the one hand studies in STS focusing on expert politics and 
controversies, 20  and on the other, the parts of contemporary China studies 
concerned with science and politics in China after 1949. In combining these two 
broad traditions of social science literature, the delineation of the overall 
theoretical lens and position of the thesis are presented.  
The following review of STS studies and approaches aim to highlight some of the 
main issues, themes and questions that have been foregrounded by these branches 
of STS. Following this, potential ‘bridging points’ between STS and contemporary 
China studies are discussed as it is my contention that the combination of the two 
disciplinary traditions can provide new insights into how expertise is used in 
policy making in a non-democratic setting such as the Chinese. Lastly, different 
notions of controversy studies are outlined. The important point of the chapter is 
thus to highlight what insights the combination of STS and contemporary China 
studies can provide and to open a discussion of how such insights can be used 
within a controversy study. 
The present chapter opens a discussion between STS and contemporary China 
studies in order to examine conceptual issues and pose theoretically informed 
questions that can be addressed empirically through the Zipingpu-Wenchuan 
controversy. 
                                           
20 In this thesis, expert politics, in the widest sense of the concept, refers to the political use of expertise in a policy 
making context. How ‘political use’ and ‘expertise’ is in turn defined in a Chinese context is part of the inquiry of 
this thesis. 
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Introducing experts, expertise, science and politics 
“The people of this country have had enough of experts” said British MP Michael 
Gove during the days before Britain voted in favor of leaving the European Union 
(White 2016). By the look of it, expertise may be on the decline in Europe but also 
in the US (Jasanoff 2004 and 2005a). This has been discussed widely in the press 
after the election of US President Donald Trump in November 2016. In Denmark, 
former Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen started a process in 2001 of 
weeding the ranks of what he called “experts and arbitrators of taste” (Prime 
Minister’s New Year’s Address, January 1, 2002). According to Fogh Rasmussen,  
“The people should not put up with finger-wagging from so-called 
experts that think they know best. Experts can be good enough at 
conveying factual knowledge. But when it comes to making personal 
choices, we are all experts” (ibid.). 
Despite this seeming decline in the value of expert knowledge we are today living 
in societies more dependent on expertise and expert knowledge for decision 
making than ever before. According to Jasanoff “there is hardly a move we can 
make without relying on experts” (Jasanoff 2003: 161). This means that, while we 
need experts more than ever the trust in experts and their expertise is perhaps at an 
all-time low – so much so that people ‘have had enough of experts’ (White 2016).  
However, any situation is rarely as black and white once you look closer at any 
one specific issue, but the outlined tension makes for an interesting lens through 
which to take a closer look at the constitution of expertise in modern society. 
Particularly so, as tensions such as the ones described above have been playing out 
in many different – and related – aspects of modern societies. Take science, for 
instance. Science is in many ways at the heart of expertise. Thus, when viewed 
through the political tensions outlined above, the idea of science as a universal 
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value “characterized by intellectual honesty, integrity, organized skepticism, 
disinterestedness, impersonality” (Merton 1938: 327) may have changed markedly 
in political circles: 
“…as scientific knowledge becomes more closely aligned with 
economic and political power, producing new expert elites, the distance 
between the governors and the governed can be expected to grow - a 
dismal prospect in societies where low levels of electoral participation 
and citizen engagement are already causes for concern. Science, 
moreover, has historically maintained its legitimacy by cultivating a 
careful distance from politics. As state-science relations become more 
openly instrumental, we can reasonably wonder whether science will 
lose its ability to serve either state or society as a source of impartial 
critical authority” (Jasanoff 2005: 5-6). 
 
Along the same lines of argument, Jasanoff (2005a) on analyzing an 
unprecedented questioning of the “postwar science-state contract”21 in the debates 
of the 2004 US presidential election campaign, asks: “Why, then, have relations 
between science and the party in power soured of late?” (ibid 210) 
The study of the tensions between science and politics and the role of experts in 
society has been the topic of numerous studies in STS. Thus, the contribution of 
STS since the late 1970s has perhaps documented in detail what we already knew: 
Not only that “expertise (…) becomes politics by other means” (Jasanoff 2003: 
159)22 but further that,  
                                           
21Jasanoff refers to the postwar social contract between science and the state as spelled out by presidential adviser 
Vannevar Bush in 1945 as a contract that in short “provided money and liberty in exchange for knowledge and 
technical skills” (Jasanoff 2005a:210). 
22 It should be noted that Jasanoff is paraphrasing Latour (1988a) here. 
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“...arguably there never has been a time when the work of science was 
wholly distinct from the work of politics” (Jasanoff 2005a:213).  
In other words, expertise and politics, and politics in particular ideological shapes, 
are deeply connected:  
“Expertise and democracy are no longer adversarial concepts, if they 
ever were: instead, expertise is almost the foundation stone on which the 
functioning of modern democracies has come to rest” (Jasanoff, 2003: 
162).  
Not by far being the first to ponder questions of expertise, science and politics, the 
next section builds on research into expert politics in different branches of the 
social sciences.23 As mentioned, the main theoretical focus is on studies of expert 
politics from the perspective of STS, supplemented with research in contemporary 
China studies. However, as STS is a wide ranging field with considerable breadth 
and depth (as is contemporary China studies) STS writings explicitly focusing on 
controversies and expert politics are foregrounded. First, however, a few notes on 
the field of STS in general and the branches of STS drawn on here in particular. 
Science and Technology Studies 
Regarded as a social science discipline or a more general field of study24, the 
overall focus in STS studies is most often “…the investigation of knowledge 
societies in all their complexity” (Jasanoff 2004: 2). Moreover, STS inspired 
inquiries are “specifically directed toward investigating the place of science and 
                                           
23 As mentioned in an earlier footnote ‘expert politics’ in the widest sense of the concept, refers to the political use 
of expertise in a policy making context. How ‘political use’ and ‘expertise’ is in turn defined in a Chinese context is 
part of the inquiry of this thesis. 
24 Bruun Jensen et al. (2007) provide an in-depth characterization of the difficulties of labelling STS a discipline as 
such by (amongst other factors) citing interdisciplinarity and diversity of disciplines and focus of studies as some of 
the main characteristics running through STS. Also, reflexivity and attention to the fluidity of categorizations of 
almost any kind are highlighted. Some within STS would thus disagree with Jasanoff’s characterization of STS 
which the following builds on. This, however, should be seen as one of the strengths of STS - i.e. an ability to 
reflexively discuss categorizations of others’ as well as one’s own work at the same time. 
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technology in society” (Jasanoff 2004: 2). Thus, at the root, then - of STS inspired 
analysis - is the enquiry into the relationship(s) between science, technology and 
knowledge production in contemporary societies. What makes STS stand apart 
from other social science disciplines is perhaps that through studies in STS, the 
boundaries between some of the social sciences’ most basic categories such as 
those between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, ‘state’ and ‘society’, ‘science’ and ‘politics’ 
and ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ are challenged (Jasanoff 2004: 2).  
Studies in STS have also highlighted the theoretical point that science and 
technology operate as political agents in the sense that they are “indispensable to 
the expression and exercise of power” (Jasanoff 2004: 14). This line of scholarship 
in STS has highlighted important discussions revolving around science, culture 
and political power - and not least the role of experts therein. A central claim that 
Jasanoff makes again and again in different contexts is that:  
“The making of science is also political, we argue; indeed the central 
claim of our collection is that there cannot be a proper history of 
scientific things independent of power and culture” (Jasanoff 2004: 21). 
However, this finding seems to be neglected or sidelined in some social science 
disciplines (ibid). Indeed, according to Jasanoff (2004: 278):  
“for the most part, the disciplinary social sciences still unquestioningly 
accept the boundary between nature and society as given” (Jasanoff 
2004: 278).  
Jasanoff (2004) has a relatively simple explanation for this:  
“The dominant discourses of economics, sociology and political science 
lack vocabularies to make sense of the untidy, uneven processes through 
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which the production of science and technology becomes entangled with 
social norms and hierarchies” (Jasanoff 2004: 2).  
This means that the role of science and technology often gets black-boxed25, 
neglected or sidelined in social science analyses (Greenhalgh 2008; Jasanoff 2004). 
STS is interdisciplinary at the root, but it also calls attention to the inherent 
divisions in existing social science disciplines precisely to avoid the sidelining of 
science and technology in analyses. Thus, it is important to stress that work in STS:  
“…calls attention to the negotiable boundaries of many things whose 
hardness we ordinarily take for granted, such as facts, institutions, social 
roles, and even inanimate objects. A core project of STS has been to 
display the fluidity of the divisions among the social, material, and 
natural worlds, showing that much of what we know through science or 
use as technology is produced and given solidity through socially 
accredited systems of rhetoric and practice. Science, in particular, 
emerges from this analysis not as an independent, self-regulating 
producer of truths about the natural world, but as a dynamic social 
institution, fully engaged with other mechanisms for creating social and 
epistemological order in modern societies” (Jasanoff 1995b: XV). 
For the present thesis, the choice to build the theoretical framework on STS 
concepts means that the approach to the study of expert politics is based in a 
constructivist frame26 where science and politics as categories are regarded as 
‘dynamic social institutions’. Or to use Sismondo’s words:  
 
                                           
25 Black-boxing is a term imported from engineering science by Latour (1988). Black-boxing refers to e.g. when a 
machine element is drawn on a chart it can be ‘black-boxed’ because the processes inside the machine element are 
well-known in the context. This means that the complexities of the processes taking place within the black box are 
essentially rendered invisible. The processes in the black box may previously have been the subject of intense 
research activity but essentially become irrelevant in subsequent research (Bruun Jensen et al. 2007: 82-83. See also 
Blok and Elgaard Jensen 2009). 
26 See note 4. 
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“For STS, then, science and technology are active processes, and should 
be studied as such. The field investigates how scientific knowledge and 
technological artefacts are constructed” (Sismondo 2010: 11).  
 
The strength of building a theoretical frame on these foundations is that STS 
provides the conceptual grounding for studying the role of expertise in policy 
making. The fact that this conceptual grounding is constructivist opens up for 
drawing on other disciplinary traditions in analyzing e.g. a controversy. In this 
case, I will be drawing on contemporary China studies. China is neither 
democratic nor physically a part of the Western hemisphere, therefore it is my 
hope that drawing on STS vocabularies for studying the use of expert knowledge 
may yield new insights and perhaps generate new challenges (also for STS) in the 
meeting with contemporary China studies. 
STS and contemporary China studies 
Like STS, contemporary China studies constitute a highly interdisciplinary field, 
albeit in a somewhat different way. Contemporary China studies borrow 
theoretical inspiration and interpretation of all things Chinese from numerous 
other social science fields - mostly political science, history, economics and to 
some extent anthropology. Political scientist and long-time China studies scholar, 
Andrew Nathan sums it up: “Knowledge is interdisciplinary, especially in the field 
of China studies” (Nathan in Nathan and Hua 2015: 5). In contemporary China 
studies, developments within China are most often being analyzed through the use 
of the different social sciences’ pre-existing disciplinary categories. For example, 
studies on whether or not China is unique (in e.g. its culture, politics, science etc.) 
present one vein within contemporary China studies. Such a question could be 
approached from a number of different disciplines thus analyzing the possible 
uniqueness of its bureaucratic system through comparing with different political 
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science models (e.g. Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988)27, over analyzing whether 
there is such a thing as a particularly ‘Chinese’ political culture (Nathan and Hua 
2015), or specific approaches that one can label ‘Chinese science’ (Particularly the 
lifelong work of Joseph Needham (1900-1995), see also Cao 2004 and 2014; 
MacPhail 2009).  
Rich in thick description different empirical fields in contemporary China studies, 
however, most often build on the acceptance of a particular theoretical field’s 
existing categories. For example, importing more ‘realist’ assumptions with 
political science in the analysis of Chinese politics may have impact on the way 
Chinese politics is understood. The contribution of the more constructivist 
approach of STS in this context would be to question the use of pre-existing 
categories (and perhaps their inherent assumptions) from other disciplines in the 
understanding of events in China while nevertheless continuing the empirically 
rich tradition inherent in China studies at large.  
In the combination of conceptual grounding in STS with the tradition of ‘thick’ 
historical, cultural and political description from contemporary China studies 
drawing on Jasanoff’s research is particularly relevant. This, because one of 
Jasanoff’s contributions to the STS field is the insistence on weaving together STS 
approaches and concepts with other social science fields – perhaps most notably 
political science and law (e.g. Jasanoff 1986; 1990; 2004). This fits well with the 
fact that, often studies on contemporary Chinese politics and bureaucratic politics 
draw on political science as well (e.g. Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal 
and Lampton 1992; Mertha 2008). There may therefore be common ground to 
explore here. One conceptual road where common ground may be explored, and 
which is highly relevant to the study of hydropower controversies, is a framework 
                                           
27 In addition Brødsgaard (2013:33) outlines a variety of different models and approaches applied in the analysis of 
contemporary Chinese history and politics, also underscoring the point that contemporary China studies is “a 
collective effort”. 
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developed for understanding policy making processes in China: the Fragmented 
Authoritarianism (FA) framework, which was briefly mentioned in the previous 
chapter. According to Brødsgaard (2017), FA:  
“…challenges alternative explanations that claim that it is primarily 
power or the aggregation of a rational division of labour and interest that 
drive policy outcomes in China, arguing instead that power can be easily 
manipulated, even effectively ‘vetoed’, at the policy implementation 
stages and that policy rationality is constantly being undermined by self-
interested, short-term and parochial calculations of institutional actors 
whose support is essential for the policy to even remotely succeed” 
(Brødsgaard 2017: 3).  
It is my hope, that employing FA as a conceptual tool in combination with 
conducting an STS inspired controversy study, may lead to a deeper 
contextualization of a controversy over hydropower in China. This in the sense of 
exploring the meeting between expertise in controversies, as understood in the 
STS literature, and the understandings of policy making processes in 
contemporary Chinese politics as understood through FA. FA is highly relevant to 
the study of the use of experts in hydropower policy making for a number of 
reasons. First, the framework was initially developed through empirical studies of 
the Chinese hydropower sector (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988) and was later 
expanded through, again, Mertha’s (2008) further empirically grounded studies of 
the Chinese hydropower sector and in particular controversies over dams in China. 
Most importantly, FA contributes with a deep understanding of the Chinese policy 
making process. Showing that underneath the surface of authoritarian one party 
rule the Chinese system is fragmented (hence naming the concept ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’). Although it may seem as if the top leadership decides on 
everything, all decision making from the top does not unilaterally become 
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implemented directly down through the system (Liberthal and Oksenberg 1988). 
This is explained through one of the central elements of FA: so-called bureaucratic 
bargaining.  
Bargaining in FA28 
The basic argument of the FA framework is that “the authority below the very 
peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed” (Lieberthal and 
Lampton 1992: 8). Lieberthal and Lampton (1992: 34) argue that bargaining is at 
the core of FA and that bargaining occurs particularly in technical and economic 
decision-making.29 Bargaining most often occurs between what they term:  
“proximate leaders”: entities that are “equals in the hierarchy or entities 
(persons, organizations, factions, localities) one step above and one step 
below that level” (ibid.: 50).  
Thus, the FA model’s units of analysis are the entities that engage in bargaining 
processes (e.g. persons, organizations, factions and localities). In his extension of 
the FA model in 2009, Mertha explains that the basic tenet of FA is that it:  
“explains the policy arena as being governed by incremental change via 
bureaucratic bargaining” (Mertha 2009: 996).  
Mertha also expands the model to include previously excluded actors in the policy 
making process – such as activists, the media and disgruntled officials – as a group 
termed “policy entrepreneurs” (ibid.).  
                                           
28 Parts of this next section has already been published in Brødsgaard (2017) Chapter 7: “Bargaining Science: 
Negotiating Earthquakes” written by the author. Permission to freely change and adapt the text to fit the present 
thesis has been given by Routledge. 
29 Bargaining is defined as: ‘. . . a form of reciprocal accommodation among the leaders of territorial and functional 
hierarchies’ (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992: 37). 
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Using Mertha’s (2008and 2009) vocabulary, the focus on earthquake risk could be 
deemed a new ‘issue frame’ – in this case seismicity, or seismic activity in 
designated dam building areas. According to Mertha (2008):  
 
“Although policy entrepreneurs deliberately choose from a wide array of 
symbols to construct their issue frames, these frames must be 
meaningful to the people whom they wish to mobilize for their cause. 
Moreover, the process is not a fishing expedition or an arbitrary mining 
of such symbols but rather is calculated to employ strategically those 
elements that will resonate as robustly as possible and thus draw the 
greatest number of potential recruits” (Mertha 2008: 14). 
 
As an issue frame mobilized by policy entrepreneurs such as NGOs, seismic risk 
in relation to dams evokes powerful symbols – such as the risk of major disaster. 
This can in turn be used to forward a specific agenda or outcome, in this case the 
fight against building more large-scale dams in China. Other types of issue frames 
have been employed in earlier anti-dam campaigns. A case in point is one of the 
major campaigns led by anti-dam activists in China at the beginning of the 2000s: 
the campaign against the decision to build 13 dams on the main stem of the Nu 
(Salween) River. In this campaign, the main focus was on preserving biodiversity 
and the pristine natural environment of the upper Nu River gorge – a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site (Mertha 2008 and 2009; UNESCO.org 2003/2010). This 
campaign evoked symbols of pristine natural environments, threat of biodiversity 
destruction and the extinction of unique species of plants and animals in the 
designated dam areas. According to the activists themselves, the campaign 
resulted in an unprecedented win over the dam proponents in 2004 when, the then 
premier Wen Jiabao, called an abrupt halt to the plans in order for more cautious 
and scientific studies of the environmental and social impacts of the dam projects 
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to be carried out (Jacobs 2013; McDonald 2007; Mertha 2008;). However, things 
have changed in the 10-odd years since Wen Jiabao put a moratorium on the Nu 
River dams in 2004 and as we shall see in Chapter 4, dams are back in vogue. 
From the perspective of FA, to gain momentum in different campaigns, NGOs and 
anti-dam activists are policy entrepreneurs. The process one could study with FA 
is the continuous creation of issue frames, such as seismic activity. With FA we 
can thus study a bargaining process where policy entrepreneurs, such as these 
NGOs, find and employ new arguments as tools to fight against further dams 
being built. Focusing on seismicity issues around dam construction and, for 
example, calling for more scientific research and transparent decision-making in 
relation to seismic risk assessments of dams, is an example of one such tool 
(INT20131001).  
 
In sum, FA not only explores the hydropower sector and controversies therein, the 
framework builds on knowledge of bureaucratic bargaining and the importance of 
technical bargaining processes for policy making in China. How is that, then 
connected to expertise in controversies? 
 
Science and politics 
Jasanoff’s significant contributions to STS and other fields lie in her ability to 
bridge gaps between a long tradition of constructivist micro-studies30 in e.g. the 
sociology of science (which falls under the broad STS hat) and blend these 
insights with the more macro-oriented political science. This allows her to 
                                           
30 Constructivist micro-studies refer to a broader collection of laboratory studies characterized by their interest in 
science as practice and culture. As famously phrased by Latour (1988) these studies take the “back door”  approach 
to science as a vulnerable process of building networks and alliances rather than going through the more grandiose 
“front door” of undisputable facts. Classics include Traweek’s (1988) Beamtimes and lifetimes, an anthropological 
study of natural science in a laboratory setting and Latour and Woolgars’ detailed Laboratory Life which studies 
fact making in scientific practice (Latour and Woolgar 1979). Latour would probably disagree with the label 
‘micro-study’ as one of his, and other STS scholars’, contributions have precisely been attacking the micro-macro 
divide (see e.g. Latour 1988).  
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challenge both fields and simultaneously contribute with substantial and 
empirically rich answers to questions such as:  
“To what extent do national political cultures condition the relationship 
between experts and the lay public in the policy process?” (Jasanoff 
1986: 7).  
And,  
“What do we actually know about the uses of science in policy decisions, 
and what does this suggest about the place of experts in the regulatory 
process?” (Jasanoff 1990: 4).  
Thus, building from here, it is my hope that bringing the richness of the tradition 
of ‘thick’ historical, cultural and political description from contemporary China 
studies into combination with the reflexive vocabulary of STS in the study of a 
controversy in a Chinese context may tease out new questions to contemporary 
China studies and STS alike. Questions such as: How is expertise constituted in 
China? Which types of expertise can legitimately be drawn on in the Chinese 
political system? And how do experts gain credibility and legitimacy in a non-
democratic context such as China? 
My point being that contemporary China studies need STS concepts for more 
context sensitive analyses of the role of expertise in policy making. For example 
controversy studies have pointed to the ways in which science and politics co-
produce in scientific and technical disputes. Although FA also analyses technical 
disputes, the framework does not take into account the science being discussed in 
the dispute but rather focuses e.g. on the ranking of the institution to which the 
scientist belongs. FA contributes with a view of the Chinese bureaucracy that 
highlights the intricacies of the Chinese system which is invaluable to 
understanding the bureaucratic aspects of a controversy in a Chinese context. 
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However, the way FA categorizes in more static units of analysis, assuming that 
when e.g. a person belongs to an NGO this person cannot simultaneously be part 
of another category (e.g. a journalist), means that the framework does not have the 
conceptual vocabulary to 1) explain the role of scientists and 2) explain the role 
scientific expertise plays in technical disputes such as a controversy.  
However, STS also needs contemporary China studies. As mentioned, FA can 
explain some of the bureaucratic intricacies in the Chinese system which can be 
hard to grasp for newcomers to the study of policy making in China. In addition, 
contemporary China studies can provide a more thorough understand of non- 
democratic policy environments such as the Chinese, and thus how expert politics 
may play out in a Chinese setting. Here e.g. bureaucratic ranking is important. 
Essentially FA needs to take scientists and science into account, but lacks the 
vocabulary to do so and this is where STS comes in. The other way around, STS 
studies on controversies has been developed with cases based in democratic 
settings. Contemporary China studies can contribute with understandings of how a 
non-democratic bureaucratic system such as the Chinese use and treat expertise in 
policy making. Thereby bridging gaps between STS and contemporary China 
studies.  
The agenda of mixing Chinese insights with STS has already been taken up by e.g. 
Greenhalgh (2008) in her study of the making of China’s one-child policy and by 
Cao (2014) in his analysis of China’s pursuit of the Nobel Prize. Furthermore, 
using STS in a Chinese context has also been taken up through the founding of the 
Journal of East Asian Science and Technology Studies (EASTS). Debates about 
the acceptability of an ‘application of STS sentiments in a Chinese context’ seem 
to abound here (Fu 2007). Discussions about a ‘post-colonial STS’ exploring 
questions such as “How might Science and Technology Studies learn from the 
intersection between ‘Western’ and ‘other’ forms of knowledge?” (Lin and Law 
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2014) are also found in this vein led by prominent scholars from other branches of 
STS such as John Law. Rather than going down the ‘post-colonial’ road, the thesis 
is positioned so as to combine 1) the rich and detailed empirical studies of Chinese 
politics, policy making and dam controversies done under the broad umbrella of 
contemporary China Studies with 2) the sophisticated conceptual tools of STS in 
analyzing expert politics through the lens of a controversy study. Through 
combining these two strands, fundamental questions such as the role of science 
and expert knowledge in policy making in China may perhaps be discussed in new 
ways.  
 
Where do you go to study experts and expertise at work in policy making? How to 
go about studying expert politics? The key to studying expert politics and the role 
of expertise is controversies. The next section focuses on STS literature concerned 
with controversies and further work in STS which has expanded upon controversy 
studies to broaden the framework for organizing studies mindful of the fluid 
boundaries between science and politics – also deemed work in “the idiom of co-
production” (Jasanoff 2004). 
Controversy studies 
Controversy studies in STS have provided a prominent avenue by way of which 
STS has achieved its more general ambition, i.e. to understand the close 
connection between scientific knowledge production, technological change and 
socio-political order (Bruun Jensen et al. 2007). While some STS scholars were 
busy inventing new and radical ways of studying scientific controversies and 
knowledge-production in laboratories (Bloor 1976; Collins 1975 and 1981; 
Pickering 1984; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Knorr Cetina 1977, 1981, 1995 and 
1999; Traweek 1988), others focused more on how science and technology 
became controversial outside the laboratory and in wider socio-political processes 
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(Nelkin 1979/1992; Jasanoff 1986 and 2004). The scholarship of Sheila Jasanoff 
dominates in this latter vein in STS. For a good reason, as she is one of the most 
persistent within this STS branch to continuously have studied expert politics in 
different empirical settings since the 1980s (Jasanoff 1986, 1990, 1995a, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2005a; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). Jasanoff is of course not the only 
STS scholar to have delved into, or touched on, matters of expertise and expert 
politics. Others STS scholars, such as Wynne (1992, 1992a and 2002), Funtowicz 
and Ravetz (1994), Benessia et al. (2016), Irwin (1987 and 1997), Collins and 
Evans (2002 and 2007), Lynch and Cole (2005; see also Lynch et al. 2008) have 
made significant contributions to the understanding of matters of expertise. I will 
primarily be drawing on this latter branch of STS as the Zipingpu-Wenchuan 
controversy is very much a controversy implicating wider socio-political processes 
in China. Thus these types of studies can provide useful concepts for analysis. 
Studying different kinds of controversies has been at the core of STS since the 
early 1970s. 31  Controversies were seen as a way to explore science-society 
relations, opening up what might otherwise be taken for granted assumptions 
among different professional and expert groups contributing to the discussion of 
science and democracy (Nelkin 1979/1992). Politics were central to studies of 
techno-scientific controversies playing out in the public and policy making 
domains. Nelkin (1971; 1979/1992) was one of the early pioneers in bringing 
together analyses on the politics inherent in technical controversies. According to 
Nelkin (1979/1992): 
“Controversies over science and technology revolve around the question 
of political control: Who controls decisions about the development and 
application of science?” (Nelkin 1979/1992: x).   
                                           
31 For a very early study of technical controversies providing some antecedents for later ‘controversy studies’ see 
Nelkin 1971. 
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This question was explored through cases on e.g. animal rights controversies, fetal 
research disputes, nuclear energy controversies, AIDS and DNA research debates 
(Nelkin 1979/1992). The cases highlighted the blending of facts and values in 
technical disputes over politically sensitive science (Nelkin 1979/1992). Studies of 
risk controversies developed out of this vein (e.g. Jasanoff 1986). 
To close controversies in favor of one position or another (if at all), different actor 
alliances and constituencies attempt different strategies to close the controversy 
according to their understanding (Bruun Jensen et al. 2007). Often, this is where 
scientific evidence comes into play as science is seen as source of epistemic and 
social authority. However, this is in many ways also where the problem originates 
from, as knowledge is often uncertain and emerging, and consensus may never be 
reached or be prolonged so that disagreement and controversy simply persists 
(Venturini 2010 and 2012). This point has been corroborated in numerous STS 
inspired controversy studies over the years (e.g. Barry 2013; Schaffer 2005; 
Jasanoff 2005a). In Barry’s (2013) words, studies of knowledge controversies 
demonstrate that: 
“…we should not expect that the disagreements that exist between 
experts will necessarily lead to a consensus (…) , or that scientific 
evidence will provide a firm foundation or ‘rational solution’ on which 
political decisions can then be made” (Barry 2013: 7-8).  
Evaluating societal risks is central to technical or expert controversies in the 
political domain. According to Irwin (1987);  
 
“What is also clear is the fundamentally uncertain nature of risk 
decisions – where action must inevitably be made in a climate of 
technical and political disagreement” (Irwin 1987: 354).  
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In expert or technical controversies that are inherently political, different nation 
states have been shown to have different approaches in terms of policy making in 
order to come to terms with uncertain scientific data and emerging science. 
Building on what is essentially the same scientific evidence, studies have time and 
again shown that different countries take different policy making roads, depending 
on, among other factors, political systems, bureaucratic arrangements, political 
cultures and ideas of scientific independence from politics (Jasanoff 1986; 
Brickman et al. 1985). Exploring this in a Chinese context is part of the aim of this 
thesis. 
 
Controversies over technical, scientific and risk issues have thus been points of 
entry into analyzing the constitution and deployment of expertise in contested 
processes of political decision making, negotiation and struggle. One example of 
such a case is Brian Wynne’s (1989) case on risk communication. Wynne analyzes 
conflicts between sheep farmers and officials in Cumbria after radioactive 
contamination from the Chernobyl accident affected parts of the UK, particularly 
Cumbria. The case points to specific cultural and social assumptions that affected 
the overall credibility of experts and expert science used to regulate sheep farming 
in the wake of fallout from the Chernobyl accident.  
 
Controversies, debates and disagreements in parliaments, courts and in the public 
domain across Europe, the US and to some extent Asian countries have served as 
fertile ground in STS for studying how experts and expertise are constituted and 
constructed in policy making processes, policy debates, during trials in court etc. 
This has resulted in cases on diverse subjects such as biotechnology and stem-cell 
research (Jasanoff 2005), potentially carcinogenic and toxic substances (Jasanoff 
1986) and fingerprinting technology (Lynch et al. 2008; Lynch and Cole 2005). 
Other examples are controversy studies on anything from oil pipelines (Barry 
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2013) over dams in India (Rogers and Marres 2008) to studies on disagreements in 
Parliament over compulsory seat-belt wear in Britain (Irwin 1987). In other words, 
controversies over new science and technology and how it should be regulated are 
often places ripe for studying the intermingling of science, politics and expertise 
(Barry 2013; Jasanoff 2004; Jasanoff 2012; Nelkin 1979/1992).  
 
As may be surmised, studying controversies involving the intermingling of 
scientific evidence with political deliberation often centers on expertise. Jasanoff 
points to the notion controversies can serve as a “means of organizing work in the 
co-productionist idiom” (Jasanoff 2004). For Jasanoff (2004): 
 
“…co-production offers new ways of thinking about power, highlighting 
the often invisible role of knowledge, expertise, technical practices and 
material objects in shaping, sustaining, subverting or transforming 
relations of authority” (Ibid.: 4). 
 
Thus, co-production can serve theoretical aims by focusing on the study of a 
controversy. This point finds particular resonance with the present thesis, where 
analyses of the case of Zipingpu involves a particular scientific controversy and 
related hydropower controversies that are not only complex and cross-disciplinary 
in nature but also highly politicized at the same time. Thus, the production of 
knowledge and the exercise of power become intertwined and co-produced 
(Jasanoff 2004) in such cases. This makes controversy studies an apt point of 
departure in attempting to understand the constitution of expertise in the Zipingpu 
controversy and start a discussion of the role of expert knowledge in hydropower 
policy making in China.  
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Controversy or controversies? 
One important issue in studying controversies is that often the involved parties do 
not necessarily agree on what the controversy is actually about (Barry 2013; Tsing 
2005). In other words, the issues in controversies are open to multiple framings 
(Wynne 2002). Seen in this way, it becomes clear that  
 
“Controversies have contested identities and multiple vectors of 
contention. In this sense the scope of a controversy ‘is part of its effects, 
of the problem posed in the future it creates’” (Barry 2013: 9).  
 
Thus, taking the controversy at the center of this thesis as an example means that 
not only is the Zipingpu controversy revolving around whether the dam triggered 
the Wenchuan earthquake itself a scientific controversy, but one of the effects of 
discussing this in scientific journals was that hydropower could be framed as a 
problematic policy option for sustainable energy. Raising questions such as: Are 
dams safe? Should more dams be built in earthquake prone zones? Consequently, 
the scope of the controversy broadened in time. To, follow Barry’s 
characterization further: 
 
“Controversies are neither static locations nor isolated occasions; they 
are sets of relations in motion, progressively actualized. They contain 
multiple sites and events that may lead to ‘vast chains of new events’, 
interfering with the dynamic evolution of other controversies” (Barry 
2013:10).32 
                                           
32 Barry quotes May and Thrift (2001), Thrift (2006: 549) and Born (2010) within in the quote. These references 
have been taken out of the quote for clarity. The precise quote including original references is as follows: 
“Controversies are neither static locations nor isolated occasions; they are sets of relations in motion, progressively 
actualized (May and Thrift 2001). They contain multiple sites and events that may lead to ‘vast chains of new 
events’ (Thrift 2006b: 549), interfering with the dynamic evolution of other controversies (Born 2010)” (Barry 
2013:10).  
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To sum up, controversies not only generate heat – in terms of heated debates over 
particular societal issues. They also generate light – in terms of illuminating 
competing perspectives and assumptions.33 In other words,  
 
“It follows that important aspects of political behavior and action cluster 
around the ways in which knowledge is generated, disputed, and used to 
underwrite collective decisions” (Jasanoff 2005: 6).  
 
Points of controversy in this way highlight the role of expertise where politics and 
science meet. In terms of the role of expert knowledge, we can perhaps now ask 
what role do experts and expertise play in China considering what we know of the 
ways in which science-politics relations seem to have evolved in the Western 
hemisphere? If in a democratic system government decisions regarding for 
example the regulation of carcinogens (Jasanoff 1986) are subject to scrutiny from 
‘the public’ as the ultimate authority. What – or rather who – is the higher 
authority in the Chinese system? Chinese public opinion does seem to matter a 
great deal to Chinese policy makers - e.g. as a way of ensuring legitimacy of the 
Party (Naughton 2007; Teets 2013). However, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is probably a more accurate authority to put at the top of policy makers’ list 
in terms of securing legitimacy for policy decisions as it seems nothing is above 
the party in China (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982/2004).  
Let us now have a look at how Chinese science-politics relations have developed 
during the last decades and then return to the questions which have been opened 
up in the above. 
  
                                           
33 I am indebted to Professor Alan Irwin for directing my attention to this point. 
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Chapter 3: Science and politics in the 
People’s Republic of China 
The present chapter outlines the history of science-politics relations in China from 
the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 to today, based on literature 
from contemporary China studies.34 In particular, focus is directed to the branches 
of contemporary China studies analyzing the history of contemporary Chinese 
politics, and the interrelationship between science, intellectuals and political elites 
in China after 1949 (e.g. Cao 2004; Goldman 1996 and 1999; Greenhalgh 2008; 
Halpern 1989 and 1992; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal and Lampton 
1992; Mertha 2008).  
This chapter therefore primarily draws on contemporary China studies for its 
structure and content. The aims is to provide contextualization through a 
description of the changing relationship between science and politics in China as 
portrayed in literature focused on the Chinese political system and thus show the 
political constitution of science in China since 1949.  
The chapter is divided into periods corresponding to the changing top leaderships 
in China after 1949 encompassing five different top-leadership periods from Mao 
Zedong to Xi Jinping. Subdividing the inquiry according to leadership reflects a 
long-standing practice in studies of contemporary Chinese politics. Referring to 
the top leader naturally grounds the study at particular times and places in the 
political history of China, the logic of which is natural to observers and 
researchers of Chinese politics as shifts in policy focus often follow in the wake of 
changes in top-leadership. Since China to a large extent exercises a “leader-centric 
politics of discourse” (Greenhalgh 2008: 51) it is suitable to divide the shifting 
                                           
34 Contemporary China studies focus solely on ‘modern China’ – i.e. developments after the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949. 
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relationship between politics and science into periods of the different leaderships 
as the leadership and their discourse influenced not only policy making but 
science making as well (Greenhalgh 2008: 51). There have, of course, been 
reforms, plans, people and party discussions that cross the span of the different 
leaderships. The most important of these in relation to the political constitution of 
science will be addressed under the relevant leadership.  
Conducting a review of science-politics relations in a chronological manner based 
on a review of literature from a broad field spanning contemporary China studies 
and more narrowly studies on contemporary Chinese political history and the 
interrelationship between science, intellectuals and political elites in modern 
China provides some challenges. For example, following a categorization such as 
‘intellectuals’ through Chinese history since 1949 and up till today begs the 
question as to how an intellectual is actually defined (Cao 2004). Given what we 
know from studies in STS, as reviewed above, about the fluid and changing nature 
of categorizations it should come as no surprise that what constitutes an 
intellectual changes with changes in political winds and political views of science. 
This issue will become evident throughout the next pages. The baseline in 
contemporary China is Mao, so let us first focus on the Mao leadership. 
Science-politics relations under Mao (1949-1976) 
In the first years after the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China 
imported the Soviet model with substantial Soviet support (Lieberthal 2004: 71). 
The model entailed “specialized universities combined with a large network of 
research institutes” (Zhong and Yang 2007: 319). In 1949, what would later 
become the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) – “China’s most important 
scientific establishment” (Cao 2004: 1) – was established as a government agency. 
The establishment of a national academy was part of following the Soviet model 
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where scientific activity was placed in research academies closely related to 
various ministries (Cao 2004: 27). CAS has endured to the present day and still 
has a dual role of both conducting research and acting as an honorific society for 
outstanding scientists, unlike the e.g. the Royal Society of London which is a 
purely honorific society (Cao 2004: 1).  
Lieberthal regards the view of science and technology imported with the Soviet 
model as follows:  
“this model stressed full utilization of technical expertise while 
maintaining a tight rein on the artistic and creative intelligentsia” 
(Lieberthal 2004: 71).  
Indeed, under Mao, most scientific research was focused on centrally planned 
projects related to the military (Greenhalgh 2008; Zhong and Yang 2007: 319). 
Mao had a dislike of intellectuals and this dislike subsequently came to provide a 
great deal of influence on Chinese politics. His views also quickly clashed with 
parts of the Soviet model (Lieberthal 2004) - particularly with regard to 
intellectuals. According to Lieberthal (2004: 71) Mao’s anti-intellectualism was 
reflected in his view of science. Although Mao emphasized scientific inquiry, his 
view seemed to have been far removed from what is largely understood as critical 
inquiry or scientific method but seemed to be more a case of “selective empiricism” 
i.e. trying out ideas in one or a few places then summing up results. This then 
counted as ‘scientific’ (Lieberthal 2004: 71). Mao’s understanding was based on 
so-called ‘democratic centralism’ which emphasized practical experience among 
the revolutionary masses. Science under Mao was thus more a class issue with the 
goal of serving a revolutionary purpose and not an apolitical, abstract ideal. 
According to Shih (1970):  
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“Many scientists were told to learn from “countrified experts”, that is, 
from those who possessed practical ingenuity rather than theoretical 
knowledge or understanding” (Shih 1970: 233).  
Shih (1970) concluded that:  
“In reality, what the Chinese Communists are really looking for is not 
science but applied technology” (Ibid).  
The Mao era was thus characterized by the focus on practical experience. This 
turned science into serving primarily revolutionary and political ends under Mao 
(Shih 1970). 
A 12-year plan (1956-1967) for “scientific and technological development”, a top-
down and state directed model based on the Soviet system, was presented at the 
CCP’s 8th national congress in September 1956 (Sullivan and Liu 2015: Iii). 
Among other goals the program was to aid rapid development of science and 
technology catching up with world science (Cao 2004: 29). Furthermore, the 
program was the first to promote “missions-led disciplinary development” (ibid). 
“Missions” were politically oriented and the program has, according to Cao (2004: 
29), left a legacy of “politicization of science, state-led research endeavor, big 
science, resource concentration and top-down interference”. 
In May 1958, the soviet model was generally radicalized by the new ideologically 
infused development strategy of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) which was 
endorsed by the CCP central committee (Sullivan and Liu 2015: Iiii). However, in 
terms of science and technology the Great Leap Forward departs from the Soviet 
Model in the view of science. During the Great Leap “local scientific activities 
expanded through “worker’s innovation” (Qureshi and Kharbanda 1980). 
“Worker’s innovation” seems to be perfectly aligned with the promotion of the 
“popularization of science” campaign during the Great Leap. The CCP 
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mouthpiece, People’s Daily promoted this campaign declaring that “science is no 
mystery” (Sullivan and Liu 2015: liii). The disastrous consequences of the Great 
Leap Forward’s goal of attempting to  overtake Britain economically in 15 years 
have been well documented elsewhere (Shapiro 2001; Sullivan and Liu 2015). 
Nevertheless it highlights the Mao-era trend of campaigns revolving around anti-
intellectual sentiments. Anti-intellectual sentiments were thus also among the 
drivers behind the anti-rightist campaign (1957) and the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76). During the Cultural Revolution scientists and intellectuals as a group 
more generally were decimated. Indeed, according to Lieberthal (2004: 242) the 
Cultural Revolution “crushed all semblance of intellectual input and prestige”. 
Only military research survived relatively unscathed from the upheavals of the 
Cultural Revolution decade (Cao 2004: 29; Greenhalgh 2005 and 2008; Lieberthal 
2004: 71).  
As should be clear, the Mao-era was a turbulent time in Chinese history, not least 
as seen through the relations between the shifting political agendas and the place 
and organization of the sciences in Chinese society. Political struggles between 
different factions and people in the party also contributed to the radical campaigns 
and contradictory policies towards intellectuals as the party under Mao attempted 
to come to terms with this group. This, particularly as Mao throughout his life 
according to Lieberthal (2004): 
“…detested the Chinese intelligentsia, which included doctors, scientists, 
engineers, and journalists, as well as scholars and creative writers” 
(2004: 71). 
Despite later periods’ departure from the chaotic and struggle-filled period under 
Mao, the Mao-era left a legacy for subsequent leaders to deal with. Deng Xiaoping 
was the first leader to have to tackle the legacy of Mao. 
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Science-politics relations under Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989)  
In the mid-70s Deng Xiaoping, in the position of vice-premier and Hu Yaobang35 
(who later became general secretary) drafted a number of documents that caused 
significant debates in the party, but nevertheless can be seen as a preview of the 
coming shift in political winds in China. The three most important documents 
drafted by Deng and Hu emphasized 1) the importance of research and education, 
2) the need for economic development and ways of encouraging this and 3) stable 
and professional leadership in the state (Vogel 2011. See also Brødsgaard 1997: 
32-33).36 Around 1976, the campaign against “three big poisonous weeds” (san 
zhu da du cao) - referring to the three documents – was initiated and subsequently 
Deng was purged from all his posts. Nevertheless, after the death of Mao in 
September 1976, and an ensuing period of intense power-struggle in the party, 
Deng regained power.  
From the late 1970s the well-known “reform and open up” period began under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Deng managed to turn the Mao-era’s anti-
intellectualism on its head by steering China down the path of “the four 
modernizations”. The four modernizations had the goal of modernizing agriculture, 
industry, national defense and science & technology (Lieberthal 2004: 134). This 
meant changing the core idea of Maoist ideology towards “seeking truth from 
facts”37. This path was endorsed at the third plenum in 1978 (ibid: 136). The 
emphasis on “seeking truth from facts” marked the beginning of a period where 
                                           
35 From December 1977 head of the powerful communist party organization department.  
36 The documents were called: 1) The Outline Report on the Work of Science and Technology” or “Some Problems 
Concerning the Work of Science and Technology”, 2) “Some Problems Concerning the  Acceleration of Industrial 
development” and 3) “The General Programme for All Work of the Party and the Country” (Li and Lok 1995: 385-
386). 
37 Seeking truth from facts (shi shi qiu shi) was actually a quote from Mao, who in turn had borrowed the concept 
from the writer Ban Gu from the Eastern Han period (25-220AD). Mao interpreted the original phrase and gave it 
new meaning in 1941 in line with his ideas of emphasizing practical experience from the revolutionary masses. In 
1981, the phrase was officially reinterpreted by the CPC so that the term came in line with the new leadership’s 
views, although it had already been used in the newer interpretation prior to 1981. See Li and Lok (1995) for a 
more detailed description of the evolution of the concept. 
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government decisions were to be based on scientifically derived knowledge or 
“scientific decision making” (Halpern 1989: 159-161) in many ways ushering in 
an emphasis on modern scientific methods as a basis for policy making (see also 
Cao 2004: 50). In a speech in May 1977, Deng referred specifically to this new 
turn:  
“We must create within the Party an atmosphere of knowledge and 
respect for trained personnel. The erroneous attitude of not respecting 
intellectuals must be opposed” (Deng as quoted in Halpern 1989: 158. 
See also Marinelli 2013: 119). 
In 1978 intellectuals, including scientists, were rehabilitated. This meant that their 
previous ‘stinking number nine’ category - a label they had received during the 
Cultural Revolution – was removed and they were accepted as part of the working 
class.38 This for example became clear as Deng proclaimed that “natural science 
has no class character” (Sullivan and Liu 2015: x). The apparent turn towards 
knowledge and modern scientific methods marked a clear departure from Mao’s 
anti-intellectualism. In turn, at the end of 1978, the third plenum of the eleventh 
central committee declared that, 
“henceforth the top priority goal would be to achieve the four 
modernizations (….) and that the correctness of all policies would be 
judged in terms of whether they facilitated or hindered achieving that 
goal rather than in terms of their fidelity to Mao Zedong Thought” 
(Lieberthal 2004:136).  
                                           
38 The ‘Stinking number nine’ (chou lao jiu) category was applied to intellectuals as one of nine categories of 
political-social undesirables during the Cultural Revolution. Number nine was at the bottom of the list after 
landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, moral degenerates, rightists, renegades, enemy agents and 
capitalists. On the historical origins of the concept from the Yuan Dynasty and a more in-depth description of the 
concept see Li and Lok (1995:27). 
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In achieving the four modernizations Deng emphasized that “the modernization of 
science and technology are the key” (Deng Xiaoping as quoted in Sullivan and Liu 
2015: x). However, modernization also entailed opening up and attracting foreign 
investments. China’s international image became something Deng cared about as 
he and his colleagues found that they needed help from abroad (Goldman 1996: 
41). The prioritization to open up and reform the Chinese economy and the 
prioritization of science and technology as a key to modernization kept some 
check on the few campaigns that, as during the Mao years, were still initiated 
against intellectuals. The campaigns in 1981, 1983 and 1987 were against a few 
writers, against ‘spiritual pollution’ and against ‘bourgeois liberalization (both 
references to western values) respectively (ibid: 42). However, the campaigns 
were more narrowly defined than campaigns under Mao, and science and 
technology were most often ‘off limits’ so that the campaigns were directed at 
particular individuals (often to discipline political rivals) or a limited group of 
people in e.g. arts and literature (Sullivan and Liu 2015: xii-xiii). The campaigns 
were also short lived (Goldman 1996: 40-41).  
Expert advice and disciplining the bureaucracy 
Despite the campaigns - which were most often an outcome of internal party 
struggles - the 1980s marked a clear turn towards including experts in the policy 
making process. This was done not only though the “recruitment of educated 
individuals into leadership positions” (Halpern 1989: 157) but also through the 
establishment of expert advisory bodies:  
“Deng reorganized the advisory system by creating new bodies to 
supplement bureaucratic sources of advice, and, more important, to 
structure that advice so as to overcome bureaucratic deficiencies” 
(Halpern 1989: 160). 
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Five research centers were set up in the period between 1980 and 1982 with the 
purpose to solicit advice from experts from both inside and outside the 
bureaucracy. 39  Experts from the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) were here considered as ‘outsiders’ 
to the bureaucracy. This is of course a point of debate, as researchers in CAS and 
CASS were - and still are – state employees and while not part of the core of the 
bureaucracy such as e.g. employees in a ministry, “independent” does perhaps not 
cover their position entirely either.40 Nevertheless, despite each center having a 
particular purpose in itself, there were common purposes to organizing expert 
advice through the centers. Thus the centers were to provide alternative sources of 
advice than those coming from the traditional core bureaucracy, sort out 
conflicting views coming from different sectors of the bureaucracy, improve long-
term planning, and channel external advice to the top leadership (Halpern 1989: 
162-163. See also Halpern 1992). Inter-ministerial rivalries and turf battles have 
long been an issue in Chinese politics and policy making (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Brødsgaard 2017) - the Deng-era 
being no exception (Goldman 1996). Halpern (1989) suggests that the inclusion of 
experts into the policy making apparatus in the 1980s can be seen as a part of 
attempting to mediate and navigate such conflicts within the bureaucratic system 
and the policy making process more generally as “China shifts to a new basis: 
expertise, rather than ideology”(Ibid: 166). She goes on to argue that:  
                                           
39 These were: The Economics Research Center (ERC), the Technical Economics Research Center (TERC), the 
Price Research Centre, the Rural Research Centre and the Economic Legislation Research Center. Already in 1985 
three of the research centers (ERC, TERC and the Price Research Centre) were combined into the Economic, 
Technological, and Social Development Research Centre (ETSRC) (Halpern 1989:162). 
40 For a fuller discussion of the organization of the research centers and a discussion of bureaucratic bargaining and 
“competitive persuasion” processes see Halpern 1989 and Halpern 1992. For further consideration of experts’ 
independence in China see Cao (2004).  
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“While still political, this ‘politics’ operates in a new fashion and 
suggests that experts have acquired a more central position within the 
political system” (Halpern 1989: 166).  
This meant that according to Halpern’s (1989) analysis already in the mid-1980s:  
“… political competition appears to be conducted at least partially 
through competing use of experts and expertise” (Halpern 1989: 174).  
The ability of top leaders - notably then premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang 
- to draw on different experts, not only those connected directly to line 
bureaucracies, but also ‘outsiders’ such as researchers at CAS, CASS and other 
relevant institutions pertinent to a certain policy process helped discipline the  
bureaucracy. This meant that in some ways the traditional information flows in the 
bureaucracy were disrupted by the establishment of the centers, which in turn 
meant that the bureaucracy had to:  
“consider more fully the externalities of their policy proposals during 
the drafting process, as the bureaucrats knew that their proposals would 
have to compete with those of the pertinent research institutes” 
(Lieberthal and Lampton 1992: 14).  
The bureaucratic system under Mao did not invite a broader vision and expert 
consideration of policy externalities in this sense (Halpern 1992; Lieberthal and 
Lampton 1992:14-15).  
In sum, in the Deng era, while the policy making process was turned towards 
“scientific decision making” by relying more on trained and educated expertise, 
and a newer understanding of science, the increasing reliance on experts also 
seems to have contributed to the policy making process becoming more complex. 
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Science-politics relations under Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) 
The demonstrations on Tiananmen Square in June 1989 and subsequent party in-
fighting resulted in Deng replacing Zhao Ziyang with Jiang Zemin as party 
general secretary that same year (Goldman 1999: 701-703).41 Also in 1989, Jiang 
succeeded Deng as chairman of the party’s central military commission. In 1993, 
Jiang Zemin became president of China (Marinelli 2013: 119-120). Although 
Jiang formally took over in 1989, Deng continued to influence Chinese politics 
until his death in 1997.42 Particularly Deng’s famous “southern tour” (nanxun) in 
1992 where he visited special economic zones in the southern Guangdong 
Province in many ways served to quell internal party disagreements between those 
who were supporting the move towards a market economy and those who warned 
against “the evils of capitalism” (Goldman 1999: 703). Although Deng was 
officially not leading China, his southern tour reignited the economic reform 
program and the ‘opening up’ policy which had slowed down after the events of 
1989 (Vogel 2011). 
Like the leadership under Deng, the leadership under Jiang continued to have 
campaigns against intellectuals such as against “all-out westernization” (Goldman 
1999: 702).43 Campaigns could be used, as they had been previously, in party 
infighting between e.g. those who opposed further market reforms and those who 
did not. Like under Deng, the campaigns were short-lived. Furthermore, they “did 
not stop the inflow of Western ideas and products” (ibid). Intellectuals, artists and 
professionals who stayed away from politics suffered little restraints during the 
                                           
41 Not only Deng supported and orchestrated this change other central figures close to Deng such as Chen Yun and 
Li Xinnian were instrumental in getting Jiang Zemin chosen – see Vogel (2011) for an in depth description of 
events. 
42 How much Deng dominated in his later years has been the subject of debate. See e.g. Cheng and White (1998: 
236). 
43 The purpose of the “all-out Westernization” campaign was to halt the inflow of Western ideals from abroad – 
which could be anything from democratic ideals to western products (Goldman 1999).  
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1990s (ibid: 702-703). In her review of the relationship between intellectuals and 
the state in the 1990s Goldman (1999: 711) concludes that: 
“…there is no question that most Chinese intellectuals and students in 
the 1990s enjoyed more individual and intellectual freedoms, access to 
foreign counterparts and a more pluralistic cultural environment than at 
any other time in the history of the PRC” (ibid.). 
Jiang in many ways continued Deng’s line of argument in his view of intellectuals 
and furthered their prominence in China’s “socialist modernization” (Marinelli 
2013: 121). According to Marinelli’s (2013) analysis of Jiang’s speeches and the 
discourse on intellectuals under Jiang:  
“…science and technology are indirectly presented as one of the 
fundamental preconditions for social stability, and, by extension, as a 
contribution to the authority of the CCP and its monopoly on power” 
(Marinelli 2013: 123).   
Intellectuals under Jiang more officially became part of the working class and in 
several speeches in 1990 Jiang emphasized that intellectuals were to play an 
“irreplaceable function in socialist modernization” and that:  
“…if intellectuals do not participate in (socialist) construction and the 
victory of the reform policy, both become truly impossible” (Jiang as 
quoted in Marinelli 2013:121).   
Another group that officially became more fully accepted by the CCP during the 
Jiang leadership was private business entrepreneurs. With the inclusion of Jiang’s 
“Three Represents” (sange daibiao) into party constitution at the 16th national 
congress of the CCP, private entrepreneurs – another word for capitalists – could 
become members of the CCP (Brødsgaard and Christensen 2002). This was an 
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important and unprecedented move by the CCP so as to be able to ensure that the 
party had some sway over the private sector, which during the 1990s became an 
increasingly important force in Chinese economic development (for further 
discussion of this point, see Brødsgaard and Christensen 2002).  
During Jiang’s leadership, reforms of the science and technology system which 
had been initiated under Deng continued. The national strategies of ‘revitalizing 
the nation through science and education’ and ‘acceleration of progress in Science 
and technology’ pushed further the orientation of science and technology towards 
commercialization (Benner et al. 2012: 261). In 1998, a leadership small group on 
science, technology and education under the State Council was also established.44 
Enter the technocrats 
A striking characteristic of the leadership under Jiang as opposed to the Deng 
leadership was the dominance of so-called technocrats45  in the leadership. In 1997, 
when the composition of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP was completed, 
18 out of 24 Politbureau members were educated in engineering (Cheng and 
White 1998: 231). According to Cheng and White (1998) technocrats have 
increasingly figured more prominently in Chinese politics since the early Deng 
years. With Jiang’s leadership consolidation, technocrats for the first time 
dominated in top-level political positions (ibid; Marinelli 2013). During the 1990s, 
the CCP also started institutionalizing rules and norms regarding e.g. the criteria 
for educational background for leading cadres (Brødsgaard and Christensen 2002). 
The fact that so many top leaders under Jiang had technical backgrounds 
(engineering being the dominant one) may have had an impact on their policy 
preferences – although this is subject to some debate (Cheng and White 1998: 
                                           
44 On the importance of Leadership Small Groups see Grünberg (2015). 
45  Cheng and White (1998: 231) define technocrats as having three traits “technical educations, professional 
experience, and high posts”. 
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234-235). Nevertheless, it seems that the Jiang-era ushered in changes furthering 
the departure from the Mao–years in terms of the political establishments’ 
relationship with intellectuals as well as capitalists. The overriding focus during 
the Jiang years was, according to Marinelli (2013), to preserve stability and ensure 
the authority of the CCP. Rule by technocrats and the further inscription of 
intellectuals and capitalists into the socialist modernization cause can thus be seen 
as part of this project. In terms of e.g. party politics, the stability and authority of 
the CCP became easier to preserve and balance when previous ‘class enemies’ 
were assimilated into the party.  
Science-politics relations during the Hu Jintao leadership 
(2002-2012) 
The transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao was, despite rumors about factional 
in-fighting within the party, outwardly a relatively smooth process (Brødsgaard 
and Christensen 2002). However, according to Holbig (2009: 46) as a 
consequence of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents’ being written into the CCP 
party constitution, with the inclusion of the so-called ‘new economic elites’ into 
the party, Hu Jintao, on taking over, faced serious discussions regarding party 
legitimacy. Public discussions and criticism over including capitalists and 
‘exploiters’ into the party eventually led to a ban on media, party organizations 
and academic discussions of the subject (Ibid: 47, see also Fewsmith 2005). As 
such, it seems that under the leadership of Hu, there was a move to back away 
from the increasing tolerance of the freer expression of ideas under Jiang Zemin 
(Fewsmith 2005).  
Getting a grip on science-politics relations from Hu Jintao onwards becomes 
increasingly complicated as China had now been through a long period of relative 
openness to the flow of ideas from the outside. At this stage ‘intellectuals’ were 
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included at all levels of party and state from the top leadership and into the 
bureaucratic administration – also as a consequence of reorganization of 
recruitment and promotion criteria in the state apparatus (Brødsgaard and 
Christensen 2002: 10).  
In a sense, the socialist modernization process under Hu Jintao became even more 
deeply intertwined with the push for the development of modern science and 
technology. According to Benner et al. (2012) a commercialization of science 
trend begun under Deng Xiaoping came into full force from 2005 onwards, where 
the Chinese innovation system developed into a firm-centered phase (Benner et al. 
2012:260; OECD 2008). Thus, science and technology were to be integrated with 
innovation so as to bring China forward in terms of new science based products 
and solutions. In 2006, the State Council announced the “The National Medium- 
and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)” 
(Guojia zhong chang qi kexue he jishu fazhan guihua gangyao) (People’s 
Republic of China. National Development and Reform Commission, 2007). The 
plan runs to 2020. It outlined important areas where China was to put extra 
emphasis as regards the development of science and technology. This included: 
“…research in basic sciences and frontier technologies, with priority 
given to energy, water resources and environmental protection” (Wen 
2008: 649).  
According to Seger and Breidne’s (2007) analysis of the plan, one of the plan’s 
defining features is the technical approach to achieving goals:  
“…the contribution to China’s future growth from innovations should be 
50% larger than that from labor and capital inputs” (ibid: 162).  
This approach is cited as an example of an “obsession with numbers and formulas” 
(ibid). Seger and Breidne (2007) cite the composition of the Politbureau as one of 
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the reasons for this highly technical focus of the plan. The nine members of the 
Politbureau Standing Committee were from 2002 and until the 17th party congress 
in 2007 represented by seven engineers and two members educated in geology and 
mining (Brødsgaard 2002: 140). From 2007, this composition of educational 
representation only changed marginally with engineers still dominating the 
Politbureau Standing Committee (Li 2007; Miller 2008). In sum, technocrats 
continued to dominate at the top of the party after Hu Jintao took over.  
The Scientific Outlook on Development 
Shortly after becoming president of China in 2003, Hu Jintao (who took over as 
General Secretary of the CCP in 2002) introduced the concept of Scientific 
Outlook on Development (kexue fazhan guan). In 2012, when Hu Jintao gave the 
reigns over to current president Xi Jinping, the concept was written into the party 
constitution on par with the ‘theories’ of the previous leaders:  
“Together with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, the 
Scientific Outlook on Development is the theoretical guidance the Party 
must adhere to for a long time” (Hu Jintao’s speech at the 18th party 
congress as quoted by Xinhua 2012b). 
The concept of Scientific Outlook on Development builds on the projects of the 
previous leaderships – primarily from the time of Deng Xiaoping onwards and his 
steering China on the path of ‘socialist modernization’. Citing “seeking truth from 
facts”, “revitalizing the nation through science and education”, “Sustainable 
Development” and the new addition of “Harmonious Society”, Hu Jintao 
reinterpreted the future path for China by building on concepts and drawing on 
reforms initiated under Deng and Jiang. According to Hu:  
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“… the salient features of the Scientific Outlook on Development are 
freeing up the mind, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times 
and being realistic and pragmatic” (Hu quoted by Xinhua 2012b).  
Fan (2006) interprets the meaning of the concept:  
“Scientific Development is, in essence, a euphemism used by the 
Chinese leaders for economic growth that takes into consideration the 
welfare of disadvantaged people and regions as well as environmental 
concerns” (Fan 2006: 709).  
During Hu Jintao’s leadership, environmental concerns and balanced growth thus 
came firmly onto the agenda. Beginning from the 10th five year plan (2001-2005) 
and speeding up in the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) protecting the environment, 
cleaning up pollution, enhancing energy efficiency and investing in renewable 
energy featured more and more prominently (10th FYP; 11th FYP; Fan 2006; 
People’s Daily 2001). As for the view of science embodied in the scientific 
development concept and more generally under Hu, the then Premier Wen Jiabao, 
a geologist by training, stated that:  
“…we need to embrace a scientific culture by promoting scientific 
rationality while cherishing Chinese cultural heritage. Enlightened by 
Science, the rich and profound Chinese culture is bound to shine more 
gloriously” (Wen 2008: 649).  
As an extension of this notion, in an interview with Science in 2008, Wen 
highlighted his belief that, 
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“Only science and the spirit of seeking truth from facts can save China. I 
firmly believe in this” (Xin and Stone 2008: 363).46  
 
It seems that science under Hu (and Wen Jiabao) was still looked to as a tool to aid 
state development, but the statements from the premier in many ways also give a 
clear understanding of how important modern science had become in political life 
in China by the time Hu Jintao gave over power to Xi Jinping.  
Science and Politics in Xi’s China  
Since the entry of Xi Jinping as China’s paramount leader in 2012 changes have 
been put in place that have shifted focus to what has been called China‘s ‘new 
normal’. This particularly refers to the fact that the focus is shifting from high-
growth to “balanced development and the quality of economic growth, with 
industrial upgrading, innovation and green development at the centre” 
(Brødsgaard 2015: 98). The ‘new normal’ also refers to changes in the governance 
of the CCP which have been put in place as “party leadership and institutional 
strengthening have been a central issue for the leadership since Xi Jinping took 
over” (Brødsgaard 2015: 102). For example, a wide spread anti-corruption 
campaign has been initiated. Many central and local leaders have been brought 
down during the campaign so far and it is still going strong (Brødsgaard 2015:102-
103). China’s 13th Five-Year Plan was approved on March 16th, 2016. Innovation 
through science and technology are priorities in the plan:  
                                           
46  At this point, the meaning of the phrase “seeking truth from facts” has changed markedly from Mao’s 
interpretation. Mao used the phrase in 1941 to describe the practice of drawing on practical experience among the 
revolutionary masses. The phrase was then re-interpreted by Deng and then Wen Jiabao who here presents the 
phrase - clearly referring back to Mao. In Wen’s interpretation however, “the spirit of seeking truth from facts” 
refers to science as a modernizing force and savior of the Chinese economy. 
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“China also intends for its research expenditure to rise to 2.5% of gross 
domestic product by 2020, from less than 2.2% over the past five years” 
(Cyranoski 2016: 424).  
The trend of investing heavily in research and development that was started during 
the previous Five-Year Plans thus continues as China is increasing efforts in the 
area of science and technology. This can also be seen from China’s steady 
increases in spending on research and development as a percentage of GDP having 
risen from 0,728 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 2.047 per cent of GDP in 2014, now 
higher than that of the 28 European Union countries’ aggregate spending on 
research and development which was at 1.951 per cent of GDP in 2014 (OECD 
2016).47 
In tandem with increasing spending on research and development and focusing on 
science and technology as a means to upgrading the economy and ‘rejuvenating 
the nation’, the composition of CCP members has also changed significantly. 
Today, the CCP has become a party for the elite (Dickson 2014). This is also the 
case in other countries where e.g. the ability to fundraise and network can be a 
significant factor in the ability to pursue a political career. Nonetheless, the 
systematic way in which the CCP selects its members coupled with the 
significance of CCP membership in securing an attractive position – political or in 
the administrative apparatus – points to a major shift the CCP has undergone in 
the last decades. According to the latest statistics of the CCP published by the 
CCP’s powerful organization department (Xinhua 2015) the traditional base of 
“workers and farmers” now makes up about 38 per cent of the party membership 
base. Newer and highly educated groups have increasingly entered the party, such 
as technical, professional personnel and managers in private enterprises, students 
                                           
47 China’s spending does still trail behind US spending at 2.742 per cent of GDP in 2014, Korea at 4.292 per cent of 
GDP in 2014, Japan at 3.588 per cent of GDP in 2014 or Denmark’s at 3.051 per cent of GDP in 2014, but is more 
on par with Singapore’s spending at 2.197 per cent of GDP in 2014 (OECD 2016). 
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and government staff. Combined, these educated groups made up more than 40 
per cent of party members in 201448. There is also a  
“…glass ceiling in many career paths for people who are not Party 
members. The CCP controls the top positions in most sectors – state 
bureaucracy, education, state-owned enterprises, banking etc.” (Dickson 
2014: 49).  
Education has thus become an important indicator in terms of entering the Party as 
the preferred members today are “young, well-educated, urban men” (Dickson 
2014:45).  
In the top leadership after Xi Jinping has taken over, the Politbureau Standing 
Committee is composed of seven members of whom there is one chemical 
engineer with a PhD degree in law/Marxism (Xi Jinping), three economists, a 
historian, one member educated in missile guidance and a teacher further educated 
at the Party School (Chinavitae 2016; Li 2013; Miller 2013: 14; Xinhua 2013). 
Thus, the majority of the top leadership is highly educated although with less 
dominance by engineers than earlier.  
In a speech on May 17, 2016 at a symposium on social science and philosophy, Xi 
Jinping remarked that:  
“Efforts should be made to ‘care for, foster and make full use of’ the 
many intellectuals in philosophy and social science fields and make 
them ‘advocates of advanced thinking, trailblazers of academic research, 
guides of social ethos and staunch supporters of Party governance.’” (Xi 
quoted in China Daily 2016).  
                                           
48 Numbers based on CCP statistics as published in Xinhua (2015). See also Dickson (2014). 
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It seems safe to say that the importance of the Party in matters of both social and 
natural science is a priority for the top leadership. Thus, the trend from the earlier 
leadership seems to continue in the sense that science and politics are very much 
intertwined in China today and likely to remain so in the future. 
Bureaucracy, the party and legitimacy 
The CCP and the government bureaucracy together play very important roles in 
Chinese society. Something that is often pointed to as a unique feature of the 
Chinese system is the negotiated character of decision making. Time and again, 
one of the pervasive China myths has been debunked by China scholars: The 
notion that the top makes decisions and then they get implemented at different 
government levels down to the local level without much change. From the above it 
may look that way too – as if everything changes with the new leader. And to 
some extent, a great number of things do change. To follow the idea of the 
uniqueness of the Chinese system, we see from the above section that the party, 
through its wide-ranging influence throughout the bureaucracy, plays a central role 
in most issues in China. One of my advisors once asked me “how far do you go in 
China before you meet the state?” I replied that you probably already meet the 
Chinese state on your flight to China (e.g. being scanned to see if you have a 
fever). Chinese bureaucracy is everywhere, and with it the CCP. The notion that 
things do not get to be discussed in China, however, is erroneous. Granted, public 
discussions, as we know them in e.g. Europe or the US may not be the same in 
China. But open discussions occur - albeit often within the party. And open 
disagreements are there too. The party has factions and people wanting to take 
China in different directions. Thus, as the previous pages showed, some 
campaigns e.g. against ‘westernization’ or other concepts most likely have roots in 
internal party disagreements rather than being about the people the campaign may 
have punished. What the previous section also outlined, is a change the CCP has 
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undergone during the last decades: enrolling different constituents into the party in 
part to keep discussions internally in the party and thus keep a firm grip on power 
(see e.g. Brødsgaard and Christensen 2002). By molding party history and by 
inscribing e.g. capitalists (private entrepreneurs) and others into the party, 
factional turf wars can be fought within the party and not through the media or in 
the public at large. Thus helping the CCP maintain a firm grip on power. 
The notion of FA (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988), which was referred to in 
Chapter 1 and 2 was developed in the 1980s and has gained traction again in 
recent years (Brødsgaard 2017). FA seeks to explain exactly the apparent 
conundrum that what looks like consensus does not necessarily cover the realities 
of practices of policy making in China. In other words FA seeks to capture what 
most researchers find when they start to do fieldwork in China: paradoxes, 
contradictions and negotiations. Paradoxes such as implementing market 
economic principles in a socialist state or e.g. reading about a policy and its 
implementation and then during fieldwork finding that at local levels officials do 
something completely different. There are documented and deep seated policy 
enforcement problems in China – particularly on environmental issues and 
implementation of environmental laws (Economy 2004; Stern 2013). Lastly, 
researchers often find that a lot of bargaining is taking place in the Chinese 
bureaucracy when it comes to the development of new policies and regulations 
(Brødsgaard 2017; Lieberthal 2004; Lieberthal and Lampton 1992). FA seeks to 
capture and explain some of these paradoxes, contradictions and the negotiated 
character of policy making in China. FA is employed to analyze aspects of the 
controversy over Zipingpu in Chapter 7. 
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Summing up on the development of science-politics relations 
There is no question that anything related to knowledge in China is also linked to 
politics.  From the Mao to the Deng leadership the notion of intellectuals, 
scientists, experts and science seems to have changed. From outright dislike and 
deep skepticism towards modern ‘Western’ science under Mao, over Deng’s 
turning Mao’s ideas around to today where the push for innovation and upgrading 
relies heavily on applied science. This development has implications for the role 
of expertise in policy making in China. An increasing reliance on applied science 
suggests that scientific disciplines and drawing on expert knowledge capable of 
solving practical problems, produce new products or improve technical 
capabilities are favored. As we have seen, today the view of science in CCP and 
government discourse has undergone profound changes. A near total integration of 
scientifically educated personnel into the bureaucratic apparatus, the significance 
of higher education for party membership as well as the changed composition of 
the top leadership in terms of educational level are telling indicators of the 
emphasis placed on scientific activity and education as forces of modernization at 
all levels of government in China. Increasing investments in research and 
development underscores this trend.  
But where does this lead us? In terms of the provision of scientific advice to 
government we can see that the nature of advice and not least the sources of 
advice have perhaps not changed so markedly. Yes, more university graduates 
have entered the administrative apparatus and party top positions, but scientific 
advice to government still originates from well-established universities and within 
the bureaucratic apparatus connected to particular branches of government or 
government think tanks. The conditions for an organization or an individual to be 
invited to provide advice to the central government thus depends on affiliation 
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with a high ranking research institute, think tank or university and a high 
educational level (preferably from a well reputed university).  
Turning now to hydropower and dams, how have the changes in the historical 
conditions for the use of scientific and expert knowledge in political decision 
making in China affected the Chinese hydropower sector? The next chapter will 
look to the history of hydropower in China as well as touch upon events in the 
global hydropower sector. The chapter aims to give an overview of how the 
hydropower sector in China has developed during the changing years of reform. 
Furthermore, it presents some of the main ‘pros and cons’ of hydropower 
development more generally. The next chapter then marks a move towards the 
empirical level where we start to dive more into the details of the hydropower 
sector, both globally and within the atmosphere of changing political climates in 
China since 1949. Understanding the general policy dilemmas presented by 
hydropower development globally and in China more specifically situates the 
Zipingpu-Wenchuan controversy in an environment not only dominated by factors 
originating within China geographically, but also within a broader and more 
globalized industry environment with its own particular logics. 
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Chapter 4: A history of dams and 
hydropower in China and beyond 
The aim of the present chapter is to provide contextualization for the analysis by 
focusing on historical development of hydropower and dams in China from 1949 
onwards. In line with the previous chapter focused on science-politics relations in 
China, the present chapter presents a history of dam and hydropower development 
in China. This chapter mirrors the previous one to provide an understanding of 
some of the ways in which science-politics relations may have influenced China’s 
hydropower development plans and policies - and continue to do so today both 
domestically and globally - as Chinese state-owned hydropower companies go 
global (McDonald 2009). In many ways, the history of hydropower development 
in China reflects the practicalities of the different ways in which science and 
politics have been co-produced in China over time. Here, hydropower and dams 
represent an industry where science and politics play out more concretely in the 
form of plans, policies and large scale infrastructure projects.  
However, the hydropower industry is not confined to China but is a globalized 
industry. Therefore, the chapter also covers basic knowledge of dams and 
hydropower and the policy dilemmas inherent in dam building. The chapter starts 
with basics on dam building in order to introduce general policy dilemmas 
hydropower policy makers face. This is followed by a more detailed history of 
hydropower and dam development in China.  
Dam basics  
The energy in water has been used a long time back in history for running a mill to 
grind flour, to pump or direct water to fields for irrigation, or like today for 
electricity generation (Wang et. al 2014). Hydropower utilizes this energy in 
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falling or running water to generate electricity.49 Prior to harnessing water energy 
for electricity generation, the control of water has been important for societal 
development around the world (Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984; Plummer 2013). 
Counting irrigation works, man has been pursuing the control of water since 
before ancient Egyptian times (Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984: xx). For example in 
China, the Dujiangyan irrigation system, which is still functioning to this day, was 
built around 200 B.C. (Magee 2015).  
Water control systems in the form of dams have been a pivotal part of 
development all over the world, especially during the 20th century (Plummer 2013; 
Scudder 2005; World Commission on Dams 2000). Dams have been built to 
harness a number of benefits such as flood control, irrigation, drinking water 
supply, tourism/recreation, aquaculture, transportation/navigation and electricity 
generation (Brown et al. 2009; Magee 2015; Plummer 2013; World Commission 
on Dams 2000). The first dams producing electricity came into operation in the 
1880s’ England and the United States and since, the promise of cheap and reliable 
electricity supply often in combination with flood control and irrigation has 
motivated the building of a vast number of large dams - above 15 meters in height 
(Plummer 2013; World Commission on Dams 2000) - around the world.50 Dam 
building took off in earnest in the middle of the 1900s (World Commission on 
Dams 2000: 8-9). By 1949 there were approximately 5000 large dams in the world, 
the majority of them in industrialized countries such as the US (Wang et al. 2014). 
                                           
49 Put in another way: The key elements in hydropower are elevation drops and flow volume. The combination of 
elevation drops and flow volumes determines the theoretical hydropower potential of a river – the sharper the drops 
and the higher the flow volume the larger the theoretical hydropower potential (Magee 2015). 
50 The main focus is on large dams (above 15 meters) and mega-dams (above 150 meters) according to the World 
Commission on Dam’s definition (World Commission on Dams 2000). It should be noted, however, that this 
definition has been questioned in recent years. Notably The IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation’s Chapter on Hydropower states that: “There is no worldwide consensus on 
classification by project size (installed capacity, MW) due to varying development policies in different countries. 
Classification according to size, while both common and administratively simple, is—to a degree—arbitrary: 
concepts like ‘small’ or ‘large hydro’ are not technically or scientifically rigorous indicators of impacts, economics 
or characteristics” (Kumar, Schei et al. 2011). 
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By the end of the 20th century there were over 45.000 large dams distributed in 
140 countries (World Commission on Dams 2000: 8).  
 
Figure 2: Cumulative capacity of dams across the world 1910-2010. 
Source: Gleick (2012). 
 
As shown in the graph above the cumulative capacity51 behind the worlds’ dams 
rose sharply from the 1950s onwards. During the 1990s there was a lull in building 
activity, as financiers such as the World Bank withdrew from financing large dams 
(Richter et al. 2010: 15-16). This lull in activity was also a consequence of - 
among other factors - waiting for the results of the World Commission of Dams 
(WCD) report52.  
                                           
51 Cumulative capacity refers to the size of the reservoir behind a dam or how much water the reservoirs built 
worldwide hold - combined. The graph thus shows how much water was ‘trapped’ behind the world’s reservoirs as 
dams were gradually being built during the last century (Gleick 2012). 
52 According to Plummer (2013: 4) many dam development projects around the world in the late 1990s were 
delayed due to financiers and private investors awaiting the results of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) 
process. The WCD process was a series of comprehensive studies on the impacts and benefits of hydropower 
globally that resulted in a final report. One of the most influential and highly cited studies of the impact of dams, 
the WCD’s final report came out in the year 2000. According to the UNEP: “Brokered by the World Bank and the 
World Conservation Union (IUCN), the World Commission on Dams (WCD) was established in May 1998 in 
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Today, however dams are back in vogue:  
“the search for low carbon and sustainable alternatives to fossil fuel has 
reviewed interest in hydropower, just as concern over climate change 
have reviewed interest in dams for water storage and flood protection, 
despite concerns over methane emissions from certain types of 
reservoirs” (Plummer 2013: 5). 
Water and dams in China 
A number of great rivers run through China - most significant are the Yangze, 
Yellow, Lancang (Mekong), Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), Heilong (Amur) 
and the Nujiang (Salween).  
 
Figure 3: Map of China with important Chinese rivers. Source: National Geographic 
Society. 
                                                                                                                                       
response to the escalating local and international controversies over large dams” (UNEP.org). However “three of 
the biggest potential dam builders India, China and Brazil” did not accept the report (Plummer 2013:4). 
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For the large part, China’s great rivers spring from the Tibetan Plateau and carry 
high volumes of water. The combination of high altitudes and large amounts of 
water makes China the country in the world with the largest theoretical 
hydropower potential at 694 GW according to the latest Chinese large-scale 
survey in 2005 (Huang and Yan 2009). China’s rivers have been, and are still, of 
central importance for the nation (Shapiro 2001: 48). Its rivers bring water, life 
and potential for social and economic development. However, throughout the ages 
China has continuously battled its rivers – especially in terms of trying to control 
floods (Elvin 2004; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Shapiro 2001). As in many 
other parts of the world, societal development in China has gone hand in hand 
with water control (Elvin 2004; Shapiro 2001). Indeed, skills in water control 
contributed greatly to Chinese economic development in ancient, medieval and the 
early parts of late imperial times (Elvin 2004: 164).  Controlling water is however, 
not unproblematic. Paraphrasing China historian Mark Elvin, water control 
systems are the places where society and economy meet the environment - most 
often these relationships are adversarial (Elvin 2004: 115). This line of argument 
seems to hold regardless of whether a project was built in medieval China or is 
built today. Looking for example to water-control systems in the form of dams, a 
number of ways in which dams ‘meet the environment’ in an adversarial manner 
come to mind: silting problems and changes to sedimentation patterns of rivers, 
destruction of fisheries and fish migration, water salinization, water temperature 
changes, evaporation and changes in weather patterns, decline of water quality, 
biodiversity loss, flooding of fertile cropland, earthquake risk, methane emissions 
and pollutants in the reservoir. This list is of course not exhaustive but describes 
some of the most important environmental impacts of large dams 53  (see e.g. 
                                           
53 Not to disregard social impacts - of course most importantly the relocation of people away from the coming 
reservoir area. Albeit of utmost importance in the considerations of dam projects (INT20121206), relocation is not 
dealt with in the thesis as the study of relocations, compensation for relocation and other related questions would 
merit a complete thesis in itself. For a discussion of relocation issues in China today see e.g. Vermeeer (2012) and 
Tilt (2015). 
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Brown et. al 2009; Magee 2015; McCully 2001; Scudder 2005; World 
Commission on Dams 2000). Environmental impacts such as these are not solely 
related to China, but are general issues that trouble dam constructors to this day. 
Water control systems in the form of dams have a long history in China and some 
of the first dams built in the early 1900s were mainly for irrigation and/or flood 
control purposes. The first hydropower dam in China, the Shilongba, came online 
in 1912 in Yunnan Province (Huang and Yan 2009) and provided electricity and 
flood control services. During the first part of the 19th century not many dams 
were built in China as a consequence of political fragmentation, the Sino-Japanese 
war (1937-1945) and the following civil war between the Kuomintang and the 
Communists (1947-1949).  
Dam building in China gained momentum after the establishment of the People’s 
Republic in 1949 (Wang el al. 2014). During the 1950s, dams were still mainly 
constructed for irrigation and flood control. Dams were constructed during e.g. the 
‘hundred flowers’ and ‘anti rightist’ campaigns (1956-57) and the Great Leap 
Forward (1957/58-61) as well as during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). 
However, these dams were often built very fast and built by people with little or 
no knowledge of engineering or hydrology (see more below). From the 1970s 
onwards, electricity generation became a central part of dam projects, although 
more often than not in combination with flood control and transportation services. 
Thus, dam projects in China have traditionally been multi-purpose projects aiming 
at solving two or more problems with one dam or a cascade of dams (Magee 2015). 
However, according to Magee (2015), in multipurpose projects different purposes 
may tend to conflict thus making the projects less effective. As a consequence, 
many hydropower plants operate at about half their full capacity in terms of 
electricity output, for example due to a need to maintain a low reservoir level so as 
to have ‘room’ in the reservoir for eventual floods (Magee 2015). Nevertheless, 
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dams have provided a number of benefits to societal development not least the 
provision of cheap, reliable electricity generation in an age of rising energy 
demand (Tilt 2015). 
Hydropower bureaucracy in China  
Plummer (2013) focused on the issue of pre-construction delay of hydropower 
projects in developing countries. Apart from detailing the literature on delay of 
hydropower projects, she also unfolds the process of hydropower development. 
Not only are hydropower projects big infrastructure projects that carry their own 
issues (Ansar et al. 2014) they also: 
 “…touch on the nationally sensitive issues of conservation of natural 
resources, environmental concerns and social impacts” (Plummer 2013: 
3).  
The case of Three Gorges Dam in China is an apt example.54 Regardless of the 
different impacts – be they positive or negative for e.g. the environment or 
economic development – in hydropower development, decision making around 
dams and hydropower in most countries is a lengthy process. China’s fast paced 
infrastructure growth is often mentioned as an economic growth driver 
(Rabinovitch 2013; Yao and Chen 2017). The fact that so many infrastructure 
projects (roads, metro-lines, airports, power plants etc.) have been approved may 
give the illusion that decision making regarding infrastructure is much faster than 
in democratically governed countries. However, infrastructure development in the 
form of dams and hydropower carries its own history in China that contributes to 
slowing down decision making considerably (Vermeer 2012).  
Planning, approving and developing a dam involve a vast array of challenges 
before a project can go ahead. China is no exception. Labeled as a renewable 
                                           
54 See note 57 for description of the project. 
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energy source based on technology that has been developed over the last more 
than 100 years, the dam and hydropower industry is anything but young. As 
opposed to for example wind and solar power, which are also found in the 
‘renewables’ basket, the policy landscape for hydropower in China is 
characterized by a long history. Where wind- and solar- energy have their own 
issues they are newer energy forms and the decision making processes in the 
Chinese bureaucracy have been relatively fast (Christensen 2013; Kirkegaard 
2015:45-46). The difference with hydropower is that the hydropower decision 
making process is weighed down by long-standing inter-ministerial turf wars that 
are still ongoing. A number of different ministries are involved in the approval 
process of hydropower. This means that in hydropower, policy and decision 
making problems stem from overlapping bureaucratic jurisdictions (and 
preferences) between different ministries - most notably the Ministry of Water 
Resources (MWR) and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). Here the 
MWR is known to push for as many dams as possible where the MEP pushes back 
to ensure that the environmental risks of projects are properly examined before a 
project is given approval (Mertha 2008: 27-64).  
Moreover, problems in hydropower stem from overlapping bureaucratic 
jurisdiction between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and between central, 
provincial and local government bureaucracies involved in planning and 
approving new dams. Bureaucratic ranking plays a role in how policies are 
decided upon in China – particularly when coordination between different 
ministries and between ministries and SOEs takes place (Brødsgaard 2012). The 
top 53 central SOEs (including the most important hydropower companies) have 
retained their bureaucratic ranking at vice-ministerial level (ibid). A small number 
of CEOs of the top SOEs, however are ranked as ministers (ibid). For some SOEs 
to have vice-ministerial rank goes a long way to trump decisions made further 
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down in the system. Thus central government level trumps provincial level, which 
trumps county and township levels. The fact that more than one ministry is 
involved in planning and approving dam projects conducted by SOEs means that 
ranking is sometimes equal between an enterprise CEO and a minister 
(Brødsgaard 2012). If there is not agreement between them then who can trump 
whom? In effect, this means that ranking is an influential factor in negotiations 
between ministries and between ministries and SOEs. If conflicts are not solved at 
lower levels in the system this means that in order to make policy decisions in the 
face of conflicting interests, decision making gets pushed upwards in the system 
(Mertha 2008: 27-64). In this way, decisions end up on the table of the National 
Development and Reform Commission or with the State Council - the top two 
policy making organs in China (Mertha 2008: 27-64).  
As regards hydropower, conflicting interests and bureaucratic entanglements such 
as these mean that hydropower policies and decision making regarding large 
hydropower projects can drag on for years and years (see Vermeer 2012). This is 
FA in a nutshell. Hydropower is one of the prime examples of how FA works as 
the framework is built on empirical studies of e.g. the decision making processes 
in large hydropower projects in China (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 
2008). Thus turf wars between involved ministries, between central government 
and provincial governments, between SOEs and ministries is a central issue in 
hydropower policy making in China (Mertha 2008; Tilt 2015).  
Looking back at the history of hydropower in China and beyond opens up for 
understanding how the sector has developed in China and how the changing 
political landscapes have influenced the place hydropower occupies in China 
today.  
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Mao and dams 
During the 1950s, Soviet experts were intimately involved with China’s dam 
planning. According to Shapiro (2001: 49) harnessing China’s rivers (and more 
generally controlling nature) became one of the distinguishing characteristics of 
Maoism and in many ways came to shape early communist China.55 Early on, the 
new regime began focusing on national water resources (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988: 291) and in this context (as well as in matters of ideology) soviet 
advisors had a great deal of influence (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 291; 
Shapiro 2001: 50-51). The involvement of soviet expertise resulted in plans to 
harness the power of the Yellow River at Sanmen Gorge and in plans for a dam at 
The Three Gorges on the Yangze River. These plans were spurred on especially 
by the promise of controlling floods but also the idea of accumulating water for 
irrigation. Generally the 1950s was a period of optimism in hydropower and dam 
construction in China (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 291). 
Mao’s view of science, as outlined in the previous chapter, in many ways 
dominated the decision making climate around dam-building up to the end of the 
Cultural Revolution. During the turbulent years of the Great Leap Forward (1957-
61) a virtual dam construction boom was set off as a result of policies to boost 
agricultural production. Accumulation of water for irrigation (so as to provide 
grounds for a great leap in agricultural production) and the promise of flood 
control were some of the main drivers. Thus, in 1958, over 100 small and medium 
sized dams were constructed in Henan province alone (Qing 1998). Construction 
was hastily started on the Danjiangkou reservoir on the Han River (started 1958) 
and the controversial Sanmenxia Dam on the Yellow River (started 1957). Both of 
                                           
55 In her book Mao’s war against nature, Shapiro details a number of cases of extreme Mao-era campaigns to 
‘control nature’ one of which was the coordinated battle against sparrows that were seen as a “pest” for eating the 
crops. Millions of people were coordinated and mobilized to go out banging pots and pans until birds fell dead from 
the sky from exhaustion. The result being that insect infestation and consequent crop loss caused starvation. 
Furthermore, the campaign resulted in sparrows being virtually extinct in China for years after (Shapiro 2001: 86-
89; Lieberthal 2004:105; Hansen, 2009). 
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these dams suffered problems due to inadequate expertise in planning and 
construction (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 291 and 303). Shapiro (2001: 49) 
points to the fact that the Sanmenxia dam (completed in 1962) across the 
notoriously silt-filled Yellow River was a project that was meant to make the folk 
saying “when a great man emerges the Yellow River will run clear” (shangren chu, 
huanghe qing) come true so as to underscore that Mao was indeed that ‘great man’. 
The Sanmenxia Dam made the Yellow River ‘run clear’ in the sense that the dam 
trapped large parts of the silt in the river and quickly silted up. The dam has 
continued to battle severe silt problems (Shapiro 2001). The Danjiangkou Dam on 
the other hand suffered from the hasty decision to start construction with sub-
standard concrete and without adequate resolution of technical issues. The dam 
was not completed until 1973 after a long series of cost overruns and construction 
stoppages mainly due to national economic crises, particularly after the Great 
Leap (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 302-303). The Banqiao dam on the Ru 
River was built during the early 1950s with Soviet assistance. This dam failed 
catastrophically in 1975 during a great rain flood set off by a hurricane, which also 
caused 62 other, smaller, dams in Henan province to fail. Despite being an ‘iron 
dam’ (one that was thought not to be able to collapse) the earth-filled dam could 
not withstand the severe flooding and collapsed, causing more flooding. Over 
85,000 people died as a result of the floods exacerbated by the dam collapses (Yi 
Si in Qing 1998: 33-34; Shapiro 2001: 62).  
Around half of the dams built during the 1950s later collapsed and had to be 
reinforced or rebuilt due to poor planning, lack of technical knowledge and fast 
paced construction. The subsequent devastating effects of the Cultural Revolution 
years (1966-1976) did not improve the years of poor planning and fast paced 
construction by people without sufficient technical knowhow. The fast pace of 
dam building in the 1950s slowed down during the Cultural Revolution. 
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Nevertheless, large dams such as the Gezhouba on the Yangze started construction 
during this period (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 306-308; Wang et. al. 2014).56 
Dam construction during the Mao era was generally influenced by the view of 
science espoused by Mao in the sense that fast-pace and learning by doing took 
precedence over e.g. planning based on technical knowhow (Shapiro 2001).  
Dams and hydropower in the reform era (1978- ) 
Achieving the ‘four modernizations’ became a guiding principle during the Deng 
era along with turning China down the ‘opening up and reform’ path. The opening 
up also entailed attracting foreign expertise and investments. In dam building, the 
first Chinese hydropower project financed by the World Bank, the Lubuge dam in 
Yunnan province, was approved in 1984 (World Bank 2007: 5-6). According to 
the World Bank (2007): 
“Lubuge was selected as a pilot by the Chinese government to test its 
“open door” policy and the Bank’s modern project management 
techniques.” (World Bank, 2007: 5).  
As in other policy areas, the approach to reform was - and today in many ways 
still is - incremental. In other words, in reforming and modernizing the 
hydropower sector and the economy more generally, the approach followed the 
logic of ‘crossing the river by groping for stepping-stones’ (Naughton, 2007: 5).  
The period since the beginning of reforms and up to around the turn of the century 
have been called China’s third period of dam building (McDonald 2007: 56). This 
period saw the previous fast pace of dam building slowing down and the 
prioritization of larger scale hydropower projects (ibid). Thus, throughout the 
                                           
56 Construction on the Gezhouba dam started in 1970. This dam project also suffered from siltation problems and 
after over ten years of construction had to be redesigned (Magee, 2006a: 243). 
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1980s the hydropower component of dams in China became relatively more 
important vis-á-vis other purposes such as irrigation and flood control mainly as a 
consequence of escalating Chinese economic growth and subsequent rising 
electricity demand (Brown, Magee and Xu 2008; Magee 2015). 
In 1981, US specialists were invited in and a five year agreement was reached 
where the US was to provide technical assistance to Chinese dam builders (Adams 
1997). The largest and most famous of projects initiated during this third period 
was the Three Gorges Dam project which was finally approved by the National 
Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in 1992.57 Prior to the approval by the NPC, however, 
there was intense debate in the bureaucracy, between technical specialists and to a 
more limited extent in the public (Qing 1994). In 1986, Ministry of Water 
Resources and Electric Power commissioned a feasibility study of the three gorges 
project from the Canadian Government (apparently fearing too much opposition to 
the dam if US interests were involved). The feasibility study was supervised by 
the World Bank (Adams 1997; Gleick and Cohen 2008). The “Canadian-World 
Bank “Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study”” (Gleick and Cohen 
2008: 147) was completed in 1988 and recommended construction to start at “an 
early date” (Ibid.). In 1989, after the study was completed, the book Yangze! 
Yangze! a collection of critical interviews and essays by scientists, journalists and 
public figures about the three gorges project was released. The publishing of the 
book marked the first-time large-scale public lobbying campaign against a major 
hydropower project occurring in China (Qing 1994: xxiii). However, shortly after 
its publication the book was banned in China (Mertha 2008: 2) and in the same 
                                           
57 The story of the Three Gorges Dam goes back to 1923 where, under Sun Yat Sen, a dam across the Yangze was 
proposed. In great detail, Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) have documented the early processes up to the end of 
the 1980s of bargaining back and forth about whether to build or not to build a dam at the Three Gorges.  Final 
approval was not secured until 1992. This approval was a very controversial vote in the NPC where one third of the 
delegates either voted against or abstained from voting on the project. Something which was unprecedented as 
voting in the NPC would normally be a matter of formality. For more on The Three Gorges process see e.g. 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) and Qing (1994 and 1998). 
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year, 1989, the democracy movement swept through China resulting in significant 
upheaval and restriction on public debate (Lieberthal 2004: 146). By 1992, the 
Three Gorges Project was approved, but later that same year the Canadian 
Government cancelled its development assistance for the project, and in 1993 the 
US Bureau of Reclamation, which had earlier made an agreement to provide 
technical assistance, also withdrew from the project. The bureau cancelled its 
involvement on the grounds of economic and environmental impacts of the project 
(Gleick and Cohen 2008: 147). Nevertheless, the three gorges project went ahead, 
started construction in 1994 (Wang et. al 2014) and was finally completed in 2012 
(Clark 2012; Vermeer 2012: 418). 
In the 1990s, environmental groups increasingly entered debates over dam projects 
in China, perhaps spurred on by the early momentum in connection with the 
publication of Yangze! Yangze! Incidentally, the 1990s not only marked an era 
where the possibility to form non-governmental organizations was opened up by 
the Chinese government and environmental NGOs started flourishing (Saich 2000). 
The 1990s also marked a low-point in terms of World Bank financing of large 
dam projects and by the turn of the century the Bank had all but abandoned 
financing dams (Richter et al. 2010: 15-16).58 The lull in global building activity 
changed again in the early parts of the new millennium. Particularly in China, 
where a new leadership took over and a new round of reforms of the energy sector 
was initiated along with turning the Chinese economy towards sustainable 
development and green growth. 
The ‘great western development campaign’  
A central part of the Hu-led leadership from 2002 was tackling a widening income 
gap between poor western regions of China and the richer eastern parts while 
                                           
58 According to Plummer (2013:4) many dam development projects around the world in the late 1990s were 
delayed due to financiers and private investors awaiting the results of the WCD process. See note 52 above. 
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turning the Chinese economy onto a green growth path. Balancing the rapid 
development of China’s eastern coastal areas with the western parts of China 
became important in order to strengthen national unity (Magee 2006a). One of the 
most influential campaigns during Hu’s political reforms was the ‘great western 
development campaign’ (xibu da kaifa). The policy campaign was initiated as a 
central part of the 10th Five-year Plan (2001-2005) with the aim of alleviating 
poverty in the western provinces through for example investments in resource 
extraction. Coupled with a turn towards sustainable development and protecting 
the environment, hydropower came back on the agenda as it provided an apt 
alternative to coal due to abundant water flows in China’s poorer western 
provinces. The development of hydropower was not only a part of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions but was also to solve electricity shortage problems in 
the high-growth eastern parts of the country. Another campaign called ‘send 
western electricity east’ (xi dian dong song) was therefore deeply intertwined with 
hydropower development plans in the south western parts of China (Magee 2006a; 
Tilt 2015). Hydropower development projects were to boost local economies with 
job creation, investment and rural electrification while also supplying eastern 
provinces with much needed electricity (Magee 2006a). The Zipingpu dam on the 
Min River in Sichuan Province was one of ten ‘key projects’ under this national 
development campaign. The historical antecedents of Zipingpu are analyzed in 
Chapter 5. 
The place of hydropower in China today 
As of the turn of the century, the strategy for hydropower development has 
changed in China, as well as in the rest of the world. Hydropower has now become 
a central part of plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and greening the energy 
sector in China (Tilt 2015). Since the implementation of the 10th five-year plan 
(2001-2005), China has embarked on this greening trajectory and has increasingly 
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emphasized sustainable development, clean energy and circular economy as new 
paths for development (10th FYP). Today, however, China has become the largest 
emitter of greenhouse gas in the world (International Energy Agency 2014). The 
greening trajectory can thus be seen as a reflection of China’s well-documented 
and steeply rising environmental problems or rather China’s environmental crisis 
(Economy 2004; Shapiro 2001 and 2012) which has been estimated to cost the 
country between 3 and 8 per cent of annual GDP (Shapiro 2012: 7). In the 12th 
five-year plan (2011-2015) China’s central government set ambitious goals for 
improving environmental protection and this entails reducing the country’s rapidly 
rising greenhouse gas emissions. The 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) is to 
continue along these lines (Brødsgaard 2015; 13th FYP). Reducing emissions 
involves increasing the share of renewable energy in the energy mix and so 
China’s hydropower potential has once again come into focus. Especially the 
south western parts of China have been targeted for significant hydropower 
development in order to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions and promote 
more integration of renewable energy. Since January 2013, a number of large-
scale hydropower projects on the main stems of big rivers in south western China 
and Tibet that seemed to have been scrapped ten years ago have been resurrected 
(Yan 2013). These plans form core parts of the plan to “raise the share of 
renewable energy in total primary energy consumption” to 15 per cent by 2020 
(People’s Republic of China. National Development and Reform Commission, 
2007). The re-focus on large scale hydropower projects as an important part of 
achieving the 15 per cent target set by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) has come after a virtual moratorium on large-scale 
hydropower construction projects in some parts of China, most notably on the Nu 
River (Deng 2013; Zhu 2011). The revival of the Nu River projects and other 
projects has put the anti-dam movement in China on alert and the latest ‘dam-
building spree’ is causing controversy and debate in the media and in 
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environmental activist circles in China as well as internationally (Deng 2013; 
International Rivers 2015a; Yan 2013).  
Part and parcel of the recent push to once again develop large-scale hydropower 
projects in China are reforms of the energy sector. Reforms of the energy sector 
have run in parallel with economic reforms and had great impact on the 
organization of the Chinese hydropower industry which has undergone a number 
of restructurings along with the reforms of the energy sector more generally. 
Restructurings from which also stem the bureaucratic entanglements that hamper 
hydropower development. 
Energy sector reforms – reorganizing the bureaucracy 
The general aim of the Chinese economic reforms up through the 1980s and 1990s 
was to reduce the role of central planning, increase market operations and separate 
policy making from commercial operations (Arruda 2003: 15). The energy sector 
was no exception. Before 1978, the sector was a vertically integrated and state-
owned utility (Yeh and Lewis 2004: 445). Through a series of reforms in 1981-
1983 and 1985-1989 the energy sector was ‘corporatized’ through creating 
corporations out of former ministries in order to decrease direct government 
control over the sector. In 1996 and 2002-2003 further reforms were carried out. 
Thus, 1996-1997 saw the Ministry of Electric Power reorganized into the State 
Power Corporation of China (SPCC).  
However, most significantly, in terms of the structure of the hydropower sector 
today, the 2002-2003 reforms finally separated generation from distribution by 
splitting the SPCC into no fewer than 11 companies (Magee 2006b; Magee and 
McDonald 2006: 40-41). The split resulted in five companies responsible for 
power generation (China Huaneng, China Datang, China Huadian, China Guodian, 
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and China Power Investment Corporation)59, two distribution companies (State 
Grid Corporation and China Southern Power Grid) 60   and four companies 
responsible for design, construction and related services (China Power 
Engineering Consulting Group Corporation, China Hydro Consulting, Sinohydro 
Corporation, and China Gezhouba Company) (Magee 2006b; Magee and 
McDonald 2006: 40-41).61 
The purpose of the restructuring of the SPCC was to separate the different 
functions so as to create more independent companies and increase competition on 
market-based terms. The restructuring of the SPCC coincided with a more general 
reform of Chinese SOEs during the same period (Brødsgaard and Li 2013). Today, 
the government, through its State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) retains some control of these now 
more independent enterprises (Magee 2006b). Thus, the five generation and two 
distribution companies feature on the SASAC list of – currently 102 (sasac.gov.cn 
2016) - central enterprises where SASAC has the responsibility for appointing top 
executives and approving mergers and acquisitions (Brødsgaard and Li 2013). The 
last four companies, the ones responsible for design, construction and related 
services, albeit not on the SASAC list, are nevertheless regarded as SOEs because 
of their close ties to the government (Magee 2006a and 2006b). So although one 
of the main aims of the reforms of the energy sector was to increase competition, 
the reforms also exacerbated the bureaucratic problems which were briefly 
mentioned above. A number of companies retained their government ranking 
despite becoming ‘independent’ enterprises. Being carved out of former ministries, 
some of the largest SOEs today have vice-ministerial rank which is only slightly 
                                           
59 In Chinese: Zhongguo Huaneng Jituan Gongsi, Zhongguo Datang Jituan Gongsi, Zhongguo Huadian Jituan 
Gongsi, Zhongguo Guodian Jituan Gongsi , Zhongguo Dianli Touzi Jituan Gongsi. 
60 In Chinese: Guojia Dianwang Gongsi, Zhongguo Nanfang Dianwang. 
61  In Chinese: Zhongguo Dianli Gongcheng Guwen Jituan Gongsi , Zhongguo Shuidian Gongcheng Guwen 
Youxian Gongsi, Zhongguo Shuili Shuidian Jianshe Jituan Gongsi, and Zhongguo Gezhouba Jituan Gongsi. 
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lower than the ministries that are to supervise them. In hydropower, long standing 
turf wars between different ministries such as what is today the MWR and the 
(since 2008) MEP have deeply affected the progress (or lack thereof) of 
hydropower development in China. Large-scale hydropower projects with budgets 
over a certain amount need to have national approval in the NDRC. This also 
means scrutiny from e.g. the MEP for example in terms of approval of 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). However, as the MEP has a ranking 
only slightly higher than that of the companies they supervise (e.g. China Huaneng 
building dams on the Lancanjiang) the approval process can be circumvented in a 
number of ways. This means that projects can stall for years and years due to 
technical disagreements. On the other hand, projects can also get sudden revival 
e.g. with a change in leadership as has happened with the change from the Hu-
Wen leadership to Xi Jinping.  
Due to projects often being stalled by bureaucratic entanglements over e.g. 
technical issues, hydropower companies have started construction without proper 
official approval on a number of hydropower projects. In an informal interview 
with a hydropower engineer from China Huadian, he mentioned that starting 
construction prior to approval was not a problem as they knew that the project 
would eventually gain approval (FN201305). Another informant was more cynical 
about the possibility to halt planned hydropower development “all dams that have 
been planned at one point will eventually be built” (INT20121116). Mertha (2008) 
highlighted the role played by hydropower engineers in this process and showed 
how engineers often go unheeded as group of experts with significant stakes in 
promoting new hydropower projects:  
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“Indeed, a large professional class of hydroelectric engineers help 
lubricate the state's drive for increased hydropower: even as a project is 
being undertaken, these engineers are already active in promoting future 
projects that will keep them gainfully employed” (Mertha 2008: 49).  
 
In other words, along with the increasing focus on applied science and technology 
technical experts, such as engineers, have a strong base from which to gain 
influence on hydropower policy making - effectively lobbying for more dams and 
thus more work.  
With significant push for new projects there are reasons for circumventing 
bureaucratic approval processes. One example of such circumventing, which also 
goes to the heart of the bureaucratic issues in hydropower, is the EIA approval 
process. The rules are very clear as to how the process should operate (Zhu and 
Lam 2010). The enforcement of the EIA rules, particularly achieving public 
disclosure in accordance with the EIA law, however, is not so straight forward 
(INT20121214; INT20130506; INT20130705; FN201212; Magee 2006a). Here it 
should suffice to mention that non-compliance with the EIA process and the EIA 
law in hydropower is not a rarity (Magee 2006a: 256). During my fieldwork there 
was often mention of EIA reports filed after a project had started or even reports 
being filed after the hydropower dam had been built (FN201305). From a 
technical point of view this should be impossible (FN201305). That such 
circumventing of the rules is possible is due to overlapping bureaucratic 
jurisdiction e.g. between the national level, the provincial and the local level 
(Vermeer 2012). Historically, local levels have often approved projects which can 
improve local economic growth while the national level has then had to stop 
projects due to e.g. insufficient EIAs. The planned 13-dam cascade on the Nujiang 
River is a case in point (Magee 2006a; McDonald 2007).  
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One of the aims of the reforms of the energy sector was to increase competition 
between Chinese hydropower companies. However, during the reforms, and 
particularly the 2002-2003 reforms the country’s rivers were divided up so that 
certain rivers or provinces were given to certain companies (Magee 2006b). As a 
result, competition for projects internally in China did not increase significantly as 
companies focused on developing the rivers they had been allocated. One of the 
consequences of this has been that Chinese companies have seen opportunity to 
utilize their significant engineering capacity and resources for dam building to go 
overseas or ‘go global’ (McDonald 2009). This has also in part been fueled by the 
government’s push for SOEs to become national champions with global reach 
(Nolan 2001). Thus, Chinese hydropower developers are now building dams in e.g. 
Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries and in a number of African 
countries, often in competition with private global hydropower developers and 
transnational financiers (FN201305). 
“The Chinese will go where no one else will go” (FN201305) or “The Chinese 
take the projects the World Bank and all the rest have given up on and try to 
develop them” (FN201305) were some of the views expressed by global 
hydropower executives and financial institutions about Chinese hydropower 
companies that have now ‘gone global’. During informal interviews in connection 
with my participation at the International Hydropower Association’s Hydropower 
Congress in Kuching, Malaysia and a fieldtrip to two large hydropower 
construction sites, delegates from e.g. the Asian Development Bank and private 
global hydropower companies expressed that Chinese SOEs are not necessarily 
warmly welcomed in the global competition for hydropower projects. Particularly 
the fact that the Chinese SOEs often present a ‘full package deal’ where 
everything is sourced from China - workers, equipment (literally down to bolts 
and screws) - was frowned upon (FN201305). Including state-backed financing in 
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that package was by some seen as leaving no room for e.g. local sub-contractors to 
bid in projects. The Chinese companies were regarded as not willing to compete 
on the same terms and generally not holding back on taking on risky projects that 
e.g. the World Bank had withdrawn from. This is perhaps not an easy position for 
the reformed SOEs as they are under pressure domestically to show their ability to 
compete on a global level playing field. 
All in all, the Chinese hydropower sector is an example of how changing political 
winds in China have had impact on not only the overall structure of the energy 
sector, with significant impact on hydropower, but also the ways in which 
hydropower is developed today. Focus shifted from early on being about fast-
paced learning-by-doing towards modern management techniques and more 
cautious and scientific development of hydropower. Today, applied science and 
global competition have become important features of Chinese development. In 
this, the hydropower sector has followed. Today, Chinese hydropower engineers 
are a powerful group of highly educated technical experts that are also gaining 
global expertise. However, as we have seen, the bureaucratic entanglements in 
hydropower open up for different ways of circumventing rules and regulations - 
particularly with regard to technical issues.   
Let us now turn to the controversy over the Zipingpu where technical, scientific 
and risk issues coupled with bureaucratic entanglements played into the policy 
making around future hydropower development in China.  
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Part III: Analyzing a controversy  
- of triggering earthquakes in science, 
politics and Chinese hydropower 
The introduction gave a peek into what the controversy over Zipingpu is all about. 
The following chapters analyze that controversy – or perhaps more accurately 
controversies – surrounding Zipingpu in more detail. As was pointed out in 
Chapter 2, one of the problems with analyzing controversies is that controversies 
are often not just about one thing. They are unfortunately not like new, neat balls 
of yarn that just unfold linearly if you pull on the thread in one end. Controversies 
are more like a ball of yarn after the cat or your kid has played with it: Difficult to 
untangle in a linear fashion. In other words, there is not just one story here, but 
multiple. As a whole, the next four chapters will present a controversy study 
centering on the Zipingpu dam.  
The main issue around Zipingpu is the dam’s possible relation to the Wenchuan 
earthquake: Did the Zipingpu dam play a role in triggering the Wenchuan 
earthquake or not? The controversy in scientific journals thus centers on this 
question. As the scientific controversy was reported in the news it grew into 
another kind of controversy and got bigger. Questions were posed such as: Is it 
safe to construct big dams in earthquake prone zones? Then came discussions 
related to policy: Should China build more big dams in earthquake prone zones? 
Involved in all of these questions are a host of different actors with different 
positions, arguments and policy preferences.  
The central question here is to provide an empirical background to engage with the 
problem statement: What historical conditions led up to the controversy over the 
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Zipingpu dam and the Wenchuan earthquake and what role did expert knowledge 
play in assessing the risk of Chinese major dam projects? 
In engaging with this agenda first we need to understand the physical conditions in 
which Zipingpu has been built. This entails taking a tour through current 
consensus in earth science which helps contextualize the scientific controversy 
around Zipingpu as well as the technical negotiation around constructing Zipingpu 
which relates to issues of dam safety in earthquake prone zones.  
To get background into the policy implications of the controversies over Zipingpu 
the controversy is set into historical context. Why was Zipingpu built in the first 
place? What spurred on the idea of a dam across the Min River? How was it built? 
And who was involved? 
Reading through the next chapters will for the reader perhaps feel a bit like going 
back and forth between contextualization and analysis, back and forth in time and 
back and forth between different places. This controversy study is not built 
linearly but rather presented by way of pulling threads out of a messy ball of yarn 
– showing and analyzing different elements surrounding the Zipingpu dam. For 
example contextualization from Chapter 5 feeds into analyses in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8 which reflect different parts of the arguments brought forth. The aim is 
that by the end of the next four chapters we have a clear picture of the controversy, 
and more importantly, how to think about controversies in a Chinese context and 
the role of expert knowledge therein. Below figure 4 illustrates the next four 
chapters and the different elements relating back to the Zipingpu dam itself: 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the different elements of the analysis of the controversy over 
Zipingpu. 
Chapter 5 provides the historical background of the Zipingpu dam from the 
inception of the idea of a dam across the Min River in the 1950s to today and 
introduces the key players and their positions in the controversies surrounding 
Zipingpu. The story in Chapter 5 follows a classic approach in contemporary 
China studies where historical documentation, such as news reports in the official 
CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily are drawn upon in order to piece together the 
rationale behind a policy decision such as the political decision to construct the 
Zipingpu dam.    
Chapter 6, entitled triggering earthquakes in science, focuses on the science of 
earthquakes. The chapter first outlines some basic understandings of earth science 
to give a sense of the general consensus in earth science that the controversy 
builds on. The chapter then analyses the controversy as it unfolded in scientific 
journals – the controversy here centering on the central question: Did the Zipingpu 
dam play a part in triggering the 7.9 magnitude Wenchuan earthquake? The 
 140 
analysis in Chapter 6 is guided by approaches to studying controversies as were 
presented in Chapter 2 and FA is drawn into the analysis where relevant.  
Chapter 7, entitled triggering earthquakes in hydropower, focuses on analyzing 
technical negotiations taking place before the Zipingpu dam was built. 62  The 
chapter first analyses negotiations concerning seismic risk in relation to Zipingpu 
and then further analyses these events by drawing on the concept of FA 
(Brødsgaard 2017; Mertha 2009). The technical negotiation at the pre-construction 
stage is analyzed using FA as a classic example of bureaucratic bargaining over 
technical and economic matters in China.  
The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 are thus examples of drawing on FA in the 
context of a controversy study to deepen the understanding of how domestic issues 
in China contribute to the unfolding of a controversy.  
Chapter 8, entitled triggering earthquakes in politics, deals with the controversy as 
it unfolded after the Wenchuan earthquake occurred. The chapter is primarily 
drawing on interviews and fieldnotes as well as representation of the controversy 
in the global and domestic Chinese media. This part of the controversy study thus 
focuses on the public controversy over Zipingpu and analyses the policy 
consequences of the wider debate over Zipingpu and whether or not other large 
dams could potentially trigger a large earthquake once built. Chapter 8 focuses on 
the experts engaged in the public debate, their strategies of legitimizing their 
viewpoints and ways of gaining policy impact with regard to hydropower policy 
making in China.  
The controversy study centering on Zipingpu puts at stake policy decisions about 
dam building and the expertise used in such decisions. Firstly, it provides an 
                                           
62 Parts of the text in Chapter 7 has already been published in Brødsgaard (2017) Chapter 7: “Bargaining Science: 
Negotiating Earthquakes” written by the author. Permission has been given from Routledge to freely change and 
adapt the text to fit the present thesis. Specific referencing in Chapter 7 to sections of text already published will 
therefore not be given apart from this note. 
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example of how a scientific controversy is connected to the Chinese state’s 
decision to build a host of large dams in earthquake prone zones. Secondly, it 
points to the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate expertise in 
hydropower policy making in China. Thus, the case as presented in chapters 5 
through 8 is also an example of one Chinese approach to managing risks 
associated with large dams. This may in turn be compared with how other dam-
building nations have approached evaluating the risk of the same relationship. The 
context of the controversy is thus one where emerging science and hydropower 
policy decisions co-create a policy environment where science itself becomes 
politicized. 
In sum, the controversy study highlights changing relationships between state 
actors, SOEs, NGOs, media, different scientists and the science they all draw on. 
Furthermore, the chapters speak to a theoretical discussion about the ways in 
which scientific knowledge and expertise play into technical and risk 
controversies and how this co-creates with political decision making.  
But let us start at the beginning. With the idea of the Zipingpu dam - and 
swimming! 
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Chapter 5: Antecedents  
- A history of the Zipingpu dam and 
controversy actors 
The Zipingpu dam is located in Sichuan province on the Min River (Minjiang), a 
tributary to the Yangze River, about 50 kilometers upstream from the city of 
Chengdu and approximately seven kilometers from the historical Dujiangyan 
irrigation system completed in 251 B.C (Mertha 2008: 95-98). The Wenchuan 
earthquake epicenter was located less than 20 kilometers from the dam.63 
 
Figure 5: Map picturing the location of the Zipingpu dam, the city of Chengdu and the 
epicenter of the Wenchuan earthquake in relation to the Min River and known fault lines 
in the area. Source: He and Choi (2009). 
  
                                           
63 Estimates of the precise location of the epicenter vary between 5 and 17 kilometers from the dam according to 
which source you quote. 
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Sowing the seeds for a controversy 
The story of the Zipingpu dam begins with swimming. In the 1950s, Chairman 
Mao visited the famous water control project Dujiangyan. 64  Dujiangyan is an 
important symbol on par with the Great Wall and other large-scale engineering 
marvels in Chinese history. Mao wanted to swim the Min River, but was 
convinced otherwise due to the turbulence of the river. This was an embarrassment 
to the Sichuan Party Secretary at the time, so he suggested that a reservoir be built 
at Yuzui, close to Dujiangyan. This way, Mao would be able to swim the Min 
River next time he visited. There were other reasons for constructing Yuzui apart 
from pleasing Mao. Boosting the irrigation capacity of the Dujiangyan irrigation 
system (and thus boosting agricultural output) was one. However, it was not one 
that carried the same symbolic weight as Mao swimming the river. Stories of Mao 
swimming, particularly his famous swim in the Yangze River in 1966 just before 
the start of the Cultural Revolution, has been chronicled many times stressing the 
symbolism and political significance of Mao’s swimming (Li 1996; Mertha 2008). 
According to Mertha, Mao used swimming on various occasions to demonstrate 
his strength and political determination (Mertha 2008: 96-97. See also Shaprio 
2001). 
In 1955-56 a plan was drawn up where the Yuzui (later to be called Yangliuhu) 
and Zipingpu dams were included in an 8-step plan for the development of the 
Min River (Mertha 2008). The two dams were to be built first. The main reasons 
for constructing the Yuzui was flood control and in combination with Zipingpu the 
overall project also included power generation, water supply and irrigation 
bolstering the capability of Dujiangyan. Construction started in 1959 and was 
documented with pictures in People’s Daily, the official government mouthpiece. 
                                           
64 The following section relating the historical antecedents and history of the Zipingpu is primarily based on Mertha 
(2008), chapter four. 
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Figure 6: On page two of People’s Daily on February 2, 1959: “Towards getting power 
from the Min River” (Chen 1959). 
 
Construction was stopped again in 1961 (Mertha 2008) although earlier reports in 
People’s Daily mentioned that the dam would be finished by 1961(Sun 1959).65 
In 1986, plans to revive the projects were forwarded in an internal watershed plan 
for the Min River put together by the Sichuan Province Water Resources and 
Hydropower Design and Survey Institute (Mertha 2008: 96). People’s Daily had 
one mention of planned construction at Zipingpu within the next ten years in 1991 
(Zhao and Bao 1991) and until the 2000s People’s Daily did not report anything 
officially regarding Zipingpu. Then in March of 2000 the State Council officially 
approved the feasibility report for the Zipingpu dam (Liang 2001). At the same 
time the project was inscribed in the 10th Five-Year Plan (10th FYP) as one of the 
                                           
65 I have not been able to determine the reasons for construction being stopped in 1961, but given the turbulent 
political climate at the time it would not be surprising that political decisions were reversed. Also, an article in 
People’s Daily from 2005 chronicles that (in the article unspecified) “foreign experts” helped the Chinese 
government build/plan the Zipingpu. However, the geological conditions were very complicated and due to a gas 
explosion the foreign experts concluded that “Zipingpu was not suitable for dam construction” (Liu 2005). This 
might explain the reasons behind stopping the project in the early 1960s. 
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top-ten key projects to be carried out under the concurrent ‘great western 
development’ campaign (xibu dakaifa) (Liang 2001) – the high priority policy 
program which was initiated in 1999 (Magee 2006a and 2006b).  
In March 2001, the Zipingpu project was officially approved by the State Council 
and listed as a “number one” project for Sichuan Province with a total estimated 
investment of 69.8 billion Renminbi (Liang 2001). As the bank of choice for 
implementing the Western Development Campaign, The Import-Export Bank of 
China provided financing for Zipingpu and in August 2001 the Sichuan Province 
Department of Finance signed a transfer agreement on 321.99 billion Japanese 
Yen as part of financing the project (Qu 2001).66  
The responsibility for the construction of the dam was placed with the Sichuan 
Province Zipingpu Development Co., Ltd. (hereafter referred to as the Zipingpu 
Company) (Xinhua Net 2002). The Zipingpu Company was founded in October 
1998 as a key state enterprise under Sichuan Province with the sole responsibility 
to construct and subsequently operate the Zipingpu hydropower station. The 
timing of the founding of the company being almost concurrent with the 1999 
initiation of the ‘great western development campaign’ suggests that, although not 
officially announced, planning of the project had been underway for years.  
As a provincial level company, the Zipingpu Company would refer to the 
Provincial SASAC office (Provincial State-owned Assets Supervision 
Management Committee) but also to the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) as 
the company responsible for a major construction project related to water 
resources. With the status of key state enterprise in Sichuan Province and with the 
                                           
66 The article in People’s Daily states the currency as Japanese Yen. I have not been able to determine from the 
article why the amount was not stated in Chinese Renminbi. However, during a long period from 1978 onwards, 
Japan provided so-called Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China through the Import-Export Bank of 
Japan (Muldavin 2000). The article does mention that the Japanese government provided development assistance to 
Sichuan Province. Development assistance from Japan may therefore explain why the transfer was stated in 
Japanese Yen. See also Qu (2001). 
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construction of the Zipingpu project being inscribed as a part of the central 
government ‘great western development’ (xibu da kaifa) policy it is clear that the 
Zipingpu Company, while not being one of the largest state-owned hydropower 
development enterprises in China, was nevertheless an important player in terms 
of spear-heading the visible implementation of the Central Government’s 
campaign.  
In November 2002, construction was officially started at Zipingpu. Then Party 
Secretary of Sichuan Province Zhou Yongkang67 officially ordered the closing of 
the Min River at an on-site event on November 23rd 2002 (Liu 2002). The event 
was documented with a picture of bulldozers pushing rocks in the river on the 
front page of People’s Daily the next day (Liu 2002). 
 
Figure 7: Front page picture, People’s Daily November 23, 2002. Article entitled: 
“Zipingpu project successfully cuts the flow” (Liu 2002). 
                                           
67 Zhou Yongkang was Minister of Land and Resources prior to becoming Party Secretary of Sichuan Province, a 
post he held between 1999 and 2002. He later held the post as Minister of Public Security and became member of 
the 17th Politburo Standing Committee in 2007. In 2013-2014 after he had retired, he became the center of 
corruption charges in connection with President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. The case received wide 
press coverage in Chinese and international media as it was unprecedented that a former member of the Politburo 
Standing Committee was tried for corruption. He was sentenced to life in prison for taking bribes, abusing power 
and leaking state secrets in 2015 (Forsythe 2015; Huang 2014; Zhai 2014). 
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Already three years later, in September 2005, People’s Daily could again report 
from Zipingpu that the project would be finished soon and showed a picture of 
workers inside the Zipingpu site (Liu 2005). Power generation was reported to 
start in October of 2005 (Liu 2005). The lengthy article in People’s Daily 
highlighted both the history and details of the technical breakthroughs of the 
project:  
“50 years ago foreign experts aided the start of construction of the 
Zipingpu project on the upper reaches of the Min River, between the 
Yingxiu and Dujiangyan segments of the river. As a consequence of 
complicated geological structures, there was a gas explosion when the 
excavation of the river diversion tunnel took place and construction had 
to come to a stop. At the time, the foreign experts withdrew and 
declared: Zipingpu is not suitable for dam construction!” (Liu 2005). 
“The difficult problems encountered at Zipingpu 50 years ago did not 
disappear or decrease with time… ” (Liu 2005). 
The article highlighted that the Zipingpu Company had overcome many technical 
problems at the site that foreign experts could not solve. Problems were reported 
as stemming from the complicated geological conditions at the site such as high 
concentrations of methane gas underground, intensive groundwater, crisscrossing 
underground coal caves and many fault cracks. Faultlines as wide as 80 meters 
had been “bored through” (Liu 2005).  
Tan Jingyi, a water conservancy and hydropower expert from the Chinese 
Academy of Engineering and winner of the National Science and Technology 
Progress Award 1985 (Cae.cn 2017) is quoted in the article saying that “Zipingpu 
has very complicated geology so it is almost like a geology museum”, this 
meaning that so many different kinds of geological problems are very seldom 
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found in one place (Liu 2005). The article was published in People’s Daily. The 
detailing of technical problems (and their solutions) at length highlighted the 
success of the Zipingpu Company in overcoming the many technical issues in 
record time – a full year ahead of schedule (Liu 2005). This type of article is a 
good example of an official emphasis on showcasing the superior capability of 
Chinese engineers, scientists and the modern management methods implemented 
by the Zipingpu Company (vis-à-vis) “foreign experts” and the strong 
commitment by both scientists and the Zipingpu Company to aid the state in 
providing sorely needed water supply, energy, and irrigation services to society 
despite very difficult geological conditions.  
According to Mertha (2008), who looked closely at the bureaucratic negotiations 
around the decision making process in relation to the Zipingpu dam, there was not 
much public controversy over the decision to construct the Zipingpu itself. Some 
of his informants did report that ‘gag-orders’ were in effect during hearings about 
the project which effectively means that criticism regarding the project could not 
be reported. Zipingpu’s proposed “sister dam” the Yuzui (or Yangliuhu) project, 
however, was surrounded by much more open controversy and ended up being 
cancelled (Mertha 2008: 97 and 103).  
Zipingpu was finally completely finished in 2006 and began full operation in 2007 
(Sichuan Province Zipingpu Development Co., Ltd. 2015). According to official 
reporting (Liu 2005) the 156m high dam with 11 billion cubic meters of water in 
the reservoir kept within budget at approximately 7 billion yuan. In conclusion 
Zipingpu was a very successful project, when understood through official 
reporting.  
The above section of the chapter is an example of a classic contemporary China 
studies approach to unfold the historical and political context of a case by drawing 
on e.g. official newspaper sources and then piecing together the historical context 
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of a policy decision or a large construction project. The symbolic significance of 
events and persons provides indications as to the importance of the project for the 
Chinese central government and Sichuan Province. This may be common sense to 
China scholars but not necessarily to someone who does not engage with 
contemporary China studies regularly. The symbolic significance of an important 
figure in Chinese politics, such as Mao (even today) being one of the primary 
reasons for suggesting a dam across the Min River in the first place, should not be 
underestimated as Mao having suggested it boosts Party determination to see the 
project come to life. The fact that the then-Party Secretary of Sichuan Province, 
Zhou Yongkang, who later went on to become member of the Politbureau 
Standing Committee, officially ‘opened’ the construction at Zipingpu, point to the 
political significance of the project for Sichuan Province. The fact that Zhou 
Yongkang was later convicted of corruption also puts Zipingpu in a different light. 
Meaning that finally getting Zipingpu constructed and inscribed in central 
government policy could have been an important part of Zhou Yongkang’s 
promotion. That he was then later sentenced for taking bribes – which often 
happen in connection with dam construction in China (Yang 2013) – means that 
although Zipingpu was described as an outward success, there is a significant 
likelihood of corrupt practices having taken place in connection with the project. 
Understanding the meaning of issues such as these, add significance to the deeper 
Chinese context and shows the importance of such aspects for a controversy study 
conducted in China.  
From history to controversy  
Looking back at the historical antecedents of Zipingpu and understanding that a 
project at Zipingpu had been envisioned and in the making since the 1950s 
broadens the understanding of the underlying mechanisms of hydropower decision 
making in China. The story of Zipingpu supports the perspective that hydropower 
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planning and decision making in China are long-term processes often with 
considerable historical antecedents (Brown, Magee and Xu 2008; Magee 2006a). 
Perhaps one of my informants did have a point in saying: “all dams that have been 
planned at one point will eventually be built” (INT20121116). The already 
incurred costs of years of planning, designing and surveying at Zipingpu without 
any result in either the 1950s/1960s or after 1986, when an internal watershed 
report by Sichuan Province Water Resources and Hydropower Design and Survey 
Institute had revived construction plans, can be good reasons for inscribing 
Zipingpu into the 10th five-year plan. It could be argued that because the project 
blueprints were already there and that Zipingpu could be built within time and 
budget once started, the decision to go ahead in the 2000s was made easier. 
Zipingpu was not significantly delayed once given the go in the 2000s - unlike 
some of the dam projects referred to in Chapter 3 - i.e. projects that often ran into 
technical problems with years of delays as a consequence. With the historical 
perspective in mind, it is arguable that Zipingpu has been delayed since the 1950s. 
Nevertheless it was presented in official reporting as a successful project, built on 
time, within budget and was highlighted as a beacon of superior modern 
management and technical expertise on the part of Chinese engineers and 
scientists (Liu 2005). 
Wenchuan 
A year after Zipingpu had been finally completed and the dam had been put into 
full operation, the May 12th 2008 Wenhuan earthquake struck. The epicenter of the 
magnitude 7.9 earthquake was close to the city of Dujiangyan and ruptured the so-
called Longmen Shan fault line. The Wenchuan earthquake was one of the 
deadliest, costliest and most destructive earthquakes in China in three decades. 
Dujiangyan was one of many villages that were completely destroyed (USGS 
2008; Encyclopedia Britannica 2013; Sorace 2017).  
 152 
Wenchuan opened a scientific debate about the role of the Zipingpu dam in 
possibly triggering the earthquake – a debate that has yet to be settled, if it ever 
will be (see e.g. Chen 2009; Ge et al. 2009; Lei 2011; Tao et al. 2015). So a dam 
that had been built without major public controversy (Mertha 2008) unexpectedly 
became the subject of a scientific controversy over its role in possibly causing 
Wenchuan. Directly linked to the scientific controversy, a public controversy 
about the role large dams may play in triggering earthquakes quickly got the 
attention of the global media. The intertwined scientific and public controversies 
have resulted in increased interest in, and scrutiny of, the decision-making 
processes around decisions to build large dams, such as the Zipingpu, in 
earthquake prone zones.  
A simple google search on the word “Zipingpu” comes back with over 19,000 hits. 
Many of them linking to articles devoted to discussing the relationship between 
Zipingpu and Wenchuan either in the news media or in academic journals. 
Searches in mandarin Chinese on only the word Zipingpu results in over 2 million 
hits while searching ‘Zipingpu Reservoir’ yields more than 98,000 hits. If google 
can be taken as any indication these days it perhaps suffices to say that a lot has 
been written about Zipingpu online. I am not attempting to cover everything that 
has been written about Zipingpu. However, the next chapters will outline the core 
arguments in the controversy surrounding Zipingpu and its possible relation to the 
Wenchuan earthquake.  
But a controversy is not a controversy without actors. Below, some of the most 
important actors who have taken part in the controversy are outlined.    
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A network of different actors and interests at work 
Different actors may provide data or analyses towards assessing damage or 
contribute to scientific as well as public debates over whether Wenchuan was 
triggered by Zipingpu. Below follows an overview of some of the most important 
actors partaking in the debates involving the Zipingpu dam both before and after 
the Wenchuan earthquake. Some of the actors listed below have played an 
important part in construction phase decisions that have implications for dam 
construction in earthquake prone zones more generally, but they may also be 
important in post-earthquake evaluations, in providing policy advice regarding 
dam safety and publishing in scientific journals about Zipingpu possibly causing 
Wenchuan. Some actors are directly connected to the Chinese government and 
others are self-proclaimed as independent. The actors’ positioning in the 
controversy and the opinions (as far as it has been possible to ascertain them) of 
the different organizations and individuals are outlined below.  
China Earthquake Administration (CEA) 
The main authority on earthquake related matters in China is the China 
Earthquake Administration (CEA). The administration has officially been in 
existence since 1971 and has developed slowly toward a central, national level 
administration since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. In 1953, not 
long after the establishment of the People’s Republic, the Chinese Academy of 
Science set up the ‘Seismic Work Committee of the Chinese Academy of Science’ 
(Zhongguo kexueyuan dizhen gongzuo weiyuanhui) which consisted of two work 
groups (a geological and a historical one) with the main responsibility to provide 
consulting and auditing services for the State Planning Commission on major 
projects. During the 1960s the efforts to develop a national level seismic bureau 
gradually advanced – particularly after the 1966 and 1969 Xingtai and Bohai 
earthquakes. In order to strengthen the monitoring of earthquakes the State 
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Seismological Bureau (Guojia dizhen ju) was founded in 1971, hosted by the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 1975, the State Seismological Bureau was 
placed directly under the State Council. Subsequently, in 1998 the name of the 
bureau was changed to the current China Earthquake Administration (Zhongguo 
dizhen ju).68 Today, the CEA is a so-called public service unit (shiye danwei) 
under the direct responsibility of the State Council. The CEA is responsible for 
overseeing and coordinating all earthquake related work in China and is 
represented on provincial and local levels by provincial and municipal Earthquake 
Administrations (Gov.cn 2012; China Earthquake Administration 2015a). One of 
the main responsibilities of the CEA is: 
“To formulate national seismic intensity zone maps and ground motion 
parameter zone maps. To manage seismic safety evaluations for major 
construction projects and possibly occurring secondary disasters, and to 
approve seismic safety evaluation results and determine anti-seismic 
fortification requirements”. (China Earthquake Administration 2015a) 
Director General Chen Jianmin, who graduated in geology from Beijing 
University and has been employed at the Geophysics Research Institute at the 
Chinese Academy of Science, has been head of the CEA since 2004. With a 
background in geology and having been employed with the CEA since 1983, both 
in the earthquake administrations’ forecast center and research office, Chen 
Jianmin has professional insight into scientific matters relating to earth sciences 
under the responsibility of the CEA (China Vitae 2015). As a member of the CPC 
from 1993 and since 2012 member of the Central Committee, Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection,69 Chen Jianmin is also in some ways a political figure. It 
is a normal feature of Chinese bureaucratic organization that the top leader is often 
                                           
68 For an in-depth description of the history of the CEA, see China Earthquake Administration (2015b). 
69 Central Committee, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is responsible for anti-corruption, among other 
tasks. There are 130 members of the commission (China vitae 2015; Xinhua 2012a; China.org.cn 2012).  
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both party secretary and director of the organization (Lieberthal 2004).70 Indeed, 
most leaders within the Chinese bureaucracy are well educated and often educated 
within the particular area they manage (see Chapter 3). A leader such as Chen 
Jianmin in many ways embodies the particular Chinese mixture of science and 
politics where it becomes difficult to tell the difference between the two.  
The CEA is an important actor in terms of providing information and guidance on 
seismic hazard and other earthquake related matters to the central administration 
and other bodies, such as construction companies. It is also important in terms of 
general regulation, policy making and approval of specific project calculations.  
Scientists from - or affiliated with - the CEA have been active in the scientific 
controversy over Zipingpu and have published articles both supporting the 
argument that Zipingpu played a role in triggering Wenchuan and that it did not. 
An article with four authors published in 2015 where the controversy is summed 
up (Tao et al. 2015) concludes that “Wenchuan earthquake was likely triggered 
indirectly by reservoir impoundment” (Tao et al. 2015). One of the four authors is 
affiliated with the CEA. The CEA is directly under the responsibility of the State 
Council. Therefore, it might be easy to assume that the CEA politically supports 
conclusions that do not question state policy on hydropower. However, suggesting 
that Zipingpu could partly be blamed for Wenchuan can be seen as questioning 
state policy. Therefore, an article such as the one mentioned above (Tao et al. 
2015) does not corroborate that the CEA unilaterally supports state policy. This 
means that while the CEA is a Chinese central government agency, scientists at 
the CEA are not necessarily restricted in terms of publishing scientific results in 
scientific journals. Although the political attention around the discussion of dam 
building in earthquake prone zones is heightened, a central government agency is 
                                           
70 Nomenklatura lists and interlocking directorates are two features through which the CCP controls important 
positions within the bureaucracy (Lieberthal 2004). 
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still allowed to contribute to international scientific journals on the subject. And 
even conclude that a state-backed project might be to blame for a serious disaster.  
Consequently, the position of the CEA can be seen as double - both as a politically 
administrative/regulatory agency and as a scientific organization. Where the line is 
drawn between politics and science is hard to determine a priori. Factors such as 
the audience addressed - academic, news, advisory role to government etc. – could 
factor in here.  The next chapter analyses the scientific controversy, and CEA’s 
role in it. In Chapter 7, the regulatory agency role of the CEA is examined in an 
analysis of pre-construction risk negotiations at the time of the final construction 
at Zipingpu. 
Research institutes and industry organizations  
Most hydropower companies in China employ seismologists, geologists and 
engineers specializing in seismic design. However, if this type of expertise is not 
found within the company it is often sourced from centrally placed research 
institutes focused on hydropower such as the Institute of Water Resources and 
Hydropower Research (IWHR). Hydropower companies are also represented by 
industry organizations. Organizations - such as the China Society of Hydropower 
Engineering (CSHE) also do research and provide consulting to hydropower 
companies. In a sense, research institutes, industry organizations and the 
hydropower industry in China mix together in these types of organizations. 
The Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research (IWHR) 
IWHR is such a centrally placed national research institute primarily tied to the 
Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) but also the major Chinese hydropower 
companies (INT20130715a; IHA Website 2; Tilt 2015).  
In Tilt’s words, the IWHR is located at:  
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“… the epicenter of expertise, financing, and planning for water 
resources in China: the China Three Gorges Corporation is next door, 
the project offices for the South-North Water-Transfer Project are 
around the corner, The SinoHydro corporate headquarters is a block 
away and the MWR is down the street” (Tilt 2015)71 
The IWHR offers a wide range of services related to hydropower such as “(…) 
technical consultancy, construction supervision, project monitoring and safety 
evaluation” (IWHR.com). The IWHR also has a special research center focused on 
earthquake engineering (INT20130715a).  
Research and consultancy for hydropower companies and the government are the 
main tasks for the organization (INT20130715a). IWHR hosts the Chinese chapter 
of the international organization the International Commission on Large Dams 
(ICOLD), the China National Committee on Large Dams (CHINCOLD) 
(IWHR.com), and also hosts the China National Office of the global hydropower 
interest organization the International Hydropower Association (IHA) (IHA 
Website 3). Research and consulting for hydropower companies and the 
government being some of the organization’s main tasks (INT20130715a) places 
the IWHR in a position where their primary ties are with the government - in the 
form of the MWR a reportedly pro-hydro ministry (Mertha 2008) - and with SOEs. 
In this way, the IWHR has a double role both as a research institute publishing 
hydropower related research, and as an organization working primarily in the 
services of what can be called pro-hydro forces such as the MWR and SOEs 
whose purpose is hydropower development. In line with this ‘pro-hydro’ view, in 
January 2010, engineers from the IWHR published an article in the industry 
                                           
71 China Three Gorges Corporation is solely responsible for the Three Gorges dam and is featured on the SASAC 
list mentioned in Chapter 4. The South-North Water Transfer Project is a high-level government project with efforts 
at directing water north to arid regions from more abundant water resources in China’s south west. The Sinohydro 
Corporation is the largest state-owned corporation responsible for design, construction and other hydropower 
related engineering services to SOEs.  
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journal International Water Power and Dam Construction arguing that the 
Zipingpu dam did not play a role in causing the Wenchuan earthquake due to, 
among other arguments, that the earthquake was unlike other induced earthquakes 
(Chen et. al 2010). More on the position and role played by the IWHR in the 
scientific debate is provided in Chapter 6. 
China Society for Hydropower Engineering (CSHE) 
CSHE is also an influential organization when it comes to research and decision 
making in relation to hydropower. The organization is: 
”…a non-profit national academic and social organization for 
hydropower engineering professionals under the guidance of the China 
Association for Science and Technology” (Hydropower.org). 
The organization works closely with the IWHR and also has a committee working 
on seismic issues related to dam design. Members of the organization include the 
MWR and all the central Chinese hydropower companies as well as universities, 
grid companies, and a host of hydropower companies on provincial and local 
levels (CSHE 2012). Their vice secretary general Zhang Boting is a hydropower 
engineer who participates in international conferences, has served as editor of the 
Journal of Hydroelectric Engineering and has published hundreds of papers on 
issues related to dams (IHA Website 1). The position of the CSHE is favorable to 
dam development and Zhang Boting, in particular, has been very focused on 
assuring the public and the central government of the safety and soundness of 
building large dams in earthquake prone zones (INT20130715). Zhang Boting is a 
central figure in the public controversy over Zipingpu. In Chapter 8, his 
positioning in favor of building dams in earthquake zones is analyzed. 
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Non-governmental organizations and individuals 
International as well as domestic NGOs and Chinese scientists have been speaking 
or writing publicly about the Zipingpu controversy. The NGOs International 
Rivers and Probe International has devoted a lot of resources to discuss the 
relationship between dams and earthquakes72 and have been quite successful in 
fueling further debate in both Chinese and global media about the risk of 
earthquakes being triggered by dams (INT20121012; INT20130607; 
INT20131001). Taken together the organizations and individuals described below 
are not in favor of dam building in general or dam building in earthquake prone 
zones in particular.  
Probe International 
The Canadian international NGO Probe International has dedicated a number of 
publications to Zipingpu as well as the relation between dams and earthquakes 
more broadly in south western China. The NGO is: 
“…an independent environmental advocacy group that fights to stop ill-
conceived aid, trade projects, and foreign investments” (Probe 
International Website 1).  
The organization has backed several researchers’ efforts into writing reports about 
the negative relationship between dams and earthquakes. One such report by an 
anonymous international geologist came out in 2012 and was very often referred 
to by different NGOs during my fieldwork and in interviews (Jackson 2012). As 
may be clear, the organization is not in favor of large dams. 
                                           
72 See for example Probe International reports and special section on earthquakes (Probe International 2015; Probe 
International Website) as well as articles by International Rivers published on their website (International Rivers 
2009; International Rivers 2015b). 
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International Rivers 
The California based international NGO International Rivers has also devoted 
time and effort to create awareness not only about Zipingpu but also about the 
risks associated with building dams in earthquake prone zones. The NGO is the 
only international NGO with a specific focus on rivers and dam construction 
worldwide and has special programs focusing on dams in China, Latin America, 
Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia (International Rivers Website). 
International Rivers has a wide network of contacts counting both academia and 
journalists (INT20130607). In addition, the organization started a policy dialogue 
with SinoHydro, the largest state-owned hydropower project contractor in China, 
among other topics discussing the company’s environmental standards 
(International Rivers 2011a). International Rivers is not in favor of dam building 
anywhere in the world and continuously advocates for dam decommissioning, and 
finding other solutions to energy shortage problems both through their network in 
academia and through blogs, newsletters and news stories. 
Green Earth Volunteers 
The Chinese domestic NGO Green Earth Volunteers (GEV) does not state directly 
that dams are part of the organization’s focus. Their president, a well-known 
public figure, journalist and activist Wang Yongchen, is widely known for her 
promotion of awareness of the negative effects of economic development on the 
environment in China – hereunder dam building – especially on China’s south 
western rivers. She was one of the major forces behind the campaign in the 2000s 
to stop the 13 planned dams on the Nu River in south west China. The campaign 
ended with a – by NGOs - declared victory in 2004 when a moratorium was put on 
further dam development on the Nu. Wang Yongchen was celebrated in a 2008 
special report in Time Magazine titled “Heroes of the Environment 2008” (Time 
2008) for her work. While not overtly focusing on dams or earthquakes the 
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organization is an important actor in terms of promoting awareness about the 
health of rivers in China and the risks associated with large scale construction 
projects. They promote awareness e.g. through the organization of ‘journalist 
salons’ where NGO representatives, technical experts and journalists meet to 
discuss e.g. dam building or new policy initiatives (FN201305).73  
Individuals  
Two Chinese individuals are, and have for a long time been, very outspoken and 
critically addressing the relationship between dams and earthquakes. They are 
often referred to as experts by both foreign and domestic journalists and NGO 
organizations alike. Both have been interviewed numerous times in international 
and domestic media when the topic of dams and earthquakes comes up in relation 
to China.  
Fan Xiao, chief engineer at the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau in Chengdu, 
has been very outspoken about the risks of earthquakes in relation to dams and has 
published a number of Chinese language articles on the topic. He is often 
interviewed and cited in international media on the topic. He was for example 
cited in the article in Science (quoted in the introduction) which was published in 
January 2009 (Kerr and Stone 2009). An article that in many ways helped spark 
the debate in the news media. Science also made a follow-up interview with him 
(Kerr and Stone 2009a). His point of view is that the science is clear and that 
Zipingpu and other dams play major roles in relation to triggering earthquakes in 
south western China. I interviewed Fan Xiao on his role in the debates in 2012.  
Yang Yong is an independent geologist and founder of The Hengduan Mountain 
Society, a non-profit center for research and activism based in Chengdu. He has 
been an independent geologist for over 20 years and through his center he and 
                                           
73 I did participant observation at one of these salons in May 2013. It was a full day event where the environmental 
impact of dam building on river systems in China was discussed. 
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other volunteers have travelled all over the south western provinces Yunnan and 
Sichuan as well as eastern Tibet gathering data on river ecosystems (Yong 
2008/2009). Yang Yong is one of two people in China (Fan Xiao being the other) 
who have publicly criticized the government’s fast-paced hydropower 
development of western and south western China. He was the first to publish a 
report in China about the relationship between earthquakes and dams in China. 
The report was not favorable towards dam building in earthquake prone zones. He 
has spent six months in house arrest for raising the issue (INT20131001). In 2013 
I interviewed Yang Yong about his role in the debates. His role as an expert is 
analyzed in Chapter 8. 
After analyzing the historical antecedents of the decision to build the Zipingpu 
dam and having become familiarized with some of the key players in the scientific 
and public controversy centering on Zipingpu that we will meet in the next three 
chapters, we now turn to the scientific controversy. The next chapter analyses the 
scientific controversy as it unfolded in scientific journals centering on the main 
question: Did the Zipingpu dam play a part in triggering the 7.9 magnitude 
Wenchuan earthquake or not?  
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Chapter 6: Triggering earthquakes in 
science 
The key technical issue in the present chapter revolves around the scientific 
controversy over whether an earthquake is “man-made” – i.e. directly caused by 
human activity such as the construction and operation of a dam reservoir – or not.  
First, a quick tour of broad academic consensus in seismology related to 
earthquakes, magnitudes etc. are presented. These basic understandings of 
consensus in earth sciences are pertinent to the understanding of the scientific 
controversy over whether the Zipingpu dam reservoir did or did not trigger the 
Wenchuan earthquake. Next, the core of the scientific controversy related to 
Zipingpu, a debate about the phenomenon called Reservoir Induced Seismicity 
(RIS) is discussed. Lastly, the debate as it unfolded in academic publications over 
whether Zipingpu played a role in triggering Wenchuan is analyzed. We start with 
the basics. 
Earthquake basics 
Most people know that earthquakes occur when the earth is moving or shaking and 
that the shaking has something to do with plates in the earth bumping up against 
each other. That is the simplest of explanations. A seismologist, someone 
specialized in the study of earth science, would perhaps explain it with more detail 
along the lines of: The earth’s crust is built up of large plates, called tectonic 
plates, that slowly move on the surface of the earth. The edges of these plates are 
rough and therefore parts of the plate can get stuck on each other while the rest of 
the plate keeps moving. These plates are immense and the tensions that build up 
between them can be enormous. Sometimes the tension becomes very high when 
plates are stuck together in one place but the rest of the plate keeps moving. At 
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one point a release – or rupture - happens and the plates move abruptly - this is 
usually what is called an earthquake. Most people know about continental plates 
and that for example on the coast off California the Pacific plate and the North 
American plate meet and that this meeting has caused powerful earthquakes in the 
past. Such places where plate boundaries meet are called faults, fault lines or fault 
zones (INT20131001; INT20131014; INT20121125; Andersen et al. N.D.; GEUS 
Website 2016; USGS 2016).74  
There are three major types of faults: Faults where the plates move toward each 
other and are pressed together so that material is subdued (normal faults); faults 
where plate move toward each other and material is pressured upwards (thrust 
faults) and faults where the plates rub up against each other (slip-strike faults). 
There are a large number of variations on these three kinds but the general 
consensus in earth science is that these are the major types of faults. It is important 
to know what kinds of faults exist in a given area when for example building 
infrastructure of any kind close to or on fault lines. Knowing what kind of fault is 
found in a given area provides information about how the earth is likely to move 
and thus, should an earthquake happen, how to build infrastructure that can 
withstand this particular kind of movement in the best possible way (Andersen et 
al. N.D; Kerr et al. 2003; University of Leeds 2016). 
Magnitude 
When reading about earthquakes in the news most often headlines will feature a 
number along the lines of: “7.0-magnitude earthquake hits SW China’s Sichuan” 
(Xinhua Net 2013). Most people also know about the Richter scale and that this 
has to do with how big an earthquake is. The Richter scale is also called the open 
Richter scale and is a logarithmic scale (each step on the scale is 10 times more 
                                           
74 For a critical appraisal of earth science, the history of earth science and the history of the consensus of plate 
tectonics as a unifying theory see Oreskes (1999) and Oreskes and LeGrand (2003). 
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than the previous one) which is based on the measurements of seismographs (a 
device for measuring ground shaking as a result of earthquakes, explosions, 
volcanic eruptions etc.). The vibrations measured by seismographs usually range 
between 0 and 9. However, as the scale is open it means that measurements have 
occurred of very small shaking by fine-tuned seismographs and that shaking can 
potentially exceed 10. The number on the Richter scale is a measurement of 
magnitude of an earthquake and is broadly designated by an M (The Constructor 
2015; Gregersen 2015).  
Today the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (MII) is often used in hazard 
communication. The MII Scale goes from I-XII and describes an earthquake’s 
effect locally (United States, California Department of Conservation, California 
Geological Survey 2002). For example X refers to major damage. For hazard 
communication purposes the MII scale is perhaps easier to relate to as it 
communicates levels of potential damage e.g. to buildings or other structures 
rather than the magnitude of the earthquake itself as measured on the Richter 
scale. 
Earthquake hazard and hazard maps 
The most common way to identify earthquake hazard, and thus the risk of ‘ground 
movement’ or earthquakes, in a given area is by using a so-called seismic hazard 
map. 75  Seismic hazard maps are maps with information on peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) for a specific area. PGA designates the maximum degree of 
vibration in a specific site expected to be exceeded in 50 years with a probability 
of 2-10 per cent (INT20130622; USGS 2015). In order for engineers and dam 
designers to build structures that can withstand earthquakes, hazard maps are thus 
an important tool as they provide the baseline for how much ground movement the 
                                           
75 For a critical discussion of hazard maps, the uncertain evidence on which they are based, why they are often not 
accurate and what to do about it see Seth et al. (2012). 
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structure is to be able to withstand. Hazard maps for specific areas are normally 
produced by geologists and/or seismologists or by people educated within 
engineering seismology and earthquake engineering. These disciplines are a 
combination of civil engineering and seismology dealing specifically with focus 
on designing earthquake-safe structures (Stein & Wysession 2003:14).  The 
responsibility for the production and maintenance of hazard maps in most 
countries lies with a central authority dealing with earthquakes such as the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) in the US or the CEA in China. 
 
Figure 8: An example of a hazard map where the PGA of a certain size across different 
countries in Asia is shown according to a coloring code. The circle in the middle of the map 
approximately designates the south western parts of China (GSHAP 1999) 
 
According to the Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Programme (GSHAP): 
“The most effective way to reduce disasters caused by earthquakes is to 
estimate the seismic hazard and disseminate this information for use in 
improved building design and construction” (GSHAP Report 1999).  
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However, prior to the GSHAP program’s initiation in 1994 seismic hazard 
estimates were not available for many countries in continental Asia (GSHAP 
Report 1999). In addition, information was not necessarily shared across national 
boundaries. The GSHAP was therefore designed to initiate scientific data-sharing 
and harmonize earthquake hazard estimation calculations across national 
boundaries because earthquakes do not respect national boundaries (GSHAP 
Report 1999). GSHAP cited an example of the consequences of the lack of 
consensus and data-sharing in terms of evaluating earthquake hazard:  
“…mismatches occur along most national boundaries. For example, 
along the China-Myanmar boundary, the expected earthquake intensity 
in 50 years is VII on China side, but is IX across the border in Myanmar” 
(GSHAP Report 1999).  
The quote above from GSHAP points to the fact that different nations used 
different methods to calculate the intensity of earthquakes. The example refers to 
China and Myanmar, two countries with a long shared border but where expected 
earthquake intensity varied from 7 to 9 depending on which side of the border you 
were on. The GSHAP was designed to build consensus and share data globally 
(but organized in regional groups) so as to improve seismic hazard estimations 
across national boundaries. In this way, building consensus between countries in 
terms of data-sharing and agreement on methods to calculate e.g. expected 
earthquake intensity.  
The map above (Figure 8) is the result of the GSHAP work in 1999. Figure 9, 
below, shows a more recent natural hazard map of China from 2007 with 
earthquake intensities shown in colors ranging from pale green (low) to dark red 
(high). The more recent hazard map for China below designates earthquake hazard 
on the MII scale as opposed to the 1999 hazard map which designated hazard in 
PGA. 
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Figure 9: Map of natural hazard risks in China. The area northwest of Chengdu, capital of 
Sichuan province, is encircled. It signifies the approximate location of Zipingpu. 
Earthquake intensity was estimated between VI and VIII on the MMI scale in the 
designated area in 2007. Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs - Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (OCHA ROAP) (2007). 
 
The ‘maximum possible earthquake’  
Is magnitude related to PGA then? PGA designates one way of discussing strong 
ground motion – by acceleration - showing possible maximum vibration at a given 
site and thus describes a local phenomenon. Magnitude is another way of talking 
about strong ground motion this time by magnitude or the actual size of the 
earthquake (energy released) for a measured earthquake. When building 
infrastructure, engineers need hazard maps designating PGA but they also need to 
know about the distance to nearby fault lines, the magnitude of historical 
earthquakes in the given area, modern seismic measurements of modern 
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earthquakes and frequency of earthquakes during the last at least e.g. 100 years. In 
seismology, the more data that is available about a certain area the better the 
hazard estimations for that area are (INT20160405). This scientific paradigm thus 
assumes that the more data on the area, the better, as less data means that more 
uncertainties have to be taken into account (INT20160405). Meanwhile, from 
other perspectives, this point is debatable as studies in the sociology of science 
have shown that the amount of data is not necessarily equal to more precise 
estimations but, quite the contrary, becomes a source of greater uncertainty (See 
e.g. Price 2003: 97). All available and relevant data for the given hazard area goes 
into calculating the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ for a given site 
(INT20130622). The ‘maximum possible earthquake’ is usually expressed in 
magnitude. This means that the constructor not only needs to be informed about 
the possible ground acceleration (hazard map estimations) but also about the 
possible magnitude of a potential future earthquake close to or at the site. This is 
important in terms of constructing a structure that is able to withstand a certain 
level of ground motion. Knowing the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ or the 
maximum magnitude for a future potential earthquake at a given site should also 
enable dam designers and engineers to design a structure that is able to withstand 
the level of ground motion but also to accommodate for other earthquake related 
hazards such as rockfall or landslides. 76  According to the chairman of the 
committee of seismic aspects of dam design at the International Committee on 
Large Dams (ICOLD): 
“…it must be pointed out that in the case of dams the earthquake hazard 
is a multi-hazard, which comprises of other hazards such as rockfalls 
and so on. In mountainous regions rockfalls are very important. This 
hazard has been underestimated up to now” (INT20130511). 
                                           
76 Background source for this paragraph INT20130622. 
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India meets China 
If we turn to the more specific geological conditions of south western China, 
where Zipingpu has been built and where the most abundant water resources in 
China are located, and thus where the most dams in China are being built and 
planned, we see that this area is quite complex geologically. This is the result of 
the last 50 million years of continuous movement where the Indian plate is 
pressing northwards into the Eurasian plate (INT20121125; INT 20120604, 
INT20130622; INT20131001; Larsen 2008: 4). The Indian plate moves 4-5 cm a 
year and as the Eurasian plate is not easily moved a lot of pressure builds up as a 
result of these movements. The pressure from the Indian plate also moves the 
Tibetan plateau towards the east where it clashes with the Sichuan-basin – where 
one of the fault lines are represented by Longmenshan fault line – the fault line 
that ruptured causing the Wenchuan earthquake (INT20131014; Larsen 2008; Lei 
2011).  
In earth science it is well known that the Himalayas and the high elevations of the 
Tibetan plateau are formed by the clash of the Indian plate with the Eurasian one. 
As the area is in continuous movement it is what can be termed an active area e.g. 
an area where earthquakes of varying sizes happen more frequently than in areas 
that are designated as more stable. Looking at the hazard maps in figure 8 and 9, it 
is clear that the potential for ground movement in the area is high in and around 
Sichuan and Yunnan provinces.  
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The debate on making earthquakes 
At the core of the discussion as to whether the Zipingpu dam has played a role in 
triggering the Wenchuan earthquake is the concept of Reservoir Induced 
Seismicity (RIS) or Reservoir Triggered Seismicity (RTS). 
Reservoir Induced Seismicity (RIS) 
The consensus in earth science is that Reservoir Induced Seismicity (RIS) or 
Reservoir Triggered Seismicity (RTS) refers to a phenomenon occurring when an 
earthquake is induced or triggered by a reservoir (Gupta 1992). There is a slight 
difference between ‘inducing’ and ‘triggering’ in seismological science terms 
(INT20160405). Where ‘inducing’ is considered a direct and active process 
‘triggering’ refers to an indirect process. For example, deep well fluid injection (as 
e.g. used in hydraulic fracking or geothermal energy production) can cause 
earthquakes directly (McGuire 2017).77 However, given the stress on nearby fault 
lines, the indirect pressure from for example underground high-pressure fluid 
injection can indirectly trigger a natural earthquake through the phenomenon of 
pore pressure diffusion. This increases pressure underground that indirectly 
influences the stress on a fault line and is thus able to ‘clock-advance’ an 
earthquake that would happen naturally sooner or later (INT20160405; McGuire 
2017). The reason why this is referred to as a phenomenon that is induced or 
triggered is essentially that it is either directly or indirectly influenced by human 
activity. Thus, if induced it is not considered a naturally occurring phenomenon, 
whereas if triggered it is. Deciding whether an earthquake is “man-made” – i.e. 
directly caused by human activity such as the construction and operation of a dam 
reservoir – is thus a scientific question. The distinction between direct or indirect 
influence becomes important here. If human activity has indirectly influenced the 
rupture of a fault and thus ‘clock advanced’ an earthquake that was going to 
                                           
77 For a description of ’man-made’ earthquakes caused by geothermal energy production see McGuire 2017. 
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happen eventually, the earthquake itself is still considered ‘natural’ 
(INT20131014). In the seismic and dam-related geological sciences the RTS or 
RIS phenomenon is well known and even quite a natural part of seismological 
knowledge (INT20160504, INT20131014).  
In relation to dams, RIS  arises when a large amount of water stored behind a dam 
- i.e. in a reservoir - puts pressure on the rock below so much so that the mass of 
the water makes the earth ‘creak’ under its weight (INT20130211). For an 
earthquake to be induced thus means that the mass change – from a relatively 
small amount of water in the area to a large amount of water in the area as the 
reservoir is filled - can cause the earth to shift, move or shake under the added 
weight of the water. The earth moving in this case is generally referred to as an 
earthquake caused by the dam’s reservoir. Similarly, if a large mass of water is 
removed from the same area (if the amount of water in a reservoir is reduced) this 
can also cause earthquakes (INT20130211; Gupta 1992). As mentioned above, 
induced seismicity is not a phenomenon unique to dams but also well documented 
in relation to e.g. large scale open pit mining, oil drilling, shale gas 
extraction/fracking, carbon sequestration and geothermal energy production 
(INT20160405; McGuire 2017). The term Reservoir Induced Seismicity (RIS) 
specifically refers to the phenomenon created by a large scale reservoir. 
RIS occurs when the sheer weight of the mass of millions of liters of water in a 
large scale reservoir (normally over a 100 meters in depth) pressing on the rock 
below alters the stress on a geological fault so that an earthquake is triggered or 
“clock advanced as part of the natural seismic cycle” (Klose 2013). RIS refers to 
geo-engineering activities or large scale constructions such as dams causing 
earthquakes. In other words:  
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“Dams have the special problem that they can cause earthquakes. This 
seems counter-intuitive, because the added weight of the water should 
increase the pressure on the rock below and inhibit faulting, because the 
two sides of the fault are pressed together harder, requiring a greater 
force to overcome the friction. However, it seems that the water 
impounded by dams sometimes flow into the rock, lowering the friction 
across faults and making rupture easier” (Stein & Wysession 2003: 18).  
The crucial point in the quote above is that to earth scientists, added weight is not 
necessarily a problem for faults as sometimes faults can actually stabilize as a 
consequence of added weight. The problem referred to above is that the added 
weight is in the form of water and water has a special quality: It can flow into the 
rock and make it easier for the fault to rupture. The phenomenon of water 
“flowing into the rock” is also called pore pressure diffusion and also occurs in 
relation to large scale dams.  
The first known and documented example of RIS took place in the US in the late 
1930s at Lake Mead, the reservoir behind the Hoover Dam on the Colorado River 
(Gupta 1992: 1). The largest earthquake was measured at magnitude 5 (Gupta 
1992: 1). However, while many refer to RIS as an established fact in relation to 
small and medium sized earthquakes (magnitude 1-6) large-scale, more 
destructive earthquakes (6 and up) are more disputed (Gupta 1992; Klose 2013). 
The largest documented case of a RIS earthquake occurred in 1967 in Koyna, 
India, where the Koyna reservoir induced a magnitude 6.3 earthquake that killed 
around 200 people (Gupta 2002: 280).  
For the reader the central question is: But how is it possible to know if it is an 
induced or triggered earthquake? Or: How do you determine if an earthquake is 
man-made? This is particularly difficult to determine and requires a large amount 
of data. However, even then consensus may not be reached. Moreover, this is 
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where the most scientific disagreements happen as these are complex phenomena 
with a large number of factors to consider. This is the core issue in the scientific 
controversy over Zipingpu.  
Seen from this perspective RIS/RTS can be considered a scientific problem 
discussed by scientists in science journals. However, as the general public can be 
affected if larger earthquakes are, or can be induced, the debate on the RIS 
phenomenon is not only a scientific problem. Scientific debate thus spills over into 
more mainstream media and a public controversy is born (Rogers and Marres 
2008; Venturini 2010 and 2012). In the case of RIS/RTS, a number of NGOs and 
the media are interested in reporting on the risk of human activity and in making 
sure the public is informed and have the possibility to weigh in on the acceptable 
levels of risk when taking on large scale geo-engineering projects such as dams 
(INT20131001; Probe International Website). The public part of the controversy is 
examined in Chapter 8. 
Having summed up the basics in earth science regarding RIS, we now turn to the 
next stage, looking closer at the content of the scientific controversy over 
Zipingpu itself. 
Zipingpu as a scientific controversy 
As previously discussed, immediately after the Wenchuan earthquake occurred, 
seismologists and geologists started speculating and doing research on the possible 
role played by the Zipingpu in triggering the earthquake. Disagreement on the role 
played by mass change caused by reservoir impoundment in triggering the 
earthquake led to a number of published articles in academic journals and 
discussions in specialized fora (Chen 2009; Let et.al 2008, Lei 2011; Klose 2008 
etc.). Foci in the different academic articles are on methods, calculative tools and 
calculations that prove or disprove hypotheses about the role played or not played 
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by the Zipingpu reservoir in the Longmenshan fault rupture (i.e. the Wenchuan 
earthquake).  
Whether Zipingpu has had a hand in triggering the Wenchuan earthquake has been 
the subject of peer-reviewed articles in specialized earth science journals such as 
Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth, Journal of Asian Earth Sciences, 
Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Vibration, Science in China Series D. 
Earth Science and a host of other academic journals since the Wenchuan 
earthquake. Over 70 peer-reviewed articles related to Zipingpu have appeared in 
such specialized journals since the earthquake in 2008. When I searched the 
ScienceDirect article database in 2016 and 2017 which includes the earth sciences, 
earthquake engineering and dam design more generally, I got more than 70 hits on 
searching the general key-words: Zipingpu or more specifically Zipingpu and 
Wenchuan. Going through the articles and abstracts a great majority of them 
referred to the debate over whether Zipingpu had played a role in triggering 
Wenchuan. In 2016 and 2017 when I did searches in citation databases such as 
Scopus and Web of Science the databases came back with between 50 and 115 
articles relating generally to Zipingpu and Wenchuan. Going through these 
searches most of the articles were concerned with general seismic analysis and 
some articles, more than 20 in both databases, related directly to the question as to 
whether Zipingpu has had a hand in triggering Wenchuan.  
Analyzing results in terms of authors and affiliation of authors listed in the citation 
databases showed participation from scientists primarily with affiliation in China, 
the US and Japan. In addition there were examples of joint publications across 
national boundaries e.g. US-China.  
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Ground zero 
In the following, I will show how two different events played a part in fueling 
interest in the role played or not played by Zipingpu in triggering Wenchuan 
primarily in academic journals. What can perhaps be called ‘ground zero’ for the 
controversy happened at the American Geophysical Union’s Fall Meeting, 
convened on December 15-18, 2008 in San Francisco, California. Here the 
Wenchuan earthquake which had occurred in May of the same year was on the 
agenda. At a session focused on different aspects of the Wenchuan earthquake a 
Columbia University geoscientist, Dr. Klose, forwarded a, to some, rather 
interesting argument. In his abstract from the conference he wrote: 
“In conclusion, the ensemble of geophysical observations suggests that 
the root cause of triggering the M7.9 Wenchuan earthquake may have 
stemmed from local and rapid mass changes on the surface” (Klose, 
2008). 
Without mentioning the Zipingpu dam by name (Kerr and Stone 2009) Dr. Klose 
planted the seed for a controversy over evidence as to whether the Zipingpu dam 
had played a role in triggering the Wenchuan earthquake. The core of his 
argument refers to mass change on the surface, i.e. the impact of the presence of 
the 11 billion cubic meters of water behind the Zipingpu dam. What seems to have 
fueled the debate further was that the respected journal Science published a short 
article in January 2009, where the American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting and 
Dr. Klose’s presentation were referred to.78 The article in Science was titled: “A 
Human Trigger for the Great Quake of Sichuan” (Kerr and Stone 2009). Searches 
in the Web of Science and Scopus citation databases in 2016 and 2017 showed 
that the article in Science has been cited between 35 and 51 times in different 
                                           
78 His address is also referred to in Zielinski 2009 and in Wang 2009. 
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academic journals focusing on seismic issues related to large scale dams in China 
and beyond.  
In a second article in Science entitled “Two years later, new rumblings over 
origins of Sichuan quake” published in 2010, the authors of the original article 
from 2009 summed up the academic debate about Zipingpu possibly triggering 
Wenchuan: 
”When experts suggested that the disastourous 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquake might have been triggered by the reservoir behind the 
Zipingpu Dam, establishment scientists in China remained largely silent 
(Science 16 January 2009, p. 322) [sic]. Now they’ve weighed in, ruling 
out reservoir triggering. But many earth scientists don’t buy their 
arguments ” (Kerr and Stone 2010). 
The article focused on disagreement between Chinese-based engineers at the 
Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research (IWHR), scientists from 
the US Geological Survey (USGS) and Fan Xiao from the Sichuan Bureau of 
Geology and Mineral Resources in Chengdu. The IWHR as represented by Chen 
Houqun, a structural engineer who is also co-author of the Chinese design code for 
seismic safety in dam design (Kerr and Stone 2010), did not think that Wenchuan 
was triggered by Zipingpu, whereas USGS scientists and Fan Xiao did. In general 
the article suggested that Chinese ‘establishment’ scientist were on one side of the 
argument and US scientists and other experts on the other. The 2010 article in 
Science concluded that:  
“What researchers still want almost 2 years after the earthquake is wide 
dissemination of the raw data from the Zipingpu monitoring. Until such 
data sets become commonplace says Geophysicist Evelyn Roeloffs of 
USGS in Vancouver, Washington, “it’s always going to be this kind of 
story””  (Kerr and Stone 2010). 
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Here we might ask what kind of story that would be? In the following, I am going 
to argue that it is precisely the kind of story I am analyzing in this thesis: the story 
of a techno-scientific controversy with policy implications. As shown in the quote 
above, from some scientists’ point of view the release of raw monitoring data was 
thought to be able to close the controversy over whether Zipingpu had triggered 
Wenchuan. The raw monitoring data refers to data from a network of 
seismometers installed around Zipingpu. The network of seismometers would 
have recorded the occurrences of (small scale) RIS during the release of water 
from the reservoir or during the filling of the reservoir prior to Wenchuan. Science 
asked why those data were not disseminated widely (i.e. not shared with foreign 
scientists). As mentioned in Chapter 1 there may be reasons why data is not shared 
widely as it can perhaps be prohibited according to the Law of the People’s 
Republic on Guarding State Secrets (1988/2010). But is it that simple? Perhaps 
data was shared with foreign scientists but not in the manner considered ‘right’ by 
Science?  
As we shall see in the following, arguments as to the role of data and calculations 
went back and forth between scientists from the US, China, Japan and other 
countries. I am going to argue that dividing up the scientists in neat boxes labeled 
‘US’, ‘China’, ‘Japan’ and thus ordering their positions according to whether they 
belong to a specific country is not enough to account for their positions. Neither 
will labelling boxes ‘CEA’, ‘IWHR’ or the ‘USGS’ fully account for what is at 
play in a scientific controversy. In other words, in digging deeper into the 
scientific controversy, I find that the characterization of the debate in Science is 
not all there is to it. It is not just about Chinese ‘establishment’ scientists being on 
the one side of the debate (not blaming Zipingpu) and US - plus US minded - 
experts being on the other (blaming Zipingpu). It is not that simple. I will argue 
that we also need to take the institutional set-up in China as well as historical 
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bureaucratic and scientific infights within the bureaucracy into account, and these 
are not necessarily divided according to institutional affiliation. In sum, the 
following is another example of how drawing on contemporary China studies in 
combination with doing a controversy study may play out. Let us untangle the 
next part.  
Weighing the evidence 
The fact that geoengineering activities can cause earthquakes was described earlier 
in the chapter. This fact is not a very controversial issue within the earth science 
community or with dam engineers for that matter (FN201305; INT20160405). 
Where is the controversy here then? The controversy over Zipingpu relates to the 
size of the earthquake. For such a large magnitude earthquake to have been caused 
by a reservoir – and one that has had high political priority for decades – is 
controversial.  
The important point here is to show that at the core of a controversy such as over 
the Zipingpu, it looks like all the actors are discussing the same thing - namely the 
question Did Zipingpu cause Wenchuan? However, perhaps they are not talking 
about the same thing? As mentioned in Chapter 2, Barry (2013) describes the 
changing nature of controversies and the fact that actors seldom agree on the 
nature of the controversy. This is also a classic point in controversy studies in STS 
(Venturini 2010 and 2012). The way the different actors argue their points is a key 
to unlocking how it can be that actors engaged in what looks like the same 
controversy are perhaps not discussing the same thing. Thus while the actors may 
they think they see one controversy, the way they argue can reveal that they are 
perhaps arguing about different issues. 
We begin in New York where I met with Dr. Klose who got the ball rolling. 
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Talking about mass  
It is a warm and sunny fall day in New York. We are meeting at Starbucks on 6th 
Avenue at 3 o’clock. When I get there at ten minutes to three he is already there. 
We get introduced, get coffee and then walk to Bryant Park nearby where we find 
a rickety table outside in the sun. I turn on my recorder. The Columbia University 
geoscientist, Dr. Klose, was the first to forward the argument that Wenchuan 
might have been triggered by mass change on the surface of the earth. Since this 
mass change was later described by Science as referring to the weight of the water 
in the reservoir behind the Zipingpu dam, I asked about this mass argument as the 
first thing and we immediately got to talking about ‘man-made’ earthquakes: 
Klose: “So it’s something that… where you can really say humans can 
cause earthquakes based on mass changes and the bigger the mass 
change is, the bigger… you can… expect a large earthquake”  
LGH: “So there is a relationship between the two?” 
Klose: “Yes, you have to have faults zones close to it, to the human…to 
the reservoir, and you have a large amount of mass change, and the 
timing is an issue, but not significant.  It’s more a distance issue and a 
mass issue”. 
LGH: “Distance from the fault lines?” 
Klose: “Yes” (INT20141014). 
What Dr. Klose was explaining to me was his mass change argument. According 
to him, humans can cause earthquakes by changing the mass on the surface of the 
earth (e.g. by building a large reservoir). This is basically the same argument as 
the RIS argument that was presented above. But according Dr. Klose, mass change 
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is not enough. You also need close proximity to a fault line where the mass change 
occurs. I then asked about knowing where the fault lines are located:  
LGH: “But what if you don’t know where the fault line is?” 
Klose: “You don’t know where the fault…you can analyze nearby faults 
and it’s hard, you can make imaging underneath, seismic imaging, 
where you can see things. You know what the major earthquakes was in 
history, like in Zipingpu area. The major earthquake was smaller than 
what you had now, 2008. So… you can question, now why was the 
earthquake so large? Suddenly it ruptured 200 kilometers, which is not 
caused by human…by the reservoir, but the initial trigger was caused by 
it. The first 15 seconds, the earthquake ruptured right underneath the 
reservoir and propagated in 15 seconds up to the surface where the 
reservoir is. And then, it covered… the largest movement was right 
there. And from there on, it moved 200 kilometers at the slip fault to the 
north” (INT20141014). 
Regarding Zipingpu, Dr. Klose explained that you may know where nearby fault 
lines are from e.g. seismic imaging. Then you determine from historical data the 
major earthquakes in the area. Historical data was known for Zipingpu, but such a 
big earthquake had not occurred here before. So Dr. Klose asked himself why the 
earthquake was so large. He refers to the earthquake as 200 kilometers of fault 
‘rupturing’. The greater part of the earthquake (the 200 kilometers of fault 
rupturing) was not caused by the reservoir according to him – only the initial 
trigger. According to Dr. Klose it was the mass on the surface which triggered the 
initial ‘rupture’ (earthquake) right underneath the Zipingpu reservoir. However, he 
only argued that the first 15 seconds of the earthquake was caused by mass 
changes at the surface under the Zipingpu reservoir. He explained it as follows:  
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“I saw it as an impounding or filling of a reservoir and there was a large 
amount of mass” (INT20141014).  
In this sense Dr. Klose wanted to examine what the impact of mass change (the 
weight of the reservoir when it was filled) on the surface was – i.e. did it cause the 
Wenchuan earthquake or not. One reason why Science mentioned ‘raw monitoring 
data’ could thus refer to the measurements of ‘mass change’ that seismometers can 
pick up. Meaning that when the reservoir fills, the earth may ‘creak’ under the 
added weight – the ‘creaking’ is small RIS. The raw monitoring data could then be 
important in determining the mass change and thus the possibility of causing a 
large earthquake. 
So according to Dr. Klose the largest movement of the fault was right at the 
reservoir and he believed the reservoir served as the initial trigger. This was the 
first 15 seconds of the earthquake. But what then happened was a ‘natural’ 
earthquake. He described it as a very fast chain of events – a bit like dominos 
falling: 
So after you started triggering - the earthquake ruptures - you can trigger 
other earthquakes. So that’s why you have different fault segments that 
rupture, and if fault makes…other fault segments are close to fail, they 
start to fail and the next one fails, the next one fails, until there is no 
other fault zone that is close to fail. So that’s why you have propagation 
of a rupture for so many kilometers. (…) So you don’t have many 
earthquakes after each other. You have one major earthquake, but 
everything is so fast, that the fault zone in 15 seconds breaks, the next 
one starts and breaks, then 50 seconds, 50, so it’s five times longer, or 
four times longer, and then the next fault breaks, and it’s so fast…” 
(INT20141014). 
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The fault was already close to ‘failure’ i.e. tension was built up so much so that a 
relatively small event, such as presence of  the mass of the Zipingpu reservoir’s 
approximately 11 billion cubic meters of water, could provide the initial trigger. 
Then other segments of the fault – that were also close to ‘failure’ (also loaded 
with high tension) – then ruptured as a consequence of the first segment of the 
fault rupturing. What Dr. Klose described can perhaps best be described as a sort 
of domino-effect happening as a consequence of the first initial trigger (the 
presence of the Zipingpu reservoir).  
The Wenchuan earthquake lasted over two minutes in total (Daniell 2013) but in 
this more detailed explanation Dr. Klose explained it more as a chain of 
earthquakes happening extremely fast after each other in effect causing one large 
earthquake. Dr. Klose’s argument was that the first 15 seconds were caused by 
Zipingpu – not the whole two minutes. There is thus a very fine line between 
determining whether an earthquake is man-made or not. 
In sum, Dr. Klose was convinced that Zipingpu played a significant role in 
triggering Wenchuan. This was the argument he forwarded at the American 
Geophysical Union’s Fall Meeting. But others were also looking into the issue. 
Their arguments centered on the concept of Coulomb failure stress change. 
Arguing about Coulomb failure stress change 
Dr. Klose played a role in triggering the initial debate over Zipingpu as it spread 
into Science. Other authors were also keen to study the role of Zipingpu. In other 
places scientists were already working on the mass issue that Dr. Klose referred to 
- something which is also called surface loading and is connected to the concept of 
Coulomb failure stress change (∆CFS):79  
                                           
79 ∆ refers to change and ∆CFS thus refers to the term Coulomb failure stress change.  
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“The change in Coulomb Failure Stress, ∆CFS, provides an indication 
of whether or not a fault plane is prone to slip failure. Specifically, the 
fault plane is brought closer to slip failure if ∆CFS > 0, and is moved 
away from slip failure if ∆CFS < 0” (Ohnaka 2013:239). 
In simpler terms what the change (∆) in Coulomb failure stress can indicate is how 
‘tense’ a fault is – or how close it is to ‘failure’ i.e. how likely it is that an 
earthquake is going to happen on this fault. When a fault ‘has slip failure’ the two 
sides of the fault move relative to each other and thus if the fault is ‘prone to slip 
failure’ a small event (i.e. building a reservoir) can make an earthquake. The 
change in Coulomb failure stress is the key method to determine if an earthquake 
is caused by a reservoir or not, as it calculates how much stress change is 
theoretically enough to cause an earthquake. 
This means that the different results scientists arrived at when calculating 
Coulomb failure stress change were important. So Coulomb failure stress change 
being above or below zero and not least which factors to use in calculation were 
important arguments in terms of providing evidence of the Zipingpu reservoir 
playing a role in triggering Wenchuan or not. Already in December 2008, authors 
from the CEA jointly with The Geological Survey of Japan and Chengdu 
Earthquake Administration published a paper in the Chinese journal Seismology 
and Geology (Dizhen Dizhi) titled: “Integrated analysis of stress and regional 
seismicity by surface loading - A case study of Zipingpu Reservoir”. The authors 
Lei et al. concluded that: 
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“Both weight loading and pore pressure diffusion resulted in significant 
∆CFS on the underlying Yingshu-Beichuan and Guanxian-Mianzhu 
Faults, which are considered as the source faults of the Wenchuan 
earthquake. Some clear correlations were verified between the local 
seismicity and stress change, thus we concluded that the impoundment 
of Zipingpu Reservoir clearly affected the local seismicity and it is 
worthwhile to further study if the effect played a role in triggering the 
Wenchuan earthquake” (Lei et al 2008).80 
The authors argued that both the mass of the reservoir (weight loading) and the 
phenomenon of pore pressure diffusion (water flowing into the rock) were 
important components in their calculation of Coulomb failure stress change. On 
the basis of their calculation, they concluded that Zipingpu did affect seismicity – 
i.e. it may have caused Wenchuan and called for further studies of the possible 
link between Zipingpu and Wenchuan. 
This article caused some stir as there were scientists from the CEA who were 
suggesting that the Zipingpu reservoir may have played a role in Wenchuan. Here 
we see the ‘double role’ of the CEA as referred to in Chapter 5. Scientists from the 
CEA should be part of what Science called ‘establishment scientists’. Then why 
were they arguing that Zipingpu may have had a hand in causing Wenchuan with 
authors from Japan and jointly with provincial colleagues from the Sichuan branch 
of the CEA? Why did they not argue that Zipingpu had no role to play as they 
should have if the notion of belonging to the ‘establishment’ means that you argue 
in favor state development policies? If we think of the article in other terms, it can 
be seen as a kind of bureaucratic disciplining or signaling exercise internally in 
China. Here scientists from a government agency can be seen as signaling to 
companies that they need to comply with regulation set by the CEA – i.e. the CEA 
                                           
80 The fault that ruptured was later corrected to be the Longmenshan fault. 
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is not willing to ‘protect’ the companies against backlash for causing Zipingpu. If 
the Zipingpu dam caused Wenchuan, and it could be proven that it did, what 
would the consequences be for the company responsible for building the dam? If 
scientists from the CEA were arguing for Zipingpu playing a role, the 
consequences for the Zipingpu Company would be dire – being blamed for the 
death of over 80,000 people. Moreover, what would the consequences be for other 
companies overseen by the CEA? This is a strong signal to send from the CEA. 
This effectively means that the CEA is not willing to protect even a company 
vested with the responsibility for a government priority project if the scientific 
evidence does not hold up and Zipingpu is in fact to blame. Thus this can be seen 
as ‘disciplining’ companies to comply with regulations. One informant, a 
seismologist with knowledge of relations between the CEA and dam construction 
companies, pointed it out to me as follows: 
“After the 2008 earthquake, those people [construction company 
seismologists red.] said: we will not debate with you the intensity [how 
large an earthquake can be at a given construction site red.] right now. 
You determine the number - we use it. However if there are some 
problem occurred that’s your… you should responsible for everything” 
(INT20130622). 
What my informant described was that the companies simply stated that they 
wanted to comply with regulations after Wenchuan occurred. They did not 
necessarily comply with them before Wenchuan – as we shall see in Chapter 7. In 
this way, the companies could place blame with the state if the company has 
designed a dam according to specifications by the CEA and something like 
Wenchuan should happen. Chapter 7 looks closer at a bargaining process between 
the CEA and the Zipingpu Company over precisely earthquake risk. 
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Now we go back to Dr. Klose and his argument in order to continue with the 
unfolding of the scientific debate. As mentioned, Dr. Klose was not in doubt about 
the role of Zipingpu in being the initial trigger. He further explained why it was 
that raising the issue of the role of Zipingpu became controversial: 
Klose: “And this Zipingpu dam basically triggered this earthquake that 
would have happened…” 
LGH: “…it would have happened anyway?”  
Klose: “No, you have to be careful with that statement because there is 
this argument that oh... this earthquake would have happened anyway, I 
say, no, an earthquake would have happened somewhere along the 
Longmenshan” (INT20141014). 
Earlier in the chapter which examined the RIS argument, the argument that dams 
can cause earthquakes, also mentioned the notion of ‘clock advancing’ natural 
earthquakes as a consequence of geoengineering activity. So I made the mistake of 
thinking that Dr. Klose’s argument was that Zipingpu acted as an initial trigger of 
a natural earthquake that was just waiting to happen and that Wenchuan would 
have happened anyway. But I was corrected. Although Dr. Klose earlier argued 
for the first 15 seconds as the initial trigger and the rest perhaps a ‘natural’ domino 
effect, this does not mean that his argument was that the earthquake was natural. 
He proceeded to make clear to me why the mass change argument around 
Zipingpu becomes so controversial. In his opinion an earthquake would have 
happened on that fault line, but: 
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LGH: “But not necessarily right there? 
Klose: “But the earthquake happened exactly at that point where the 
highest stress change occurred for the last thousands of years. 
Remember, a mass change caused by a reservoir like Zipingpu, no 
geological process can cause such a rapid mass change in such a short 
time period, except a volcanic explosion. So we humans, can do 
processes, or induce processes, that are much larger than what nature 
does in a shortened time period. And that’s the whole understanding 
why that earthquake might have… or happened there, or the argument 
why it happened there and not somewhere else” (INT20141014). 
The fact that humans can cause earthquakes is the center of the argument above. 
First of all Dr. Klose argued that the earthquake happened at this particular point, 
close to the Zipingpu reservoir. This was not a coincidence. According to Dr. 
Klose humans have the ability to build something that can cause enough change 
on the surface of the earth within a short time and with forces so great that in 
explaining it to me he compared it to a volcanic eruption. That is a very powerful 
force. The essence of his point being that not in thousands of years would an 
earthquake have happened ‘naturally’ at this particular point had it not been for the 
presence of Zipingpu dam’s reservoir. 
In sum, Dr. Klose’s argument and initial mentioning of mass change at the 
American Geophysical Union’s Fall Meeting was controversial in the sense that 
his argument highlighted the role played by Zipingpu. A natural earthquake might 
have occurred at some point along the fault line in some distant future. However, 
the fact that Zipingpu was built and that the earthquake started right at the point 
where the largest mass change occurred, sums up his argument as to why it started 
precisely at Zipingpu. The earthquake was anything but natural according to Dr. 
Klose. 
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There were other scientists who agreed with Dr. Klose about the role of mass 
changes at Zipingpu. In a four author paper titled: “Did the Zipingpu Reservoir 
Trigger the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake?” by scientists with affiliations at US 
Geological Survey, and three US-based universities, published in the journal 
Geophysical Research Letters the authors argued that the Zipingpu Reservoir did 
play a role in Wenchuan: 
 
“This study evaluates the stress changes in response to the impoundment 
of the Zipingpu Reservoir and assesses their impact on the Wenchuan 
earthquake. We show that the impoundment could have changed the 
Coulomb stress by - 0.01 to 0.05 MPa at locations and depth consistent 
with reported hypocenter positions. This level of stress change has been 
shown to be significant in triggering earthquakes on critically stressed 
faults. Because the loading rate on the Longmen Shan fault is <0.005 
MPa/yr, we thus suggest that the Zipingpu Reservoir potentially 
hastened the occurrence of the Wenchuan earthquake by tens to 
hundreds of years” (Ge et al. 2009). 
 
The paper authored by only US-based scientists reached the same conclusion as Dr. 
Klose, this time in a peer-reviewed paper. As the quote above shows they were 
evaluating mass change – based in the Coulomb failure stress change calculation – 
and arrived at the conclusion that the mass of the Zipingpu reservoir was enough 
to trigger the already very ‘loaded’ fault line. This means that an earthquake was 
close to happening on that fault line. However, we have to keep in mind that we 
are talking geological terms here and that the meaning of an earthquake which is 
about to happen refers to that it could happen within e.g. hundreds of years. The 
conclusion by Ge et al. (2009) was that an earthquake that was waiting to happen 
sometime in the distant future was ‘clock advanced’ by ‘tens to hundreds of years’. 
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The article thus emphasized that the mass change at Zipingpu played a role 
causing the Wenchuan earthquake. Although these authors agreed with Dr. Klose 
their article did not lead to consensus – on the contrary.  
In 2010, paper by four authors affiliated with the CEA, Beijing University, and the 
Sichuan Earthquake Administration was published in the journal Earthquake 
Science. The authors were not agreeing that Zipingpu had played a role and 
specifically referred to the two papers cited above. The one by Lei et al. (2008) 
where researchers from the CEA were co-authoring with the Geological Survey of 
Japan and the one by Ge et al. (2009) by US based researchers cited just above. 
Both those papers argued that Zipingpu had some influence on Wenchuan and 
called for further research. The paper by Zhou et al. (2010) quoted below 
disagreed with the conclusions by Lei et al. and Ge et al. and highlighted that 
Zipingpu could not be blamed for Wenchuan: 
“Among all published discussions, Lei et al. (2008) and Ge et al. (2009) 
might have a very strong impact on both the scientific community and 
the society of China. Both these papers presented a result suggesting 
that the Zipingpu reservoir hastened the occurrence of the Wenchuan 
earthquake by tens to hundreds of years. Their researches calculated the 
Coulomb stress change induced by Zipingpu reservoir on the rupturing 
fault of the Wenchuan earthquake. Their results, however, are critically 
dependent upon the hypocenter location, the reservoir location, and the 
fault plane orientation. We have done similar work and infer that 
Coulomb stress changes alone were neither large enough nor of the 
correct sign to promote this disastrous earthquake” (Zhou et al. 2010). 
 
At the beginning of the quote, the authors write that the discussion started by the 
two previous papers is hazardous in the sense that discussing this issue may have a 
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‘strong impact’ not only on the scientific community but also on Chinese society. 
The authors however, do not elaborate in the paper as to what kind of impact this 
is. They then go on to argue that the results, with regard to Coulomb failure stress 
change, that the two previous papers arrived at were erroneous. They draw in the 
hypocenter location – which is the exact location down below the surface of the 
earth where the earthquake started. In addition, they draw on the location of the 
reservoir and the angle of the fault that caused the earthquake. All three 
components go into the calculation of Coulomb failure stress change and can thus 
affect the calculation. According to the calculation by Zhou et al. the Coulomb 
failure stress change was not significant enough to cause Wenchuan. It was simply 
not big enough or of the correct ‘sign’ meaning that it was not calculated correctly.  
 
These authors, with affiliations at the CEA, the Sichuan branch of the CEA and 
the top-tier Beijing University were thus not in agreement with their colleagues 
who were also at the CEA and with the Sichuan branch of the CEA. The only 
affiliation difference between the paper by Ge et al. and Lei et al. is that the latter 
also had an author with affiliation with the Geological Survey of Japan. The first 
sentence of the quote above by Ge et al. stipulating ‘strong impact’ on the 
scientific community and Chinese society can be seen as reference to internal 
disagreement within the CEA. Some at the CEA perhaps did not think it wise to 
indirectly criticize state policy on dams.  
 
In the quote above, the authors argued that Coulomb failure stress change alone 
was not enough to cause Wenchuan based on the components of the calculation. 
The same approach was also used by other authors. In 2009, a structural engineer 
from the IWHR, Chen Houqun, published an article in the journal Earthquake 
Engineering and Engineering Vibration. Not only did this article focus on the 
calculative components of Coulomb failure stress change similar to the later article 
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by Zhou et al. (2010), but a number of additional factors were drawn in. The 
purpose of which was to forward the main argument that Zipingpu could not have 
played a role in triggering Wenchuan.  
 
First, it is suggested in the quote below that the article by Lei et al. - authors from 
the CEA and the Geological Survey of Japan - used an ‘oversimplified’ 2D model 
– i.e. a model that was not accurate enough to support their argument. Moreover, 
they assumed that the reservoir was located on a fault: 
 
“… a case study of the Zipingpu Reservoir by Lei et al. (2008) and 
quoted by Richard A. Kerr and Richard Stone (2009) [the article in 
Science red.] uses an oversimplified 2-D model and assumes that the 
entire reservoir is located on a fault. Actually, only the narrow 
Mingjiang River crosses the fault” (Chen 2009). 
 
The argument that only the river crosses the fault questions the logic of the 
argument about mass. If only the river crosses the fault, how much weight can be 
on the fault?81 Like Zhou et al. above, Chen (2009) goes on to focus on the 
location of the hypocenter as a component in the calculation of Coulomb failure 
stress change. He concludes that not only is the model “very simplified” it also has 
‘large uncertainties’ (Chen 2009). The article by Chen thus questions most of the 
components of the discussion thus far. Chen even asks outright if the conclusion 
that such a large earthquake can be caused by a small change in Coulomb failure 
stress change is even credible: 
 
                                           
81 There is of course more to this aspect of the debate. For example another debate about how the weight might 
have pressed on one side of the fault was running parallel to this debate (INT20131014). However in outlining the 
scientific controversy the main arguments about Coulomb failure stress changes are foregrounded. 
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“An artificial argument can be made that a large earthquake of M=8 can 
be triggered by a small change in ΔCFS, however, is this a credible 
conclusion?” (Chen 2009). 
 
What is an artificial argument? It seems that in this context an artificial argument 
is arguing for Zipingpu having triggered Wenchuan. It is simply not a credible 
conclusion to Chen. As opposed to Lei et al. (2008), Ge et al. (2009) and Zhou et 
al. (2010), the way Chen argues here is based more on logic than on actual 
calculation. The language of the article is also different. The articles by Lei et al. 
and Ge et al. refrain from making statements such as ‘artificial argument’ or 
‘oversimplified’ about the evidence. They simply present the evidence. The article 
by Zhou et al. draws in Chinese society and the scientific community in their 
argument, but otherwise refrains from statements such as the above. Perhaps, the 
fact that Chen is a structural engineer has something to do with the way he argues? 
He draws on arguments previously made in the debate, and has a clear point of 
view but does not present new evidence to counter it other than disqualifying the 
arguments. He is very certain in the article that the Zipingpu reservoir could not 
have triggered Wenchuan and clearly states this in the article (Chen 2009). But 
what seems to bring his argument home is his point that:  
 
 “… the Wenchuan earthquake did not have the basic characteristics of a 
reservoir earthquake” (Chen 2009). 
 
What are the basic characteristics of a reservoir earthquake? This is essentially 
what the seismologists are debating - and they are not agreeing. Their arguments 
are exactly about whether such a large earthquake can be caused by a reservoir. 
But maybe the logic of Chen’s argument is different? Instead of only looking at 
the available data for Zipingpu and calculating on the basis of that, Chen (2009) 
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argues that it is possible to compare with other large earthquakes possibly caused 
by reservoirs and then conclude from there about ‘the basic characteristics’ – thus 
suggesting a case study comparison method instead of calculating components of 
Coulomb failure stress change. It seems then, that engineers and seismologists 
have different ways of arguing about what should be the same issue. 
  
If we go back to the seismologists some were in agreement with some of Chen’s 
points. Although the way they argued was different from Chen’s.  
 
Authors affiliated with the Sichuan Seismological Bureau, the CEA, Beijing 
University and a New Zealand Earth Science consultancy service, GNS Science, 
were agreeing on some of Chen’s points. In an article published in the Bulletin of 
the Seismological Society of America the authors were arguing against the 
Zipingpu reservoir in playing a role in Wenchuan. The authors, three from ‘the 
usual suspects’ - the CEA, the Sichuan branch of the CEA and Beijing University 
- and one foreign, here New Zealand based, concluded that: 
 
“Both the calculated Coulomb stress variations and the observed 
seismicity analysis suggest that the probability that the huge Wenchuan 
earthquake, Mw 7.9, was induced by the Zipingpu reservoir is very low” 
(Deng et al. 2010). 
 
The argument by Deng et al. again centered on Coulomb failure stress but also 
brought in an “observed seismicity analysis” as evidence. This seismicity analysis 
was based on local data about seismic events around Zipingpu – essentially this 
would be the data recorded by seismometers installed at Zipingpu – or the data 
which was not ‘widely disseminated’ according to Science. The title of the article 
by Deng et al. made their point clear: “Evidence that the 2008 Mw 7.9 Wenchuan 
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Earthquake Could Not Have Been Induced by the Zipingpu Reservoir”. The article 
prompted a reply from the authors Ge et al. who had argued in an earlier paper in 
the journal Geophysical Research Letters (Ge el al. 2009, also quoted above) that 
the that Zipingpu did play a role. In their article “Comment on Evidence that the 
2008 Mw 7.9 Wenchuan Earthquake Could Not Have Been Induced by the 
Zipingpu Reservoir” again by Ge et al. and published in Bulletin of the 
Seismological Society of America in 2011, they quickly dismissed the argument 
made by Deng et al. (2010): 
 
“Deng et al. (2010) computed the Coulomb stress change induced by the 
impoundment of the Zipingpu Reservoir and suggested that the reservoir 
could not have induced the Wenchuan earthquake. They have omitted a 
crucial term in calculating pore pressure. Thus the calculation of the 
pore pressure component of the Coulomb stress was flawed, and the 
conclusions derived from the calculations are unsound. In the following, 
I [sic] elaborate on this omission.” (Ge et al. 2011) 
 
Ge et al. conclude that the conclusion was ‘unsound’ and go on to show how they 
would calculate Coulomb failure stress and thus qualify the way in which Deng et 
al. are wrong. Here the argument centers on another component of Coulomb 
failure stress change - the phenomenon of pore pressure diffusion – or simply 
water flowing into rock. Ge et al. show how, according to them, Deng et al. did 
not calculate this component correctly. Note here that Ge et al. use the word 
‘unsound’ about the way Deng et al. argue. Remembering that Chen (2009) also 
made judgements as to the scientific quality of the work he was criticizing above, 
the difference here is that Ge et al. show how Deng et al. were wrong. Chen (2009) 
above judges the scientific quality of the arguments based on other arguments 
forwarded by other scientists. 
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A scientific conclusion 
The above discussion went back and forth between 2008 and 2011 in different 
journals arguing about the right method to calculate different components of 
Coulomb failure stress change, based on the data the authors possessed. This led to 
conclusions regarding whether the reservoir behind Zipingpu could or could not be 
blamed for triggering the Wenchuan earthquake. Components of the calculation 
that were most hotly debated were the hypocenter location and pore pressure 
diffusion. The debate on the role of Coulomb failure stress change in relation to 
being the main component in triggering earthquakes has continued to today. The 
latest article published analyzing Coulomb failure stress in relation to Zipingpu 
was published in April 2017 (Miao and Zhu 2017). There has been no final 
conclusion in terms of a firm result being able to conclude whether to blame 
Zipingpu for the Wenchuan earthquake or not. In a summary article published in 
2015 in the respected Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth82 authors 
affiliated with the CEA, University of California Los Angles, The Spanish 
National Research Council and Beijing University sum up the debate. In their 
conclusion they write:  
 
“The impoundment of ZR [Zipingpu Reservoir red.] perhaps did not cause 
significant increase of the ΔCFS at the hypocenter of the WE [Wenchuan 
Earthquake red.], therefore might not have directly triggered the initial 
rupture of the quake. However, because the reservoir loading significantly 
increased the ΔCFS on the middle-shallow depth of the LSF 
[Longmenshan Fault red.] and advanced ~60–450 years of its earthquake 
recurrence time, a small event in the deeper part of the fault zone could 
                                           
82 In a follow-up interview with a Danish seismologist in 2015, we discussed the debate and some of the journal 
articles that had been published during the debate. Including the one mentioned here published in Journal of 
Geophysical Research: Solid Earth. My informant related to me that the journal was a respected journal within 
seismology (INT20150405).   
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trigger rupture of the asperities above, followed by cascade failure of 
asperities along the fault zone.” (Tao et al. 2015) 
 
In the above it is important to note that the main debate points are being accounted 
for, here particularly the location of the hypocenter and how that impacted on the 
calculation of Coulomb failure stress change. The quote also describes what I 
discussed with Dr. Klose namely that a small event could cause a ‘cascade failure’ 
or what was earlier described as a fall of dominos.  
 
In sum, the central debate on Coulomb failure stress change and the arguments 
about the pore pressure diffusion and hypocenter location components of the 
calculation were all accounted for in the article, as well as the ‘clock advancement’ 
argument i.e. there was a natural earthquake waiting to happen somewhere along 
the fault line. The authors concluded that Zipingpu did not directly trigger the 
Wenchuan earthquake but that the fact that Zipingpu did something opened up for 
“a small event” being able to trigger a large earthquake i.e. causing a “cascade 
failure” 60-450 years ahead of time. This article presents the closest to consensus 
possible as all the arguments are drawn in (and were analyzed at length in the 
article). The conclusion, however, is a both/and type of conclusion. On the one 
hand there were changes as a result of the Zipingpu reservoir. On the other, these 
changes could not be pointed to as a direct cause of Wenchuan as the reservoir 
was concluded as being only part of causes for Wenchuan, not the only cause.  
Affiliations and taking sides in the debate on making 
earthquakes 
In many ways, the above debate is a classic example of a scientific controversy 
that is not resolved by a clear consensus (as in Zipingpu did cause Wenchuan or 
Zipingpu did not cause Wenchuan). The consensus is rather made up of a 
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summary of the evidence presented by the different sides, where the conclusion 
lands somewhere in the middle of a yes or a no to Zipingpu being a man-made 
earthquake. To think of it in Venturini’s (2010), terms the consensus may be to 
agree to disagree. In scientific publications, this may be a normal phenomenon – 
to agree to disagree or to have a both/and conclusion. In this case no ‘smoking gun’ 
arguments were universally agreed upon. This might all be well and good, if the 
scientific discussion occurred in some kind of scientific echo-chamber. But it did 
not. When political decision making hinges upon such decisions, then the issue of 
which side politicians are listening to becomes important. Thus, also in debating 
this issue in the public – e.g. through the news - the taking of sides is highlighted 
as news outlets tend to prefer good stories and good stories often describe 
controversies. Chapter 8 examines more closely the public side of the debate and 
the implications for hydropower policy making in China 
 
The core of the scientific debate was focused on the phenomenon of RIS. However, 
when examining this in more detail, this chapter has shown how arguments went 
back and forth between different constellations of authors about the concept of 
Coulomb failure stress, and whether this phenomenon could provide conclusive 
evidence about Zipingpu’s role in Wenchuan. Conclusive evidence was never 
universally agreed upon, but in summing up the debate, a middle-ground 
conclusion was found in 2015 (Tao et al. 2015). The article was co-authored by 
scientists from China, Spain and the US. Looking to who were arguing in the 
academic journals, it is not easy to recognize the characterization made by Science 
summing up the debate in 2010 (Kerr and Stone 2010 quoted above). 
 
The second article in Science highlights the difference of opinion between 
“establishment scientists in China” and other “experts” or “scientists” (Kerr and 
Stone 2010). The article put forward the notion that the general opinion of 
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“establishment scientists in China” is that they have ruled out reservoir triggering. 
What the above analysis shows, however, is that scientific publications arguing 
about Zipingpu were on more than one occasion co-authored by “establishment 
scientists in China”, such as scientists from the CEA, and authors from US 
universities (e.g. University of California), from a New Zealand consultancy or 
from the USGS. The picture is perhaps a bit more nuanced then. Scientists from 
the CEA argued both sides of the debate and scientists from US based universities 
did the same. The article which summed up the debate in 2015 by Tao et al. is an 
example of such co-authorship.  
 
In terms of institutional affiliation, such as the CEA or IWHR, there is a difference 
to be found, as (mainly one) engineer from the IWHR did not change his position 
during the debate. Chen Houqun, from the IWHR, also quoted above (Chen 2009) 
was quoted at length in the second article in Science from 2010 (Kerr and Stone 
2010), arguing that Zipingpu did not trigger Wenchuan. A picture of him was inset 
on a centrally placed picture of the Zipingpu dam in the article. The caption below 
said: “Did filling the Zipingpu Dam trigger the magnitude 7.9 Wenchuan 
earthquake? Chen Houqun (inset) says no” (Kerr and Stone 2010). According to 
Science then, Chen Houqun was convinced he had conclusive evidence. As we 
saw above, indeed, Chen (2009) did argue that Zipingpu could not be blamed. 
However, his evidence was not universally adopted in other scientific articles, 
many of which were referred to above.  
 
Perhaps then Science was not referring to “establishment scientists” from the CEA 
at all, despite the CEA being the central authority on earthquake related matters in 
China, but to the IWHR instead? Thinking along these lines engineers (in the form 
of Chen Houqun) are pitted against other kinds of scientists, such as seismologists 
(be they from the USGS, from the CEA or the Sichuan branch of the CEA). Thus, 
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it is not only different countries’ scientists that are arguing but rather different 
scientific fields that are arguing and weighing evidence for or against Zipingpu 
triggering Wenchuan differently. Perhaps, then engineers have a different way of 
proving their points than seismologists? Chen’s way of arguing as presented above 
at least suggests this. 
 
Institutional affiliation, which was also touched upon in the introduction of the 
actors in Chapter 5 and in this chapter thus may have something to say here. The 
affiliation of authors to countries or to institutions can be ways of categorizing in 
order to determine how conclusions are framed. FA would for example most likely 
categorize CEA scientists as ‘establishment’ or ‘government bureaucrats’. 
Positioning scientists employed at the CEA as ‘establishment’ would be natural 
because the CEA, as a Chinese government agency, should be expected to not 
openly criticize - or indirectly question - government policies that favor the 
building of dams in earthquake zones. However, from the arguments analyzed 
above we see that for example being affiliated with the CEA was not necessarily 
equal to being in opposition to the argument that Zipingpu caused Wenchuan. 
Scientists affiliated with the CEA argued both sides – supporting evidence both 
that Zipingpu did play a role in triggering Wenchuan and that it did not. 
 
The categorization used in FA may thus be seen as too rigid and not being able to 
account for scientists’ different positions within the bureaucracy. Therefore, the 
strength of drawing on FA here is not in focusing on categorization according to 
institutional affiliation. The fact that different scientists from the CEA argued both 
sides of the argument highlights another side of FA which works very well in 
analyzing Chinese policy making: That which may seem an easy conclusion in 
China on precisely positioning of different institutions is actually not only 
fragmented but disjointed below the surface. Thus, to conclude on the position of 
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the CEA by putting the institution in an ‘establishment’ category leads nowhere, 
but in a larger perspective there is something to be said for FA here. To go back to 
the history of hydropower in chapter 4, it was related that there has been a long-
standing turf war in hydropower development between ministries – as represented 
by the MWR and the MEP (and its predecessor the State Environmental Protection 
Agency - SEPA). The two ministries have more often than not been at odds 
regarding hydropower policy making (INT20130506; Mertha 2008). As was 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the MEP (which is a relatively new ministry formed in 
2008 – a major victory in itself for environmental protection supporters in China) 
have been fighting an up-hill battle to discipline state-owned hydropower 
companies to comply with for example environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
regulations. The CEA, as a public service organization, may be in even less of a 
position to discipline well-connected and high ranking hydropower companies. 
But there are other ways of influencing policy making than fighting ministerial 
turf wars. Scientific arguments may be another way forward. Co-authoring with 
e.g. ‘foreign’ scientists to boost the argumentation is also a case in point. This may 
explain why some CEA scientists are arguing for the Zipingpu triggering 
Wenchuan, although the bureaucratic logic of “where you stand depends on where 
you sit” (Allison 1971 as quoted in Brødsgaard 2013) would say that they should 
not.  
 
In the next chapter we move to an argument, also about Zipingpu, between two 
groups – seismologists at the CEA – and seismologists and dam engineers at the 
Zipingpu Company. This time, they argued about the magnitude – or size – of a 
future earthquake potentially occurring near or at Zipingpu and how the risk 
associated with such an earthquake should be translated into safety measures when 
constructing Zipingpu. This also illustrates the already mentioned ‘turf war’ 
component of bureaucratic negations in China. Let us now go back to before 
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Zipingpu was constructed and see how the different groups argued the case of 
earthquake risk, back when Wenchuan was still considered a statistical outlier 
(INT20120622; INT20131014).  
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Chapter 7: Triggering earthquakes in 
hydropower – constructing Zipingpu 
The present chapter focuses on pre-construction negotiations regarding earthquake 
safety at Zipingpu. In Chapter 5, the history of Zipingpu as seen through primarily 
official newspaper reporting gave some background to the policy environment in 
which the decision to build Zipingpu was made. This chapter first analyses 
technical negotiations concerning seismic safety of dam design for Zipingpu and 
secondly uses insights from the concept of FA to further analyze the technical 
negotiations in the Chinese policy making context.  
The point of the chapter is to highlight the important role played by probability 
calculations and trust in engineering capability in China. In the following I am 
going to argue that the trust in probability calculation and engineering capability 
on the part of Chinese engineers in many ways overshadow the fact that dams may 
trigger earthquakes in and of themselves. We start with how risk is calculated in 
large construction projects such as Zipingpu 
Designing Zipingpu: Negotiating earthquakes 
When calculating risk in large construction projects a number of actors are 
involved. Here we focus on the company responsible for a construction project – 
the Zipingpu Company – and the CEA which is the government authority in 
charge of approving seismic safety evaluations made by the company. In such 
large construction projects such as the Zipingpu dam, seismologists at the 
company level and relevant personnel at the CEA communicate about seismic 
safety evaluations as the CEA has to approve seismic safety assessments made by 
the company. In addition, construction companies are to follow hazard map 
assessments, other guidelines produced by the CEA, as well as the CEA’s 
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estimates of the ‘maximum possible earthquake’, calculated for the specific site. 
As described in Chapter 6, the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ is calculated on the 
basis of historical records of earthquakes in the given area, modern seismic 
measurements and the frequency of earthquake occurrences over approximately 
the last 100 years (INT20130622; Wang 2004). This number is usually expressed 
as magnitude (M) (e.g. M6).  
According to an interview (INT20130622) with a key informant - a seismologist 
with intimate knowledge of work conducted at the CEA as well as work conducted 
by seismologists in large Chinese state-owned companies responsible for dam 
construction (hereunder the Zipingpu Company) - the construction company may 
not always agree with the magnitude number that the CEA comes up with:  
“They [the construction company] also want to make a feasibility 
research and to say: “your data is not so correct”. However, the 
government wants the Earthquake Administration to determine this 
point [the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ red.].  So the constructor 
wants to do their own research and see… to debate this number” 
(INT20130622). 
According to this key informant, the magnitude of the ‘maximum possible 
earthquake’ can be subject to what we can call ‘technical bargaining’ between the 
construction company and the CEA. The CEA makes their calculations and the 
construction company makes theirs. Then the data are discussed. This may appear 
to be a classic scientific debate but as we shall see in the following there is more 
at stake here. The informant explains the discussion as follows:  
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“Here [pointing to a circle signifying the CEA on a diagram he has 
drawn] they say that you should give a large number, here [pointing to 
the circle in the diagram signifying the construction company] they say 
you shall give it a more small number. They are very difficult to do 
really scientific problem. Sometimes it’s not – it’s a political problem” 
(INT20130622). 
Evidently, this discussion is not only a strictly scientific debate where 
seismologists from the construction company and CEA seismologists discuss the 
data and the accuracy of the calculations and then agree on a number. The 
informant also mentions that other factors complicate the debate about the 
probable size of an earthquake – or the figure for the ‘maximum possible 
earthquake’ – and mentions that it is “a political problem”. Bargaining about the 
size of an earthquake is also connected to other non-scientific factors. This does 
not appear to be a neutral exchange of facts by a well-defined group of experts. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, no such group of defined experts actually existed 
for the ensuing scientific controversy over Zipingpu’s possible role in Wenchuan. 
Thus, when the informant points to a political problem in this context it highlights 
the fact that bureaucratic issues very likely are drawn into the scientific debate 
between the two parties. This point was also illustrated briefly in the previous 
chapter. 
According to my informant, there are consequences of such discussions between 
the company and the CEA. One such consequence occurred in the debate about 
determining seismic risk at Zipingpu. During our interview, the informant stated 
that when the estimation of the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ (which already 
requires some negotiation for the specific site between the construction company 
and the CEA) is agreed on, the construction company should “plus alpha” (a 
number between 0.5 and 1) for safety purposes (INT20130622). Alpha thus refers 
 206 
to an additional safety margin. This means that if the hazard map for the area 
shows high PGA83 and the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ is estimated at 7 to 8 
then the company should “plus alpha” and build a dam that can withstand an event 
with a magnitude between 7.5 and 9. Thus, the final number depends on the 
agreed number for the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ (e.g. 7) with alpha added 
(a number between 0.5 and 1). Therefore, the highest possible number (including 
alpha set at 1) is 9 if the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ is estimated at 8 and the 
lowest (including alpha at 0.5) is 7.5, if the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ lands 
at 7. As the informant stated it: “The local people require… stronger is better” 
(INT20130622). “Plus alpha” therefore means adding a safety margin in the 
construction design so that the design exceeds the estimated ‘maximum possible 
earthquake’ and the dam is constructed to withstand stronger ground motion.  
However, adding this safety margin on a high number for the ‘maximum possible 
earthquake’ is costly: 
“However money is another problem…if you increase by one their… 
the cost will double” (INT20130622).  
According to the informant, there is therefore a big tradeoff between safety and 
cost: if you increase the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ number by one, the cost 
of construction will double (INT20130622). This means that the number for the 
‘maximum possible earthquake’ for the site is not an insignificant issue when 
talking construction costs. It is actually rather simple: the higher the number, the 
more costly the dam.84 
                                           
83 See previous chapter for description of hazard maps and PGA. 
84 Ansar et al. (2014) calculated actual cost of large dams in relation to cost estimations for a sample of 245 large 
dams worldwide. The authors found that: “Three out of every four large dams suffered a cost overrun in constant 
local currency terms” (Ansar et al. 2014: 48). One of their conclusions as to why cost overrun was present in so 
many cases was that “…planners have difficulty in computing probabilities of events that happen far into the future” 
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From this perspective, it is clear that actors other than the seismologists are 
influencing the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ calculations – this may be 
financiers, provincial or central level bureaucrats needing the project to go through 
within the approved budget. Ansar et al. (2014) made calculations on cost 
overruns in big dam projects where they highlight that strategic misrepresentation 
by project promoters have impact on cost calculations. Other actors thus may have 
an interest in lowering the number, in turn making what should have been a 
scientific debate between seismologists a “political problem” (INT20130622).  
In this context, the fact that my informant labels something a “political problem” 
can also be seen as his way of positioning himself relative to the debate and in this 
way show me what side he agrees with in the debate. He presents himself as a 
scientist and this kind of negotiation makes purely scientific discussions difficult 
according to him. The point here is that, according to him, we are talking about 
separate domains: science or politics. He positions himself as on the side of 
science. Thus effectively separating things technical and scientific - which can 
here be understood to be undisputable - from things political - which can here be 
seen as disputable and contestable - as political problems are not neutral but 
fraught with human error and bargaining in this context. This brings to mind the 
discussion of science and politics in Chapter 2, where according to Jasanoff (2005: 
5): 
“Science, moreover, has historically maintained its legitimacy by 
cultivating a careful distance from politics” (Ibid.).  
 
This ‘move’ by my informant positions him as someone on the side of discussing 
pure science (i.e. discovering the truth about a natural phenomenon), as opposed to 
                                                                                                                                       
(Ansar et al. 2014: 48). Estimation of the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ and the impact on cost can therefore also 
be seen in this context. See also Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). 
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people who draw other factors into the scientific discussion  – such as the question 
of cost – effectively turning the scientific debate into a bargaining process. Thus 
my informant is positioning himself so that his legitimacy as a scientist remains 
intact as he is able to point out to me when the discussion turns political. 
In the Zipingpu case, the negotiation or discussion between the Zipingpu 
Company and the CEA about the size of a future potential earthquake settled 
around a magnitude 7-8 event as the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ 
(INT20120622). 85  According to the informant, the dam was therefore 
“underdesigned” as the Zipingpu Company should have constructed it to 
withstand a larger quake – up to a magnitude 9 event when the safety margin is 
added. He also mentioned that the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ was calculated 
by “many young scientists” (INT20130622). To the informant, who is a seasoned 
seismologist with intimate knowledge of the work done by both seismologists at 
the CEA and at dam construction companies, the fact that the ‘maximum possible 
earthquake’ calculation was made by “many young scientists” simply means that 
he thinks they are inexperienced. In his opinion, the fact that they were 
inexperienced also impacted on the outcome of the negotiation or discussion 
around the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ and contributed to a lower number 
being settled upon (INT20130622). In sum, the scientists at the CEA: 
 
“So those people worked for determining these simple number is very… 
can feel very heavy press… pressure” (INT20130622). 
 
The CEA scientists thus felt heavy pressure from the more experienced scientists 
representing the Zipingpu Company side of the negotiations. In order to counter 
                                           
85 Journal articles and books written post-Wenchuan contributing to the discussion about Zipingpu cite the seismic 
intensity at Zipingpu at VII and the design for the dam at VIII. See e.g. Guan (2009) and Yong and Booth (2011). 
In addition, another informant, Dr. Klose, as quoted in Chapter 6, also related that in this area there was no prior 
evidence of earthquakes at the magnitude of Wenchuan’s 7.9. 
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companies’ arguments, and way of acting in such negotiations, my informant 
stated that he wanted to do more research and publish papers that could then help 
in disciplining companies: 
“So I want to do more research and publish some paper to review this, 
and then maybe we shall… shall struggle with the company” 
(INT20130622). 
Although my informant in an earlier quote positioned himself as being on the side 
of ‘science’ this quote shows that in effect, science and politics do co-produce in 
matters of expertise. Thus, here my informant shows what it is he wants to achieve 
with his science - which is to provide evidence that can discipline companies in 
negotiations such as the above. 
To sum up, were it not for the costs, a seemingly rather technical detail of the dam 
pre-construction phase where seismologists from the construction company and 
the CEA discuss technicalities about how large an earthquake the dam should be 
able to withstand would perhaps not have been interesting. Nonetheless, one of the 
reasons for it not only being a scientific discussion was precisely as the informant 
put it: “if you increase by one the cost will double” (INT20130622).  
Considering the magnitude 7.9 Wenchuan earthquake, the kind of technical 
bargaining described above also comes into a new light. When talking about 
Wenchuan, the informant stated that it was “very lucky” that “nothing happened” 
this time (INT20130622) as the earthquake was around 10 at the actual site.86 That 
“nothing happened” may come across as an understatement considering the grave 
consequences that the earthquake did in fact have in other places in Sichuan 
                                           
86 What the informant referred to when he stated that the earthquake was around 10 at the site means that he at this 
point does not refer to the Richter Scale as with the other numbers but to the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale 
which goes from I-XII – and describes an earthquake’s effect locally. X (or 10) refers to major damage. See also: 
United States, California Department of Conservation, California Geological Survey (2002). 
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Province.87 Here, however, my informant was referring to that the dam did not 
break, as this would have exacerbated the disaster significantly, spilling 11 billion 
cubic meters of water on Dujiangyan city which was already destroyed by the 
earthquake (Daniell 2013; INT20130622). Zipingpu went out of commission due 
to damages to the dam but withstood the earthquake and could ultimately be 
repaired (Chen and Wieland 2009; Owen 2008). 
Earthquakes - an engineering problem 
There are two events at play here: 1) the described pre-construction negotiations, 
which involved the size of a future potential natural earthquake happening near the 
proposed dam site; and 2) the fact that the dam could potentially trigger an 
earthquake once built. In interviews, a number of different informants stated that 
the fact that large-scale dams can cause earthquakes (Gupta 1992) is not reflected 
in considerations by the Chinese authorities as uncontrollable risk; rather it is 
considered an engineering problem (INT20130604; INT20130622; INT20130715; 
INT20131001). The main issue is that dams need to be constructed safely so that 
they are able to withstand big earthquakes – regardless of whether they are 
triggered or not. Construction is a job for engineers. Discussing if dams should be 
built at all due to the risk of causing earthquakes is not part of this discussion. 
Thus, while there are examples of dam plans being cancelled in the US due to the 
risk of a dam triggering an earthquake (INT20131001; Rogers and Gahan 2013), 
the trend in China is to frame this as a problem for engineers: they should build 
stronger dams (INT20131001; Chen 2009). This was also related in Chapter 5, 
where at one point in the history of development at Zipingpu a lengthy article in 
People’s Daily (Liu 2005) highlighted the superior quality of Chinese engineers 
citing the evidence that they were able to overcome very difficult geological 
                                           
87 The gravest of consequences was the death of around 80,000 people as well as countless material damage. See 
also Sorace (2017). 
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conditions and build Zipingpu nonetheless, while foreign experts had claimed that 
Zipingpu was not a suitable site for dam construction (Liu 2005).  
This way of dividing the discussion around earthquake risk can tentatively be 
called a ‘compartmentalization move’ on the part of engineers. The risk of 
earthquakes is simply divided into two separate issues which are not 
interconnected. Such a move means dividing the problem up into one 
compartment - which is the job of engineers - and another compartment which is 
not the job of engineers. The first one can be taken care of within engineering 
science: The science of building earthquake proof dams. The second one - the 
problem that a dam, once built, can cause an earthquake - is simply 
‘compartmentalized’ out of the discussion as it is not an engineering problem (and 
thus not a job for engineers). 
In an interview with a Chinese hydropower engineer and the Vice-Secretary 
General of the CSHE, Zhang Boting, he was adamant about the need for 
hydropower development:  
“So why does our country continue to develop and build hydropower? It 
is to solve the fundamental problem of social development, that is, the 
community needs this” (INT20130715). 
Structural engineer Chen Houqun from the IWHR88 also explained the necessity of 
building dams in earthquake prone areas in the article published in the journal 
Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Vibration in 2009 (Chen 2009), also 
quoted in the previous chapter. In the article he posed the question: “Why is 
construction necessary in earthquake prone countries such as China?” (Chen 2009). 
He then proceeded to answer: 
                                           
88 As mentioned previously, Chen Houqun was referred to in the second article in Science from 2010 summarizing 
the scientific debate, which was analyzed in the previous chapter. According to the Science article Chen Houqun is 
also co-author of the Chinese design code for seismic safety in dam design (Kerr and Stone 2010).  
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“Water and energy supplies are key factors affecting the economic 
development and environmental improvement of China. Reasonable 
allocations of scarce water resources to guarantee water supply and 
prevent flood and draught disasters, as well as the effective utilization of 
abundant renewable and clean hydropower potential ranked the world’s 
first, are important measures in sustaining China’s economic 
development and environmental security. Large dams play an important 
role in this process. The source of most major rivers and almost 80% of 
the national total hydropower resources are located in western China. 
However, this area is part of the China-Pacific Seismic Belt and the 
Mediterranean Seismic Belt, making it very seismically active. (…) 
Recently, a series of critical hydropower projects using an arch dam 
design about 300 m high are under construction in this highly seismic 
region of western China. (…) Therefore, ensuring the seismic safety of 
high dams is an important challenge facing Chinese dam engineers.” 
(Chen 2009) 
 
In the above quote there is no question about the soundness of Chinese policy 
regarding dam construction. It is presented as a fact that it is necessary to use the 
hydropower potential China possesses to sustain economic development in China. 
It should be remembered here that sustaining economic growth and development 
in China is a key component in keeping social stability – an important part of 
keeping the CCP in power (Teets 2013). Thus, there are no two ways about it. 
According to Chen, it is a simple matter of fact that dams have to be located in 
earthquake prone zones as this is where water is located and thus were dams have 
to be built to support economic development. This leads Chen to the conclusion 
that, as dams are currently being constructed in this area, Chinese engineers have a 
challenge in ensuring that these dams are safely constructed. At no point in Chen’s 
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argument is the option presented to refrain from building dams in earthquake 
prone zones. But why would it be? If no dams are built economic development, 
stability and the CCP are not supported.  
 
In sum, refraining from building dams in earthquake prone zones is not considered 
an option if we consider Chen as a representative of Chinese engineers’ point of 
view. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a large professional class of hydroelectric 
engineers is, according to Mertha (2008), pushing for more work even as dam 
projects have just started. In sum, it is plausible that this professional class of 
engineers, of which Chen and Zhang Boting (also quoted above) is part, forward 
arguments in favor of building more dams. If, rather than refraining from building 
dams, building dams is necessary, according to these engineers, then it becomes a 
question of overcoming difficult geological problems and ensuring the seismic 
safety of such constructions ( Chen 2009; INT20120715; Liu 2005).  
 
From this perspective, it might seem that the Chinese authorities downplay the risk 
of earthquakes and sideline the science when dam building in earthquake zones 
continues. Particularly so, if listening to engineers e.g. from the IWHR and the 
CSHE who are suggesting that reservoir induced earthquakes (RIS) is in fact not 
an issue. However, I would like to argue the opposite. Based on the analysis here 
and in the previous chapters, on interviews and archival research, the practice in 
China seems to be to trust science to a degree where belief in probability 
calculations and engineering capability overshadow the fact that dams may trigger 
earthquakes in and of themselves. To put it more boldly - in a sense it is not 
important if a dam triggers an earthquake because the dam is designed to 
withstand it. Furthermore, experienced hydropower engineers from two different 
professional organizations, the CSHE and the IWHR, guarantee the scientific 
quality of Chinese hydropower engineering capability. In other words, dams 
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designed and constructed according to scientific methods will remain safe. Given 
the number of deaths caused by the “very lucky” (INT20130622) 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquake, this trust in engineering capability and science highlights the 
importance of understanding the role of technical and scientific facts in the 
bargaining process. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the fact that engineers 
‘compartmentalize’ the risk of a dam causing an earthquake in and of itself, as 
being outside the debate on dams and earthquakes effectively excludes the policy 
option of not building dams in earthquake prone zones in China. 
Next, the pre-construction negotiation is analyzed as a classic example of 
bureaucratic bargaining over technical and economic matters in China as explored 
through the lens of the FA framework (Brødsgaard 2017; Mertha 2009), different 
aspects of which have been presented and drawn on in chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. 
Bureaucratic bargaining  
From the perspective of the FA framework, the description of the Zipingpu pre-
construction events above may seem to be a classic case of bargaining in the 
bureaucratic system. This, in the sense that a provincial level key state enterprise 
(the Zipingpu Company) and a central level organization (the CEA) have to 
bargain over what can be considered a technical feature regarding earthquake 
hazard in relation to the design of a specific dam. The CEA is - at least on paper - 
solely responsible for this technical detail. Thus, had the bureaucratic system 
functioned as it ought to according to the regulations, the construction company 
would have to comply with the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ number produced 
by the CEA. Nevertheless, as the decision on the exact number involves 
significant costs for the company, there is all the more reason to bargain about the 
size of an earthquake, particularly since a potential earthquake is still a 
hypothetical event with a small probability of happening in the next 50-100 years, 
depending on the probability number attached to it in the actual calculations. What 
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was found above was that the calculations of the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ 
are not up to experts alone to decide. Consequently, the technicality of the size of 
an earthquake is no longer a strictly scientific problem to be worked out only by 
seismic experts and dam engineers.  
Taking the bureaucratic set-up into account, it is plausible to surmise that the CEA 
was in no position to directly influence the Zipingpu Company. This means that 
the CEA would have to go through the Sichuan Province Earthquake 
Administration office according to the Chinese bureaucratic system. Thus the 
bureaucratic ranking of the provincial CEA and the Zipingpu Company - a 
provincial level company was on par. However, the Zipingpu project was one of 
the first of the ten key projects under the ‘great western development’ (xibu da 
kaifa) campaign. In other words, a central level priority project that needed to be 
built. In light of the status of the project and the fact that the Zipingpu Company is 
partly owned by the Sichuan Province, the Zipingpu Company should have had 
enough bureaucratic leverage to succeed in lowering the ‘maximum possible 
earthquake’ number in a bargaining process with the provincial CEA. This means 
that the Zipingpu Company was effectively ensuring a lower cost of construction 
for a project of high political priority for the central government. Regardless of 
‘maximum possible earthquake’ calculations, then, the bureaucratic ranking of the 
provincial CEA would not have measured up to the Zipingpu Company’s 
considering the stakes involved in the project. 
When this bargaining process is seen through the perspective of FA, it 
corroborates the analytical point that a bargaining process is indeed occurring 
between two – at least on paper - proximate bureaucratic entities. However, as we 
have seen, individual scientists - here seismologists - may also be able to affect a 
decision. We can therefore tentatively include an epistemic community 
(seismologists in this case) as a fourth category of policy entrepreneurs, thus 
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adding one to the tree categories already included by Mertha in his extended 
version of the FA framework (Mertha 2009). However, what the FA framework 
does not take into account is that the actors involved do not necessarily maintain 
fixed positions and may change their status in the course of the bargaining process. 
In this sense, a scientist is not just a scientist. Thus, scientists cannot necessarily 
be analyzed as fixed ‘entities’ (e.g. a policy entrepreneur) that can be 
unproblematically employed as an analytical unit. What this short description 
shows is that scientists and the science on which they build their arguments 
become politicized and malleable. It is in fact science itself that is being bargained 
over. In this sense, FA can only take us so far.  If the framework takes science, as 
a category, for granted and does not take into account that science itself is being 
negotiated this highlights the shortcoming of FA as a lens to fully analyze a 
controversy involving science and technology in China. As the previous chapter 
and the section above showed, the science of seismic risk in relation to large dams 
is contested and alliances across institutions such as the CEA and foreign 
universities muddle the categorizations of actors involved in a socio-technical 
controversy. This means that while FA can pinpoint essential bureaucratic features 
and highlight aspects of technical bargaining processes in China, the framework 
cannot account for the scientific disagreement inherent in technical debates.  
A risk worth taking 
Had the Wenchuan earthquake not occurred, the type of technical bargaining 
analyzed above could be accounted for as a natural part of the building process. 
After the analysis of the scientific debate, it should come as no surprise that 
experts can disagree. In seismology there are a significant number of variables to 
take into account when determining probabilities of sizes of earthquakes 
(INT20130622; INT20131014). It is unfortunate, not only for the Zipingpu 
Company but also for the CEA, that the Wenchuan earthquake occurred shortly 
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after the dam started operations – especially since, at the time of bargaining, an 
earthquake of such magnitude was still very much a hypothetical event or what 
can be called a statistical outlier. As described in Chapter 6 and above, the known 
earthquakes in the region were not as big as Wenchuan’s magnitude 7.9. This 
means that, with a small probability of occurring within the next 50-100 years the 
calculation of the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ was still about calculating a 
hypothetical event. 
Wenchuan was described as a “fat-tail event” by my informant Dr. Klose (who we 
met in the previous chapter) during our interview in October 2014 (INT20131014). 
A “fat tail” refers to that when visualizing the risk of earthquakes in a probability 
curve, the curve flattens out as magnitude rises - i.e. the probability of a dam 
causing a magnitude 1 earthquake is significantly higher than magnitude 8. Thus 
the larger the magnitude, the lower the probability. However, towards the higher 
magnitudes the curve turns into a so-called “fat tail” where probability is almost 
equally low for the highest magnitudes. In considering the risk of major 
earthquakes in construction projects, the “fat tail” is cut off at one point as the 
probability of an earthquake exceeding the magnitude of historical earthquakes in 
the area is so low that it makes no significant impact on the risk calculation to 
utilize the “fat tail” data. In sum, Zipingpu can be described as a “fat-tail event”, 
or what can also be called a statistical outlier, as the Chinese authorities 
considered the probability for a magnitude 7.9 earthquake to be extremely low 
(INT20131014; INT20130622). As my informant quoted above mentioned, 
Zipingpu was “underdesigned” (INT20130622) - perhaps also due to the fact that 
such a large earthquake was considered a statistical outlier at the time of 
construction. Dr. Klose, however, did not believe that Wenchuan was a statistical 
outlier. He explained this point to me during our interview and had also argued the 
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same point in a peer-reviewed paper published in Journal of Seismology in 2013 
(Klose 2013).89 
Wenchuan opened up questions about dam safety and risk in construction 
processes. It also strengthened the position of earth scientists as voices - or 
potential policy entrepreneurs to use Mertha’s (2008) vocabulary - in the debate 
over the relationship between dams and earthquakes, and whether dams can 
trigger large-scale earthquakes. During the Wenchuan earthquake, the Zipingpu 
dam did not collapse. It withstood the earthquake, although it went out of 
commission and needed strengthening and repairs following the quake 
(China.org.cn 2008; Owen 2008). In many ways, from the CSHE’s point of view, 
this proves the point that the technicalities of dam construction are best left to 
engineers and that hydropower engineers are more than capable of controlling 
these kinds of risks in dam projects (INT20130715). Nothing catastrophic 
happened at Zipingpu, insomuch as the dam did not collapse. However, the notion 
that technical experts (such as seismologists) negotiate science itself as if it were a 
political problem to be settled, calls into question the engineering argument that it 
is possible to have complete control of large-scale risk to dam projects, such as the 
risk of earthquakes (whether triggered or not). For such an argument to hold it 
would mean that all dams in earthquake prone zones would be ‘overdesigned’ for 
safety purposes. This would mean that the ‘maximum possible earthquake’ was 
settled by ‘science’ and that the highest possible safety margin was then added. 
However, as the analysis above has shown not only science arguments and 
scientific data, but also the cost of construction and the estimates of probabilities 
played a significant role in relation to the pre-construction phase at Zipingpu. In 
                                           
89 Risk calculation such as the described is also discussed in Lee (1998) and from a different perspective by Beck 
(2007). 
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this case, science and politics co-produced in the process of achieving the targets 
of a key political project set high on the agenda of the ‘great western development’ 
(xibu da kaifa) campaign. 
The next chapter will look more closely at the post-Wenchuan controversy as it 
unfolded in the public sphere, the experts involved, their strategies of 
legitimization and the potential policy impacts on hydropower development in 
China. 
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Chapter 8: Triggering earthquakes in 
politics – post-quake controversy 
The present chapter focuses on the public controversy over Zipingpu primarily as 
it unfolded in the media. The analysis highlights methods of legitimization 
employed by different experts who participated in the public controversy. 
Establishing such legitimacy plays an important role for the possibility to have 
influence on policy making on hydropower development in China. In the 
following, I will illustrate how the idea of the impersonal ethos of science may 
have impacted on the positions of the experts in the public debate. Furthermore, I 
will discuss how different experts positioned themselves in interviews and in 
relation to other experts publicly discussing the controversy over Zipingpu and 
Wenchuan - and by extension the risk of dam building in earthquake prone zones. 
The different ways of positioning ultimately affect whom the Chinese government 
were most likely to listen to when deciding whether to go on building dams in 
earthquake prone zones after Wenchuan. 
From science to news – introduction to Zipingpu as a 
controversy with policy implications 
As the scientific debate, which was analyzed in Chapter 6, migrated into the media, 
the nuances of the scientific debate gave way to a somewhat changed discussion. 
In media reports and newspaper articles after the Wenchuan earthquake, the role 
of Zipingpu in the Wenchuan earthquake was highlighted and questioned and in 
turn related to larger questions of risk of earthquakes in south western China. The 
Wenchuan earthquake and its possible connection to Zipingpu was also linked to 
China’s current strategy of relying on large scale hydropower for future green 
energy. The scientific controversy over Zipingpu thus got entangled with other 
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ongoing controversies over China’s hydropower policies and plans to rely more 
heavily on hydropower for future energy supply. 
The Wenchuan earthquake itself caused a virtual flood of news stories in the wake 
of the May 2008 earthquake. Zipingpus’ role in triggering the earthquake however, 
did not hit mainstream global media until early 2009. The article published in 
Science in January 2009 titled “A Human Trigger for the Great Quake of Sichuan” 
(Kerr and Stone 2009) marked a point where major global media began publishing 
intensively about Zipingpu. During February 2009 alone, global news outlets such 
as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Guardian and The Telegraph 
carried articles regarding the possible influence Zipingpu might have had in 
triggering the Wenchuan earthquake (Moore 2009; Branigan 2009, LaFraniere 
2009, Naik and Oster 2009) all referring to either the article in Science or experts 
mentioned therein. Other US based outlets such as Radio Free Asia, the 
Smithsonian Institution and NBC News also carried articles between February and 
April 2009 (Zielinski 2009, He and Chou 2009). Specialized industry journals 
such as International Water Power and Dam Construction and Bulletins published 
by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) (Chen et al. 2010; 
Chen and Wieland 2009; ICOLD Website) have also engaged in the media 
discussion over the role played or not played by Zipingpu in Wenchuan. Since the 
article in Science at the beginning of 2009, earthquakes and their potential impact 
on dams have entered public debate to the point that earthquakes are now part and 
parcel of almost every mainstream news story about dams in China, both 
domestically and internationally (Branigan 2009; Lewis 2013; Sjøgren 2013; 
Thidemann 2013; The Economist 2013;  Qiu 2014; Zhuang 2015). 
 
Before the article in Science was published in January 2009, more China focused 
(although Canada and US-based) NGO organizations, Probe International and 
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International Rivers were already publishing about Zipingpu’s possible role in 
triggering Wenchuan on their websites. They published articles and analyses in 
June and July 2008 respectively (International Rivers 2008; Wang 2008; Zhang 
2008).  
Domestically in China, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post was one 
of the first to publish on a subject related to Zipingpu.90 According to the news 
outlet itself, The South China Morning Post has a reputation for “… authoritative, 
influential and independent reporting on Hong Kong, China and the rest of Asia” 
(Scmp.com). In July 2008, the newspaper published a story about NGO 
organizations’ wish to put a stop to dam building in the wake of Wenchuan, 
mentioning Zipingpu (Shi 2008). Until February 2009, however, stories in Chinese 
domestic news, such as the official government news outlet Xinhua, were focused 
on safety issues after the earthquake, rescue efforts and high-level politicians’ 
visits to the disaster area (See e.g. Xinhua 2008). According to Probe International 
(Berkow 2009) and The South China Morning Post (Shi 2009b) a media ban was 
issued by the Chinese government prohibiting publicly discussing the theory of the 
link between Zipingpu and Wenchuan in the Chinese media. This ban lasted until 
an article was published by the state-run Xinhua News Agency in February 2009 
citing Dr. Klose and the scientific discussion about Zipingpu (Berkow 2009; Shi 
2009b; Wang 2009). Subsequently, the South China Morning Post published on 
the subject of Zipingpu and the possible connection to Wenchuan in February and 
March of 2009 (Shi 2009a and 2009b).  
                                           
90 Hong Kong has officially been part of China as a semi-autonomous territory since 1997. This means that the 
region in general, and the companies located here in particular, has retained some of the previous independence 
from mainland China. For a description of tensions between Hong Kong and the mainland see e.g. Bland (2016) 
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In domestic news about Zipingpu and its possible relation to Wenchuan, The 
South China Morning Post and Beijing-based Caixin Media91 have generally been 
the most engaged outlets in terms of publishing critical articles on Zipingpu and 
the broader subject of earthquake risk in relation to dam projects (INT20121210; 
Shi 2009 and 2009a). China Daily, People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency have 
also brought articles after February 2009 but the approach has been less critical 
(People’s Daily 2008; Xinhua 2008). Xinhua is the official government news 
outlet and China Daily, which is published in English, is considered “the 
government mouthpiece to the world” (BBC 2013). The fact that the state owns 
Xinhua, People’s Daily and China Daily means that articles published from these 
outlets are rarely very critical of state policies and most often function as 
‘mouthpieces of the party’ (Heimer and Thøgersen 2006: 196).  
At the center of the wider controversy over Zipingpu is still science - or 
interpretations of scientific arguments. All newspaper articles regarding the 
Zipingpu-Wenchuan controversy as it has unfolded in the media refer back to one 
or more ‘experts’ regarding for example reservoir induced earthquakes (RIS). 
Some of them are the same as the ones publishing in academic journals, others are 
not.  
The role of experts, expertise and expert knowledge in the public debate is worth a 
closer look. In the following I will analyze what kinds of experts the Chinese 
government listened to with regard to making future policy decisions about dam 
building in earthquake prone zones after Wenchuan. Besides public news reports, 
the present chapter also draw on interviews and fieldnotes in order to discuss 
issues of expert knowledge and expert legitimacy which is drawn on to make 
                                           
91 Caixin Media is part of Caixin Media Company Ltd. The editorial staff at Caixin are, according to Caixin itself, 
“…well-known for independent thinking and professional practices. (…). They are the torchbearers of professional 
journalism, known for providing high-quality, credible content” (Caixin.com).  
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hydropower policy decisions in China. We start with the official take on the man 
that got the ball rolling in the first place - Dr. Klose. 
Discrediting Dr. Klose 
The article which was deemed the first Chinese official news publication 
commenting on the link between Zipingpu and Wenchuan was published by a 
reporter at the state-run Xinhua News Agency in February 2009 (Berkow 2009; 
Wang 2009). Half of the article is spent on discrediting Dr. Klose, who we met in 
Chapter 6. As stated in Chapter 6, Dr. Klose played a key role in starting the 
scientific debate. This carried into the public debate by way of the article in 
Science which quoted Dr. Klose’s abstract from The American Geophysical 
Union’s Fall Meeting. In the official Xinhua article from February 2009 Dr. 
Klose’s name and (then) affiliation to Columbia University was mentioned in the 
second line. As the quotes below show, the article focused on lack of peer-review 
and emphasized the need for detailed evidence to be published in a journal paper. 
The article made these arguments by drawing on expert knowledge in quoting 
mainly a geophysics professor from Texas Tech University, Mr. Zhou. The main 
point of Mr. Zhou’s critique was the lack of peer-review of Dr. Klose’s abstract 
from the American Geophysical Union’s Fall Meeting, which according Mr. Zhou, 
made it: “… flawed in some facts” (Wang 2009).   
In other words, the article questioned the scientific integrity of Dr. Klose himself: 
 ““I think that Dr. Klose ought to present more detailed evidence in a 
journal paper, such as “Journal of Geophysical Research”, that will offer 
more room for a vigorous analysis”, Zhou said” (Wang 2009). 
The article thus relied on expert knowledge to pass judgement on Dr. Klose’s 
work and focused on the abstract presented at the American Geophysical Union’s 
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Fall Meeting. Mr. Zhou concluded that the abstract was “not very convincing” 
(Wang 2009). Clearly, Dr. Klose’s work was not considered a credible source of 
scientific evidence regarding Zipingpu’s possible link to Wenchuan by Mr. Zhou 
or Xinhua who published the article. Particularly due to the lack of peer-review of 
his abstract and the fact that he had not yet published a peer-reviewed paper with 
evidence backing up his theory. In our interview in October 2014, I asked Dr. 
Klose if he had had any personal issues with the media attention around his 
presentation at the American Geophysical Union’s Fall Meeting: 
Klose: “I have had issue. There were some issues that the Chinese 
Government was interested in calling Columbia University, because 
Columbia gets lots of funding from China. They have lots of Chinese 
students, and so if someone studies that is, you know that…all the 
funding comes from the central organ and China, so there… if 
somebody questions things that’s why I made my comment before, they 
were questioning too much.” 
LGH: “Yeah?” 
Klose: “Yeah, they wanted to know who I am and what I do” 
(INT20131014). 
In other words, Dr. Klose, also personally, became the center of attention due to 
his abstract and the fact that this was reported widely by a number of major news 
outlets. Only Xinhua commented on the lack of peer-review, which can be 
interpreted as a way of questioning Dr. Klose’s conclusions. Keeping the analysis 
of the scientific debate in Chapter 6 in mind, however, demanding that Dr. Klose 
could reach a firm peer-reviewed conclusion already in December 2008 is perhaps 
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a bit too much to ask.92 As shown in Chapter 6, there will probably never be a 
final and firm conclusion on whether Zipingpu caused Wenchuan or not.  
The fact that an article from an official government outlet such as Xinhua 
highlights that Dr. Klose’s facts were “flawed”, that his abstract was not peer-
reviewed and that he did not publish his research in a scientific journal suggests 
that Dr. Klose’s science is not entirely accurate and this affects his credibility. In 
this way questioning the root cause (Dr. Klose himself) of the argument about 
Zipingpu’s possible relation to Wenchuan. This brings to mind a classic issue in 
the analysis of science-politics relations – that separating scientific practice from 
personal disposition: 
“The impersonal nature of scientific authority relates also to the 
commitment, expressed in the ethos of science and the norms of 
scientific practice, to separate the content of scientific knowledge from 
the emotional, ethical, religious or political dispositions of the scientists, 
both as individuals and as groups” (Ezrahi 2004: 256). 
 
Questioning Dr. Klose himself thus indirectly questions his expertise. 93  If Dr. 
Klose is not a credible source of evidence about Zipingpu then who is? According 
to Xinhua it seems peer-review serves as an indication of credibility. If peer-
review and scientific publications to some extent measure scientific credibility in 
China, what does that suggest about who can be considered a legitimate expert e.g. 
in Chinese hydropower policy making? Next we take a look at the sources of 
expertise in the public discussion around Zipingpu. 
                                           
92  Klose did publish two peer-reviewed papers, albeit not until years later. He published one in the journal 
Environmental Earth Sciences in 2011 (Klose 2011) and one in Journal of Seismology in 2013 (Klose 2013) both 
arguing for his original point.  
93 Dr. Klose later chose to leave Columbia University and today work as an independent consultant in his own 
company. In 2014 he published a popular science book entitled “Frack this!” (Klose 2014) focused on man-made 
earthquakes (Cdklose.com; INT20141014). 
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What makes an expert? 
Expertise and expert knowledge is subject to cross-national variation (Jasanoff 
2002; Irwin 1997). Consequently, expertise and expert knowledge is a complex 
construction which can be based on a wide range of different factors relating e.g. 
to the kind of knowledge the expert possesses (e.g. educational background), the 
organizational affiliation of the expert (e.g. employed as scientist at a university), 
publication outlet(s) (e.g. publishing in peer-reviewed journals) or other factors 
such as working experience within a particular field or providing scientific advice 
to government (Collins 1981; Collins and Evans 2007). In a word: an experts’ 
science does not speak for itself (Lynch et al. 2008) but is inevitably entangled in 
social norms and hierarchies (Jasanoff 2004). A factor such as organizational 
affiliation has been pointed to as being of importance in the Chinese context in 
terms of possessing authority that can be legitimately drawn on in a policy context 
(Halpern 1989 and 1992).  
Let us see how expertise is constructed in the debate about Zipingpu and 
Wenchuan and the wider controversy about dam building in earthquake prone 
zones. Below are two excerpts from my field notes written during my research 
stay in Beijing in 2013. The excerpts illustrate the point that context matters in 
matters of expertise. I interviewed the two main proponents of extreme opposites 
of the – at the time - very heated debate about Zipingpu and Wenchuan, and more 
generally the debate on dams and earthquakes in south western China. The first, 
Yang Yong, an independent geologist and head of the Hengduan Mountain 
Society, was briefly described in Chapter 5. The second, Zhang Boting is the 
Vice-Secretary General of the China Society for Hydropower Engineering (CSHE) 
- he was also briefly introduced in Chapter 5 and quoted in the previous chapter. 
In the following I will analyze which factors were drawn into the debate and how 
the two men relate the kind of expertise they respectively offer in the questions of 
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whether Zipingpu caused Wenchuan and whether dams should be built in 
earthquake prone zones.  
Yang Yong is an independent geologist, who originally worked in the mining 
business. However, he did not want to work for the government any longer and 
left (INT20131001; INT20130604). Since then he has travelled extensively in the 
mountains of south western China and Tibet, documenting in pictures, books and 
reports the geology surrounding the big Chinese rivers flowing through south 
western China’s seismically active areas (INT20130604). He now runs a volunteer 
research network of scientists and students that collect data about the river eco 
systems in western China (INT20130604). Yang Yong is one of two people in 
China who has publicly criticized the government’s fast-paced hydropower 
development of western China and was the first to publish a report about the 
relationship between earthquakes and dams in China. He has spent six months in 
house arrest for raising the issue (INT20131001). He also openly defied the media 
ban on discussing the possible link between Zipingpu and Wenchuan (Shi 2009b). 
To Yang Yong, people like my other informant, Zhang Boting, have no idea of 
what is happening in the areas where dams are to be built:  
“They are afraid of going into the areas where I go, because it is 
dangerous there. There are landslides, mudslides and rock falls all the 
time” (INT20130604).  
To him Zhang Boting is just another bureaucrat talking from behind his desk in 
Beijing. This second informant, Zhang Boting, is in fact placed in Beijing at the 
industry association for hydropower engineers, CSHE. He is a very enthusiastic 
blogger on hydropower related matters and especially on seismic safety of dam 
construction. His opinion about dams and earthquakes is very clear when you talk 
to him or read his blog-posts:  
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“China needs hydropower. Engineers have built dams in seismically 
active areas for a long time, so it is not a problem. Of course we would 
not build anything unsafe” (INT20130715).  
Zhang Boting is of the firm conviction that Yang Yong is a “fake scientist who 
works on tourist related matters” (Ibid), someone who “has no work unit and no 
proper education” (Ibid). To Zhang Boting the issue of the risk of earthquakes in 
relation to dams is a non-issue in the sense that this kind of risk is something that 
can be calculated into dam construction and therefore a risk that can be contained. 
He thinks that people like Yang Yong are “hyping the argument that reservoirs can 
cause earthquakes” (INT20130715).  
The two excerpts below describe the different settings in which the interviews 
with Yang Yong and Zhang Boting respectively took place. They provide an 
illustration of the role that organizational affiliation may play in valuation of 
expertise. The valuation of expertise may be judged differently, depending on 
where the person drawing on their respective expertise comes from. If e.g. from an 
international NGO working in China there may be some wariness of talking to 
Zhang Boting as he is “part of the establishment” in the sense that “we already 
know his opinion” (INT20130709; INT20121116). Others, however, are not so 
wary e.g. the International Hydropower Association (IHA) or the Chinese central 
government (INT20130715) who value his organizational affiliation, education, 
publications and experience in the field of hydropower engineering – and thus the 
expertise stemming from that (INT20130715; IHA Website 1).  
Turning to the other ‘extreme’ the fact that Zhang Boting “always hits out on 
Yang Yong” (INT20130709) gives Yang Yong some credibility in ‘non-
establishment’ circles (INT20121116). Furthermore, Yang Yong’s credibility to 
the NGO and global media also stems from him having been in house arrest, as 
this begs the question as to what it is that the authorities do not want him to voice 
 231 
publicly. Moreover, Yang Yong does not openly acknowledge affiliations to 
officials, government or other ‘establishment’ organizations but makes a point of 
working independently – only with the aid of volunteers (INT20130604). This 
could be said to bolster his credibility in terms of not being easily swayed from his 
cause by government or industry interests. However, he is also considered by 
some as “radical” (INT20130709), so not all want to associate openly with him – 
perhaps precisely because he is the embodiment of politicizing the issue of RIS. 
Some environmental NGOs in China are doing very well within their field and do 
not want to associate openly with overt political issues, as this can create 
unnecessary attention from the authorities (FN20130509; INT20121105). 
Looking to the two excerpts, they illustrate expert affiliation as viewed from the 
point of view of the interviewer entering the location of the interview. Thus, the 
descriptions show how the setting and place of an interview may affect the overall 
impression of the source of the two different experts’ expertise: 
My interview with Yang Yong was agreed on by phone with a ninety minute 
notice. I was given the address to a Beijing hotel on the phone and rushed into cab 
a as quickly as I could, as getting anywhere in Beijing can easily take an hour or 
more. I arrived at the hotel a few minutes late and waited in the lobby. When he 
did not come to the lobby after ten minutes I sent him a text message asking him 
where to meet. A two word text message buzzed back on my cell phone only with 
the words “room 5007”. I did not think we were going to do the interview in his 
hotel room and I felt a bit strange about it since all the other interviews I had done 
had been conducted in office settings, cafes, in foyers or other public spaces. To 
be sure before I went up to the room I asked at the reception if they had a person 
called Yong staying in room 5007. “Yes we do” was the reply. I then took the 
elevator to the 5th floor and found room 5007. The door was open. I looked 
through the door and made a small knock while saying “Mr. Yong?” A man in a 
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white t-shirt with rumpled hair got up from a deep office chair behind a classic 
Chinese hotel room desk in dark colored wood. “Louise? Come in.” I walked a 
few steps into the room, and we shook hands in the short entrance hall. Then he 
turned around and walked back to the desk. He made no move to close the door 
and neither did I, so the door was left wide open. I followed him into a small hotel 
room packed with oversized dark furniture. There was a bathroom to one side 
without much of a door and a big double bed in the middle where the duvet had 
been sort of thrown over the bed in an attempt to make it look like it had not been 
slept in. It felt a bit too intimate to be in that small cramped room with him. He 
looked like he just got out of bed. It was not a fancy hotel room, but not a bad one 
either by Chinese standards. “A friend of mine paid for the room for me, I don’t 
have the money to pay for these kinds of hotels myself” Yang Yong said. He did 
look out of place somehow. I looked at the thick grey carpet, it softened the sound 
in the room and everything seemed very dark. It was an exceptionally smoggy day 
in Beijing. Smog in combination with thin almost-grey-from-nicotine curtains 
gave the room a dim atmosphere. The TV was turned on; a CCTV channel with a 
Chinese soap opera. Yang Yong sat at the desk where a laptop was running. “Sit 
down, I am just sending some e-mails” he said, gesturing to one of two oversized 
lounge-chairs squeezed in close to the side of the bed. I took a seat on the one 
farthest away from him, my knees almost touching the bed. After a few minutes of 
emailing he lighted a cigarette, looked at me and said: “you can ask your questions 
now” (FN20130406). 
In contrast to the interview with Yang Yong, the interview with my second 
informant, Zhang Boting, took place in a whole different context. It was a day 
with heavy rain and I had arrived 10 minutes early, which I found rather 
uncomfortable. Once at the address I was confirmed in my initial assumption that 
his office was indeed located at the headquarters of the biggest hydropower 
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company in the world. I felt very small as I entered tower B of the building.  When 
I walked into the spacious lobby I found it had an extremely high ceiling which 
seemed to disappear at the top of the tall glass-fronted building. The guards at the 
entrance were wearing red berets and military-looking uniforms. I was the only 
visitor in the lobby. Beside me there were four guards wearing red berets and two 
dark blue uniformed receptionists behind a counter. There was no sofa or any 
place in the lobby where I could put down my wet umbrella or have a rest to get 
my wet clothes in order, so I walked straight toward the reception feeling the eyes 
of the guards at the door on my back. Before I reached the reception the two other 
guards had asked me what my business was, and one of them followed me towards 
the reception. I told the receptionist that I had an appointment with the Vice-
Secretary General of the Hydropower Engineering Society, Mr. Zhang in room 
1102. The two receptionists looked a bit lost, but then found a worn-out folder 
with plastic-sheet covered papers that had rooms and telephone numbers listed in 
it. “We don’t have a room 1102. Who are you going to talk to?” the receptionist 
asked. Mr. Zhang in 1102 I repeated. “Do you have his phone number?” “Yes”, I 
said and showed the woman my cell phone where I had his cell number up on the 
display. She pointed to a red plastic landline phone that she had lifted onto the 
reception. She said: “Sorry, that number won’t work here, this telephone can only 
call internally. Do you have another number?” I replied: “Never mind I will just 
call him on my cell”. I walked a few steps away from the reception and dialed 
Zhang Boting’s number. He answered immediately and I told him that I was at the 
reception. “Just take the elevator to the 11th floor and I will come and get you by 
the elevator”. “Ok, thank you”, I replied. I then told the receptionist, and the two 
guards who were standing closer to me, that I had been told just to take the 
elevator to the 11th floor. I started walking towards the elevators. “Wait, someone 
will take you up” said the receptionist and ushered the male receptionist towards 
me. He walked me to the elevator and pressed the button for me. The guards 
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walked back to their positions in the lobby. When the elevator finally arrived, the 
male receptionist stepped in and I followed him. He pressed 11. There was a thick 
red carpet on the floor. As the elevator ascended, I noticed that in the middle of 
the carpet were big yellow characters spelling the word “Monday”. It occurred to 
me, that this must mean that they have a carpet for every day of the week. When 
we reached 11, I walked out of the elevator with the receptionist trailing behind. A 
few steps outside the elevator, I was met by a tall, thin, neatly dressed man in a 
blue and pink checkered short-sleeved shirt with a red Hermes belt holding up his 
dark blue slacks. “Louise? Hi. Nice to meet you! I am Zhang Boting”, he said 
while he stretched out his hand to greet me. (FN201307). 
The descriptions of the two settings may look like settings of many interviews 
conducted in connection with research projects – be they conducted in corporate 
settings or at someone’s home. The settings as described here can also be seen as 
part of the way the two informants positioned themselves in relation to me, a 
foreign researcher, asking about their expert knowledge in relation to the questions 
of Zipingpu and Wenchuan and the soundness of building dams in earthquake 
prone zones.  
In the case of Yang Yong I was introduced to him by an NGO contact. This meant 
that I was ‘vetted’ before given his contact information as the NGO contact trusted 
me with it. Thus by being introduced this way I was signaling that I was somehow 
sympathetic to his point of view in the debate. One important point about the 
circumstances of the interview was the ‘personal space’ of his hotel room that I 
was invited into. In descriptions of him and his work in the news, his person is 
always drawn into the argument. He is simply the embodiment of independence 
from government and you are implicitly personally connected to him when you 
wish to talk to him about his work. He is living his scientific work and also looks 
like someone who is well travelled – often under rough conditions. He also 
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mentioned that he did not pay for the room himself and that he did not have that 
kind of money. This implicitly shows that he does not get payed for his work and 
that he is not in it for the money but out of interest and personal drive to get his 
scientific work acknowledged. This is in many ways the source of his expertise in 
terms of the “non-establishment” where independence, personal drive at your own 
peril seems to be a source of credibility. However, it is also his weakness, as he 
cannot separate personally from his work and as we saw above with the 
discrediting of Dr. Klose, being personally connected to a scientific argument can 
be a source of criticism in China.  
In contrast, the interview with Zhang Boting was arranged by direct contact. I did 
not need to be referred to him by someone else because his contact information, 
unlike Yang Yong’s, was accessible online. I wrote to Zhang Boting directly to 
ask if he would be willing to share his knowledge about the question of dam 
building in earthquake prone zones as I had read in the news that he had 
knowledge of this area. Looking to the setting, this worked in much the same way 
for Zhang Boting as Yang Yong, only the opposite was the case. His source of 
expertise is affiliation with the government bureaucracy and the well-established 
hydropower industry. His office was located at the headquarters of the largest 
hydropower company in the world which spoke volumes as to the level of his 
professionalism and expertise. The setting was professional, impersonal and 
impressive. If distancing personally from your scientific work is an indication of 
your level of expertise then Zhang Boting did it just right. However, this is also his 
weakness, as the “non-establishment” (and Science for that matter) is wary of 
close connections to the government. 
What did we talk about in the two interviews? The two settings were as different 
as the interview content. Both Zhang Boting and Yang Yong tried to explain to me 
what the crux of the matter in the RIS discussion is. Greenhalgh (2008) described 
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coping with the situation of quickly realizing that none of her informants were 
neutral about the policy she was researching: “there were ardent proponents and 
fierce opponents” (Greenhalgh 2008: 42). The same issue clearly applies here as 
both the informants were clearly not neutral about dam-building. Zhang Boting 
and Yang Yong are perhaps some of the most outspoken individuals I talked to 
during my fieldwork.  
The interview with Zhang Boting can best be described as a lecture, where I was 
taken through the science-based work his organization engaged in. I was also 
provided with written material that backed up his viewpoints. The interview with 
Yang Yong had more of a personal feel to it, where he described his somewhat 
secretive research, his travels and his struggles to get his work published. Both in 
the setting, being in the more personal sphere of his hotel room, as opposed to the 
office setting and meeting room where the interview with Zhang Boting took place, 
but also in the sense that he emphasized his experience in terms of travelling far 
and wide in south western China.  
The settings and the way the interviews unfolded in many ways fit well into how 
the debate has been characterized in e.g. the international media but also have 
importance for the understanding of the sources of two men’s expertise or 
positions as experts often cited in the public debate. Would the Chinese 
government listen to the data stemming from Yang Yong’s research? If he has 
trouble even getting his research published how will his research reach decision 
makers? If at all?  
Interestingly, both informants emphasized that science formed the backbone of 
their arguments. During our interview Yang Yong responded to my asking about 
the nature of discussing hydropower development in south western China: 
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“Sensitive. There is talk about this issue - hydropower development. It is 
sensitive because of so big disagreements in the discussion of this 
question. And it is possible to influence some interest groups. When 
there is influence of some groups, economic interests it will politicize 
these questions. Actually it is a scientific question. We are discussing 
science” (INT20130604). 
Much along the same lines as my informant from Chapter 7, Yang Yong 
distinguished between a scientific discussion and a political discussion and 
emphasized that the scientific questions were politicized. Again effectively 
separating things scientific (i.e. things undisputable) from things political (i.e. 
things disputable and contestable). He saw it as a question of interest groups with 
economic interests in the projects that tried to influence a scientific discussion. 
Much in the same way as we saw with the informant in Chapter 7, the fact that 
something is labeled ‘political’ here means not only that he positions himself on 
the side of impersonal science but also that it is not his agenda that turns the 
discussion of scientific questions into a discussion about something political. 
Zhang Boting agreed that the question was about science. However, he does not 
think that the science produced by Yang Yong and another of my informants, Fan 
Xiao, chief engineer at the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau in Chengdu (who 
was also described in Chapter 5 and quoted in Science) is of high quality: 
“Domestically there is a group of people, these people, often their 
scientific quality is relatively poor. This includes this Fan Xiao.” 
(INT20130715). 
So he felt that had to engage in discussion with them because “these people”, like 
Yang Yong:  
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“Actually he does not really understand science, so there is a lot of 
debate between us, and now a lot of debate has been concluded” 
(INT20130715). 
It seems, then that there is a discrepancy between how Yang Yong and Fan Xiao, 
as included in “this group of people”, understand science and how Zhang Boting 
understands science. Both sides claim that they are on the side of science. 
However, the debate between them indicates that their disagreement stems from 
their different ideas of what high quality science actually is. We saw in Chapter 6 
that affiliation may have a role to play in such distinctions. Perhaps this also 
applies in the public controversy? 
Does reputed institutional affiliation help? 
In some media – predominantly international – Yang Yong was often cast in the 
role of a David courageously working to defeat Goliath (in the form of the 
Chinese government or big (SOE) industry). Zhang Boting, on the other hand, was 
often cast as a man of big industry with perhaps too close ties to government i.e. 
being in the pocket of big industry interests. He did not see his role in this way but 
described himself more as the well-educated and experienced expert with a 
responsibility to root out fake experts and false knowledge being expounded on 
the subject of hydropower development and earthquake risk. He thought these 
discussions were clouding the real aim - which was the development of China 
(INT20130715). 
Another source of Zhang Boting’s expertise is a university education as a 
hydropower engineer as well as long standing experience from work in the 
hydropower sector. The source of Yang Yong’s expertise is education in geology 
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from a mining university (INT20130604),94but more significantly his experience 
and travel far and wide in south western China. His degree in geology is from a 
mining university and thus a less reputed institution than the university Zhang 
Boting attended for his hydropower engineering degree. Furthermore, Yang Yong 
does not have a ‘work unit’ or an official affiliation to a university or other more 
official institution. The fact that he calls himself independent does not help his 
reputation domestically in China and neither does the fact that he has trouble 
publishing his research.  
Affiliation to well reputed institutions is very helpful, if not a requirement, in 
order to get the ear of policy makers. This applies within the bureaucracy – as we 
have seen in Chapter 3 where the organization of scientific advice to government 
is enshrined in bureaucratic procedures and advice predominantly originates from 
universities, the government bureaucracy or government affiliated think tanks.  
Another way to reach policy makers is through more public debate, activism or 
petitioning. Before Wenchuan a number of researchers, including Yang Yong and 
Fan Xiao, sent an open letter to the central government saying that a magnitude 
7.3 earthquake would be devastating for Zipingpu. The letter reached central 
government leaders and according to Zhang Boting:  
“…the central government was very nervous, our central leaders were 
very nervous” (INT20130715).  
That central leaders become nervous is not a small problem in China. Stability is 
one of the main concerns of the central government and so questions that can lead 
to large-scale disagreements or civil unrest in some way or form do not sit well 
with central government leaders (Teets 2013). Natural disasters are of course a 
                                           
94 In China this most often refers to an industry-affiliated lower-level university education as compared with the big 
universities in Beijing. 
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concern as they may lead not only to death and destruction, and cost the 
government dearly, but they also have the tendency to open up more public 
criticism of government handling of disaster mitigation and recovery (Sorace 
2017). The open letter may not necessarily be considered government advice per 
se, but the group of signatories on the letter got the attention of the central 
government nonetheless. The central government then asked more official 
channels to give advice on the issue raised. Zhang Boting’s organization was 
asked to address the issue:   
“So they [the central government leaders] wanted us to answer. We saidt 
is definitely not a problem, we said, these things [the reservoirs] are all 
scientifically designed” (INT20130715).  
The CSHE turned to a science argument in order to back up the claim that a 7.3 
earthquake would not be devastating to Zipingpu. “…then we had a 8.0 
earthquake. So Zipingpu proved us right” (INT20130715). The dam was soundly 
designed because it withstood an earthquake larger in magnitude than the one the 
letter was saying would be devastating for Zipingpu. 
For Yang Yong, this is an odd logic. As mentioned before, he wants there to be a 
scientific discussion – in the sense that to him it should be possible to keep to 
debating things scientific without drawing in political considerations – or 
questions of state development:  
“But the people that are being affected - or those who have their 
advantages affected - will let the case be politicized. They will say 
that you are against the development of the state, that you are 
disturbing stability. You scare them. So they make it political. When 
it is politicized it is not good for us. Because they have put this big 
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hat on your head [symbolizing a suppressed group ed.], because 
China’s main task right now is development” (INT20130604). 
This means that people such as himself, in his opinion, get labeled as groups that 
are against development – here referring to hydropower development e.g. as a 
poverty alleviation and economic development strategy. Getting this label marks 
him (and people like him) as a person advocating for viewpoints that are against 
the development of the state. In sum, he is labeled as someone who may disturb 
stability. Outspoken individuals like him or Fan Xiao may therefore be shadowed 
so as to keep an eye on their potentially subversive activities (as described in 
Chapter 1). Consequently, a purely scientific discussion is not an option in Yang 
Yong’s opinion. 
Talking about such issues as earthquakes and dams and how big earthquakes 
might be devastating for dams is frightening according to both men in the sense 
that they both understand the impacts of devastating earthquakes on dams. For 
Yang Yong the understanding comes from his experiences with earthquake 
impacts first hand through travelling in the areas (INT20130604). For Zhang 
Boting his understanding comes from experience with risk evaluation and design 
parameters for dams in earthquake prone zones (INT20130715). According to 
Yang Yong it is people who are in an advantageous position due to dam 
development (e.g. investors, contractors, state-owned companies etc.) who are 
politicizing the discussion (INT20130604). Zhang Boting thinks it is people like 
Yang Yong who are doing the politicizing with fake science, scaring people and 
hyping the green agenda, trying to stop dam building - and by extension 
development of the state and the Chinese economy (INT20130715).  
It is no wonder that many news stories have reported on the issue of earthquakes 
and dams by illustrating the disagreements through a David-Goliath type fight: 
Zhang Boting, with all his government backing, official affiliations and eye for the 
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development of China at large versus Yang Yong, the lone-ranger activist, fighting 
for the safety of ordinary people. But each cast as an expert with certain people 
listening to their arguments95, it is easy to make the claim that they are in total 
disagreement. However, in the interviews they both emphasized that China needs 
development, but it is the manner in which this development progresses that is 
perhaps at the root of their disagreement. Yang Yong is not against all dams being 
built in China, but he wants an open discussion of the safety of dams and he works 
to make sure they are built in safe areas where they do not hurt ordinary people 
(INT20130604). Zhang Boting has the same in mind, but thinks the science base is 
solid and that dams can be built where they are already planned and that this is 
safe (INT20130715).  
Perhaps drawing on foreign scientists may help bolster either viewpoint in the 
public debate?  
The credibility of foreignness 
In 2012, Probe International published a report by an anonymous geologist going 
by the name John Jackson (Jackson 2012). His report highlighted the RIS issue as 
a major risk to the continued plan to build more dams across the western parts of 
China - particularly in Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. I interviewed Jackson in 
October 2013.96 During our interview, he related to me that the basic reason he 
wished to remain anonymous was that bringing up this issue in China had earlier 
led to Yang Yong being put under house arrest for six months (INT20131001). 
Jackson didn’t want to draw attention to himself. He was asked by Yang Yong to 
write a report about RIS because, according to Jackson: 
 
                                           
95 Often divided as NGOs listening to Yang Yong and industry listening to Zhang Boting, although during my 
fieldwork I found that it was not that simple (FN201306; FN201307; INT20130709). 
96 After months of asking informants from different NGOs if they could put me in touch with him, I finally got to 
interview Jackson via Skype in October 2013. 
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“ (…) it would be really helpful if we had a report published outside of 
China, that we could get translated into Chinese and then published in 
China, because it would have more credibility if it came from a foreign 
scientist” (INT20131001).  
According to Jackson, Yang Yong thought a report written by Jackson or one of 
his colleagues would help him and Fan Xiao in their endeavor to get into dialogue 
with the Chinese authorities on the subject of the risk of earthquakes in relation to 
dams. In the end, Jackson agreed to write the report. He agreed to write it, because 
no one else would. According to Jackson, other people were asked but were not 
willing, either because they thought it was going to cause personal problems for 
them or because it was not going make any difference in terms of impact on the 
authorities. Thus, one person asked had, according to Jackson, said “… it’s a 
waste of time, the government is going to ignore it” (INT20131001). Jackson, 
however, thought that either way someone should do it: “… well maybe it will 
make a difference and it’s worth my time” (INT20131001) and being anonymous 
would then keep his person out of it (INT20131001). Earlier in the chapter we saw 
that Dr. Klose was personally affected by his public scientific statements. 
Therefore, being anonymous had the advantage that it provided some measure of 
protection from personally being affected by questions including the scientific 
quality of your work and your affiliations. 
The John Jackson report came out translated into Chinese in November 2012 
concurrent with the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping  
“… so it got lost in the noise. That was a much bigger front page issue 
than earthquakes and dams” (INT20131001).  
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Jackson also remarked that: 
“Eventually we tried to get some response from the Chinese government 
but it was totally negative, they just panned the report altogether…. they 
said our dams won’t fail. And that… we know where all the 
earthquakes… where are all the faults are… and we didn’t build our 
dams on any faults. Yeah and that’s not true at all... they don’t know 
where all the faults are because nobody does … some of them haven’t 
been active, so we won’t know where they are until they are active” 
(ibid).  
Although the report apparently did not have much impact on the Chinese 
authorities, it was often referred to in NGO circles and during interviews with 
NGO representatives during my fieldwork. Thus, the report became influential as 
a piece of work deemed independent from government interests and thus 
influential for international and national NGOs in terms of having independent 
foreign scientific backing for their arguments. The fact that Jackson was to be kept 
anonymous and the report was apparently publicly ignored only seemed to add to 
its credibility in those circles (FN201305; FN201306; FN201307).   
The story of the John Jackson report illustrates the apparent gap between the 
credibility of different organizations – here the central government or international 
NGOs – as to the source and validity of expertise. It seems that the criteria for 
determining the credibility of expertise are vastly different for the government and 
international NGOs respectively. What is at play here then? Why won’t the 
government listen and why are international NGOs so certain about trusting these 
few experts? 
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RIS as an unsuccessful anti-dam argument in China 
Chapter 3 took a tour through the development of science-politics relations in 
China over time through a description of changing leadership constellations and 
the overall policy trends towards intellectuals and scientists in the different 
leadership periods. Far from being a linear story with consistent views of science 
in the different periods, the chapter nevertheless highlighted the interesting trend 
that since the 1980s scientists and technical specialists have increasingly been 
integrated not only into the bureaucracy, but also the top leadership. Why is it then, 
that e.g. international NGOs and journalists remain skeptical about the 
government’s ability to make ‘unbiased’ decisions? Particularly, as the 
bureaucracy and the top leadership is well educated and should appreciate and 
understand the necessity of unbiased research. The inherent norm in western 
science is to strive for unbiased and independent research and not letting special 
interests or personal concerns impact on research results or research processes. In 
China, the same norm seems to be adhered to, however, the fact that the party by 
definition is above all else seems to be causing skepticism notwithstanding the 
underlying norms of science being preached by the leadership.  
This might be one of the underlying factors in the need for reports written and 
published outside China, because foreign scientists are perhaps thought of as 
adhering to these western science norms, and this lends credibility to their 
publications (INT20131001). The main point of the John Jackson report was to 
sway a Chinese audience – not an international one. Here with what we could call 
a ‘credibility of foreignness’ attached to it with all the norms and values attached 
to this idea. Thus, if coming from a foreign scientist it would by definition be 
unbiased and scientifically credible. But it didn’t work. Why? Mr. Jackson had a 
somewhat blunt way of explaining the failure:  
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“It works in America because we can vote, it doesn’t work in China” 
(INT20131001).  
The RIS argument is a good way to illustrate this point. RIS as an anti-dam 
argument, both in the form of the Jackson report, but also as pushed by Fan Xiao 
and Yang Yong in terms attempting to get into dialogue with the government to 
have a more open discussion about RIS in China. It does not seem to be catching 
on with the Chinese government in the way that Yang Yong, Fan Xiao and Mr. 
Jackson intended. Dams that are planned in earthquake prone zones are going 
ahead regardless. Furthermore, broader discussions involving e.g. NGOs or people 
like Fan Xiao or Yang Yong are not taking place in public or within the 
government bureaucracy. In the US, the RIS argument had previously worked, not 
only as an anti-dam argument, but also as an opener for dialogue with scientists 
and activists not part of the established system. According to Mr. Jackson:  
“So I was involved in the United States trying to stop several dams and 
one of them was the Auburn dam, which is near Sacramento, the capital 
of California on the Auburn river, which is one of my favorite rivers and 
nearby there’s a big dam on the Feather river and that dam caused RIS, a 
small amount of damage just to building but no damage to the dam 
when it was being filled - Oroville dam… and we used RIS, and the fact 
that it damaged a few buildings at Oroville, to convince the government 
of California not to build the Auburn dam.  It took a long, long time, 
like 20 years.  The federal government agency, Army Corps of 
Engineers, really, really wanted to build the dam - that’s their job, 
building dams - and we did everything we could figure to stop that dam, 
we talked about environmental issues, we talked about water issues, all 
kinds of things and they managed to overcome all of those concerns 
except when we finally raised the specter that if the Auburn dam failed 
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due to RIS then Sacramento would get flooded and that was enough to 
scare them but only because of Oroville and the event there. Otherwise, 
I don’t think we would have worked” (INT20131001) 
After Wenchuan, the conditions of using RIS as an anti-dam argument are more or 
less the same as in the US context. Before Wenchuan, the letter sent to the 
government, with Yang Yong, Fan Xiao and others as signatories did not have 
much effect. Perhaps because a big earthquake had not yet occurred. This could be 
similar to the Auburn dam situation where the argument did not work until RIS 
had occurred at Oroville. If Zipingpu did cause Wenchuan, RIS would then be 
proven to have caused Wenchuan. Should this not have bolstered the RIS 
argument significantly in China?  
The fact that RIS as an anti-dam argument did not work very well in China is 
perhaps not because the government is unwilling to listen, but because the 
government regards the risk of RIS in a different way. In listening to engineers, 
who it was shown ‘compartmentalize’ the risk of RIS as being outside the job of 
engineers, the government foregoes the policy option of not building dams in 
earthquake prone zones in China. This means that the risk of RIS becomes a risk 
that is contained by science and engineering. It does not matter if an earthquake is 
man-made or not, as long as dams are able to withstand them. Therefore, 
according to Zhang Boting, the discussion was concluded by Zipingpu and 
Wenchuan: “…then we had a 8.0 earthquake. So Zipingpu proved us right” 
(INT20130715).  
Summing up 
The intense debate about mass change on the surface of the earth under the 
Zipingpu dam, as discussed in Chapter 6, was an example of the way arguing 
about RIS in scientific journals went back and forth from 2008 to today. In the 
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present chapter we saw how this debate spread into mainstream media and turned 
the discussion about Zipingpu from the science towards the political consequences 
of dams triggering big earthquakes – thus intermingling with controversies over 
the political logic behind building dams in earthquake prone zones in China. 
Mixing with the scientific and public controversies were events prior to the 
Wenchuan earthquake: the history of Zipingpu (as described in Chapter 5) and 
technical bargaining over risk in major dam projects, exemplified by calculations 
of the risk of a major earthquake occurring at Zipingpu during the design of the 
dam, as analyzed in Chapter 7. Together the past four chapters make up a 
controversy study focused on whether the Zipingpu dam did, or did not, cause the 
Wenchuan earthquake. The chapters drew in perspectives from contemporary 
China studies and STS alike and showed that policy making around hydropower in 
China was not necessarily directly influenced by the scientific debate over 
Zipingpu but rather by how the scientific controversy intermingled with other 
contested issues in Chinese politics: issues of which experts to listen to and how to 
determine their credibility as well as risk calculation issues in relation to large 
construction projects. Ultimately, not much has changed with regard to China’s 
determination to expand hydropower capacity and continue building dams. 
Hydropower is still at the top of the agenda in China in terms of securing green 
energy. Ultimately, the history of hydropower development in China, and the 
history of Zipingpu in particular, suggest that hydropower policy plans are not 
easily discarded. Hydropower as an option for stable energy supply in China can 
perhaps persevere in part due to this long-term perspective - regardless of how 
much scientific debate and how many new issue frames can be coined to counter 
such plans.   
 
The present chapter showed that ideas of the impersonal ethos of science in many 
ways permeated the way experts were positioned in the public controversy over 
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Zipingpu and the debate over dam building in earthquake prone zones more 
generally. The separation of one’s person from one’s science was found important 
in relation to which experts were relied on by the Chinese government. Zhang 
Boting was one such expert whose affiliation bolstered his credibility. However, 
his insistence on mixing in what Yang Yong deemed ‘political’ issues – such as 
China’s economic development – into ‘pure’ science arguments, discredited 
Zhang Boting with the ‘non-establishment’ e.g. NGOs. On the other hand, Dr. 
Klose and Yang Yong had their persons drawn into the public debate – effectively 
tying them personally to their science. Dr. Klose unwillingly, by the way he was 
discredited in the news, Yang Yong perhaps more willingly, in the sense that his 
personal independence bolstered his credibility to the ‘non establishment’ and 
some media. One of the points of Chapter 7 was that the trust in science by 
establishment scientists – who in this chapter has been exemplified by Zhang 
Boting – is so firm that it overshadows the fact that dams can cause earthquakes in 
and of themselves. In other words, dams designed and constructed according to 
scientific methods will remain safe. Having analyzed the public debate around 
Zipingpu, this chapter in many ways supports this argument as the public 
controversy over RIS at Zipingpu even after Wenchuan has occurred – contrary to 
an outcome in the US where a dam was cancelled – did not convince the 
‘establishment scientists’, that the government primarily draw on, to reconsider 
building dams in earthquake prone areas. On the contrary, the soundness of their 
scientific dam building methods was only confirmed by Wenchuan. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis was initially motivated by the idea of studying a controversy in China 
involving emerging science in a highly politicized context. The choice settled on 
taking the controversy over the Zipingpu dam as the empirical point of entry. This 
in turn, meant that the thesis spanned two disciplines: that of contemporary China 
area studies and that of the constructivist tradition of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) - particularly controversy studies as developed within STS. Part I of 
the thesis, comprising Chapters 1 and 2, served the aim of describing how the 
thesis came about, outlining the methods employed, and positioning the two 
disciplinary traditions relative to each other. Part I thus outlined in which ways 
contemporary China studies and controversy studies in STS could contribute to 
each other conceptually. It was my contention that contemporary China studies, 
and particularly the notion of Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA), need STS 
concepts for more context sensitive analyses of the role of expertise in policy 
making. I thus argued that FA does not possess the conceptual vocabulary to 
explain the role of scientists and scientific expertise in technical disputes such as 
controversies and that drawing on STS could fill this gap. Conversely I argued that 
controversy studies in STS need contemporary China studies in order to study 
controversies in a non-democratic context such as the Chinese. This due to the fact 
that most studies in STS have taken the (‘Western’) democratic state as a given in 
their investigations of how scientific knowledge and political systems interact. 
Moreover, as China is becoming a significant player when it comes to scientific 
knowledge and technological development, I argued that the STS of tomorrow 
must be able to investigate the complex interweaving of science, technology and 
society into a non-democratic setting such as the Chinese. 
So how did conducting a controversy study in a Chinese context fare?  
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Based on the contextualization of the controversy in Part II and the analysis of the 
controversy over Zipingpu in Part III of the thesis, it can be concluded that the 
controversy study approach as developed in the constructivist STS tradition fared 
quite well in combination with contemporary China studies. How so? First, 
because the notion of a controversy study is open and flexible enough to be 
‘applied’ in a non-democratic context such as the Chinese in the sense that 
additional perspectives from contemporary China studies can be drawn into the 
analysis. Second, because the analysis of the controversy over Zipingpu has 
benefitted from drawing on concepts such as the inherent reflexivity about the 
researcher’s own role, about the fluidity of categorizations, and about how to 
approach the analysis of a scientific controversy. These have been important 
points to help open up the typical categorizations in FA to more detailed analysis 
of expertise in policy making in China.  
Chapter 6 showed how this combination worked in practice in analyzing the 
scientific debate over Zipingpu. First, the analysis highlighted a classic point in 
controversy studies, namely that often actors in a controversy are in fact not 
arguing about the same thing. In analyzing the scientific debate in detail, it was 
found that the way scientific actors argued was more related to the scientific field 
they belonged to (e.g. engineering or seismology) than where they were working 
or which country they belonged to. This effectively broke up the categorization in 
FA based on the bureaucratic logic of “where you stand depends on where you sit” 
(Allison 1971 as quoted in Brødsgaard 2013). This meant that the logic of the FA 
categorization of the CEA as a government entity belonging to the ‘establishment’ 
could not account for the way CEA scientists argued in the scientific debate. 
Drawing on STS helped open up this categorization issue in showing that 
scientists at the CEA argued both sides of the debate. However, where FA made a 
contribution to the combination with controversy studies was in the understanding 
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of bureaucratic politics in China more generally. The analysis of the scientific 
debate in Chapter 6 also showed that arguing for Zipingpu having triggered 
Wenchuan could serve the additional purpose of ‘disciplining’ hydropower 
companies into complying with CEA regulations. This point was substantiated by 
Chapters 3 and 4. These chapters accounted for the historical conditions for the 
use of scientific and expert knowledge in political decision making in China and 
particularly how these historical conditions had influenced hydropower policy 
making in China over time. When the findings from chapters 3 and 4 were drawn 
on the analysis in Chapter 6, it was shown how bureaucratic ranking could make it 
difficult for the CEA to discipline hydropower companies into complying with 
regulations set by the CEA - particularly, as these companies’ ranking most likely 
only differed slightly from the CEA’s. Thus, FA contributed to STS in the sense 
that the deeper context of bureaucratic turf-wars helped unpack the scientific 
controversy further than STS would have been able to on its own.  
Bureaucratic rank as a factor in pre-construction negotiations about earthquake 
risk at Zipingpu was examined closer in Chapter 7. Here the potential risk of a 
large natural earthquake occurring at, or near, the Zipingpu dam once built, was 
agreed on in a debate between the CEA and the Zipingpu Company. At this point 
in time the Zipingpu dam had not been built. The account of historical conditions 
leading up to the controversy over Zipingpu analyzed in Chapter 5 showed that the 
dam plan for Zipingpu was not only a project inspired by Mao, it was also 
inscribed in the high-priority central government reform program ‘the great 
western development campaign’ as one of ten key projects. In sum, the analysis of 
the historical conditions showed that Zipingpu was a project that the Chinese 
central government and Sichuan Province needed to have built. The stakes in the 
negotiation analyzed in Chapter 7 were therefore high. The analysis in this chapter 
showed that the Zipingpu Company was most likely in a favorable position to 
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influence the negotiation with the CEA so that a lower number for the ‘maximum 
possible earthquake’ than the CEA had initially suggested was settled on. 
Bureaucratic ranking was once again highlighted as a way the negotiation could 
have tipped in favor of the Zipingpu Company against the provincial branch of the 
CEA, regardless of the scientific evidence presented by seismologists on each side. 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 in different ways showed that the risk of large dams 
causing earthquakes once built was, on the part of engineers, considered a risk that 
could be contained by engineering science. Chapter 7 showed that engineers 
played a key role as experts in assessing the risk of Chinese major dam projects. 
The chapter also uncovered how engineers made what was tentatively called a 
‘compartmentalization move’ where the risk of earthquakes was divided into 
separate domains effectively dividing risk into what was the task of engineers and 
– perhaps more importantly – what was not the task of engineers. The science of 
building earthquake proof dams could then be taken care of within engineering 
science. This ‘compartmentalization move’ meant that it did not matter if an 
earthquake was man-made or not, as long as the dams built were able to withstand 
them. In this way, the risk of RIS was ‘compartmentalized’ as being outside of the 
discussion as it was not a task for engineers.  
This point was substantiated in Chapter 8, analyzing how the scientific and public 
debate around man-made earthquakes affected hydropower policy making in 
China. First, Chapter 8 showed that the strategies used by different experts to gain 
credibility and legitimacy were important for their possibility to influence 
hydropower policy making. Particularly affiliation to well reputed universities or 
research institutes and being able to publish peer-reviewed scientific output were 
important measures for getting the ear of policy makers. Thus, the analysis of the 
public debate showed that experts in the form of engineers with affiliations to the 
IWHR and the CSHE were more likely to be listened to than experts possessing 
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other kinds of knowledge. The reason being, that engineers were able to contain 
the risk of RIS within their field of expertise. Thus the analysis in Chapter 8 
showed how the ‘compartmentalization move’ on the part of engineers could be 
affecting policy making around hydropower in China. Thus, the fact that dams can 
cause earthquakes, as an anti-dam argument, did not work very well in China was 
perhaps not because the government was unwilling to listen, but because the 
government, in listening to engineers, forego the policy option of not building 
dams in earthquake prone zones in China.  
In conclusion, this study gained some ground in showing that contemporary China 
studies can benefit from the reflexive analytical vocabulary of STS found in 
controversy studies. Nevertheless, controversy studies in STS could not stand 
alone in studying an actual controversy in a Chinese context. The study of the 
controversy over Zipingpu showed that STS could not account for the deeper 
context when analyzing a scientific controversy in China. Issues such as 
bureaucratic turf-wars, the importance of specific political reforms, projects and 
persons intermingling with the scientific controversy point to the importance for 
STS – and perhaps other fields of study focusing on China – to draw more on the 
area studies scholarship contemporary China studies provides in analyzing societal 
developments and heated debates involving scientific and technical issues in 
China.  
As someone originally coming from China studies, STS has been the subtle 
wrench that has turned the way I see the world upside down. This has meant 
questioning my assumptions, embarking on fieldwork and following actors to 
places I never thought I would go. It has been an interesting, fun, frustrating and 
extremely educational ride. I would never have been able to conduct this study 
without knowing the Chinese language and many of the subtle things that come 
with it. Were someone to be inspired to conduct a controversy study on a new 
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techno-scientific controversy unfolding in China, my advice would be to start with 
the language. Learning Mandarin, as any other language, brings with it a broad 
cultural and historical understanding which is in many ways necessary to follow 
both the historical and presently unfolding conditions of controversies. Equally 
important, however, are technical and scientific languages and terminology as they 
lead into the heart of techno-scientific controversies. Thus, in studying 
controversies, cultural and scientific languages are intertwined and I find that it is 
the knowledge of them that helps untangle the ways in which controversies may 
come to shape policy decisions.  
If I were to continue down this road and do more research on techno-scientific 
controversies in China, I would particularly want to engage with the digital 
approach to mapping out controversies. A whole branch of scholarship in STS 
focuses on systematically mapping controversies online and this approach could 
be an ideal supplement to the kind of fieldwork and archival research I have 
undertaken in this study. A logical next step for me would thus be to engage with 
this digital side of controversy studies more systematically and make an effort at 
learning the skills and the language(s) required to undertake such studies. In an 
age of ‘big data’ and an increasing reliance on all things online, understanding the 
interconnections between this way of representing physical phenomena offers 
additional perspectives to fieldwork and traditional research that may open more 
avenues into understanding the way science, technology, expertise and political 
decision making are interconnected. This study showed that you cannot apply a 
controversy study framework in China without drawing in, and taking account of, 
the deeper historical and cultural context. In the same way, this kind of work lies 
ahead for a digital mapping of controversies in non-democratic contexts such as 
the Chinese where online communities are tightly regulated. 
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Today, discussions of science and expertise fill the news daily. Much in line with 
many STS inspired studies, this study has shown that the way science, politics and 
expertise co-produce in China has deep roots in the Chinese historical and cultural 
context. This knowledge, combined with the controversy study notion that actors 
are seldom in agreement as to the nature of the controversy they take part in, can 
perhaps be extended into another theme for further research. When Chinese 
leaders say that science is of utmost importance for the future of the Chinese 
society what does that mean? Does it mean the same as when our prime minister 
in Denmark, or a European Commission spokesperson, utters the same words? Or 
are they in fact talking about different things? The implications of the findings of 
the thesis on, for instance, science policy could indicate that we do well in being 
more attentive as to which scientific fields are favored in making policy decisions. 
If different disciplines have different ways of arguing, are some disciplines better 
at communicating their science in such a way that policy makers tend to favor 
these perspectives when making decisions? What does that mean for the way for 
instance our science policies, environmental policies or our energy policies are 
made nationally and internationally? And what does that in turn mean for the way 
we order our societies? 
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